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ABSTRACT
The construct of organizational culture has been used to interpret various aspects 
of organizational life, including organizational leadership and organizational change. The 
literature indicates that leaders can influence organizational change by attending to and 
modifying an organization’s cultural dimensions. Much of this literature, however, is 
theoretical and speculative, and the empirical work that does exist has focused mostly on 
business.
The purpose of this case study was to develop an understanding of how leaders in 
a combined government and military organization used the notion of culture during a 
two-and-a-half year planned change initiative. The study explored the strategies and 
mental constructs those in positions of formal authority used to make sense of and 
influence the change process. The particular focus was on identifying any culture- 
oriented change strategies leaders use to overcome resistance to change. The study also 
examined how organizational culture shaped and constrained leaders’ actions.
This study employed qualitative methods. Interviews with designated leaders of 
the planned change initiative were the primary data collection method. Document 
analysis and participant observation were used to triangulate interview data.
Several findings and conclusions emerged from the study. One of the more 
interesting findings involved the observation of resistance at the top of the organizational 
hierarchy, i.e. the level from which the change initiative had been promoted. Normally, 
resistance is conceptualized as something that occurs at the bottom rungs of an 
organizational hierarchy. In this initiative, in which middle managers were given 
considerable authority about what would be done to achieve goals mandated from the top,
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there was significant resistance coming from above as well as below. Both levels, in other 
words, were uncomfortable with the specific cultural change being implemented, and 
both levels attempted to minimize its impact.
This study should be useful to individuals who are charged with leading large- 
scale change initiatives within their organizations and to scholars who analyze and write 
about the use of culture as both a facilitating and an inhibiting factor in planned 
organizational change.
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Background to the Study 
The Emergence o f Planned Change Initiatives
The second half of the 20th and the first part of the 21st centuries have produced 
incredible change in the world of work (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002). Rapidly changing 
conditions in global and local markets, along with advances in technology, economic 
factors, government regulations and cultural forces, have prompted a significant increase 
in the rate of organizational change (Rousseu & Tijoriwala, 1999; Winum, Ryterband, & 
Stephenson, 1997; Cummings, 1995). The nature and pace of change is only expected to 
become more rapid and complex in the future (Bowman & Deal, 1997, Kotter, 1995, 
1996; Cummings, 1995; Burke, 1993). Not surprising, therefore, the topic of 
organizational change has become increasingly important in both the popular (e.g., 
Sternberg, 2002; Strebel, 1996; Kotter, 1996; Hammer, 1997; 1993) and the academic 
(e.g., Senge, 1999; Bowman & Deal, 1997; Burke, 1993) literature about organizations.
In response to the environmental factors alluded to in the previous paragraph, 
continuous planned organizational reform is occurring in both the private and public 
sectors. A major motivation in the private industry has been the need to remain 
competitive in a changing global marketplace; this translates into reducing costs and 
becoming more efficient. Downsizing, reengineering, quality management, change 
management and organizational transformation are just some of the planned, large-scale 
reform movements that corporations have tried in order to create more efficient and 
competitive organizations.
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In recent years, the public sector also has begun to focus more intently on planned 
organizational change. A dissatisfied public that views government as increasing 
spending and decreasing service delivery has prompted change and reform in this sector 
of organizational life. In their 1992 book, Reinventing Government, for example, Osborne 
and Gaebler recommend that the sorts of change initiatives being undertaken by private 
industry also be adopted in the public sector. Supporting Osborne and Gaebler’s view, 
Hughes (2000) points to the fact that growing discontent with overgrown bureaucracy, 
antiquated service systems, and out of control spending has led both private citizens and 
public officials to point to the need for government reformation.
The movement to reform and “reinvent” government has been embraced recently 
by President George W. Bush and previously by the Clinton and Gore administration in 
1993. For example, when Clinton and Gore took office, their administration initiated the 
National Performance Review (NPR), an intensive six-month study of the entire federal 
government that focused on ways to reduce costs and improve services. In the remarks 
announcing the NPR, President Clinton stated, “Our goal is to make the entire federal 
government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our 
national bureaucracy” (Gore, 1993, p. 460). This sentiment received broad bi-partisan 
support, as evidenced by congressional enactment of the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) in 1993.
The Failure o f Planned Change Initiatives
Since the early 1990s, the NPR and GPRA have promoted formal public sector 
reform and improvement efforts at rapidly increasing rates. Interestingly, all of this has 
occurred even though the track record of formal reform initiatives in the private sector 
has been less than positive. In 1994 alone, for example, an estimated $30 billion was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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spent on change-oriented personnel, consulting services and technology investments by 
U.S. corporations (Winum, Ryterband & Stephenson, 1997), yet the literature suggests 
that most large scale reform efforts in the private sector fail (Senge, 1999; Schein 1993; 
Kotter, 1996; Strebel, 1996; Somerville & Mroz, 1999, p. 75; Hammer & Champy,
1993). There is less literature about the fate of change initiatives in the public sector, but 
the literature that does exist about public sector reform essentially mirrors the less-than- 
positive picture that researchers have presented about private sector change initiatives 
(Hughes, 2000; Winum, Ryterband & Stephenson, 1997; Champy, 1997; Gore, 1993).
As a result of this bleak organizational change track record, there has been an 
increased interest among academicians and practitioners in exploring why change efforts 
fail. Although a number of factors undermine planned change efforts, resistance to 
change consistently surfaces as among the most significant (Oreg, 2003; Trice & Beyer, 
1993; Kotter, 1996; Senge 1990; 1999; Agocs, 1997).
Much of the recent literature on resistance has focused on individuals’ response to 
change (Oreg, 2003; Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002; & Strebel, 1996). Trice & Beyer 
(1993), however, note that resistance to change does not only take place at an individual 
level; it also occurs at a group and organizational level. The authors suggest that any of 
these levels may be impacted during change efforts.
Utilizing the Construct o f Organizational Culture to Account fo r  Resistance to Change
In recent years, organizational theorists have turned to the construct of 
organizational culture as a way to help understand and explain factors surrounding 
organizational change and resistance at the macro/organizational level (Bowman & Deal, 
1997; Schein, 1993; Trice & Beyer, 1993). Some theorists have addressed the impact that 
culture inevitably has on planned change efforts. These theorists recognize that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
concept of organizational culture serves as a helpful construct for understanding the 
success or failure of change initiatives (Detert, et. al., 2000). As Burke (1993) contends, 
large-scale system change has been explored before, but we are now beginning to 
understand that organizational culture serves as a primary lever for initiating and 
implementing organizational change. In other words, the way an organization’s 
employees act and respond to change can be linked to its culture (Galpin, 1996).
Edgar Schein (1992) has made the linkage between organizational culture and 
organizational resistance even more explicit: “Organizational learning, development, and 
planned change cannot be understood without considering culture as a primary source of 
resistance to change” (p. xiv), Schein writes. He adds, “resistance to learning and change 
is a ubiquitous phenomenon often talked about but seldom understood”.
Somerville & Mroz (2000) also support this link between organizational culture 
and resistance to change. They suggest that even when leaders have understood the need 
for change and put in place a well-thought-out program (e.g., organizational 
restructuring, or process reengineering), “the organization and its culture usually thwart 
progress” (p. 75). Similarly, Detert, Schroeder & Mauriel (2000), point to changing the 
culture as the one common denominator that led previous quality and change 
improvement efforts to fail. The authors suggest that most organizations had a ‘flavor of 
the month’ concept of change but unsuccessfully addressed the environment in which the 
organization tried to make the change. Like Schein (1992), they imply that most 
organizational change initiatives typically require some change in the culture. Galpin 
(1996) also argues that effective change requires changes in operations, systems, and 
procedures so that they are clearly aligned to the changed culture that is emerging from— 
and will be required to support—the changes that are being made.
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Resistance, Organizational Culture and Leadership
Thus, there is a virtual consensus that failure to change the culture of an 
organization is one of the main reasons why most change initiatives fall short of reaching 
their goal (p. 84). This focus on the need to change culture has also led to an emphasis, 
especially in the organizational culture literature (see, for example, Bowman & Deal, 
1997; Schein, 1992; Hofstede, 1991; Peters & Waterman, 1982), on the importance of 
leadership and the relationship between leadership and culture. Schein (1992), for 
example, contends that if leaders are to successfully overcome organizational change 
resistance, they must first understand the dynamics of culture (p.2). “Neither culture nor 
leadership, when examined closely, can really be understood by itself,” states Schein. He 
also suggests that that a distinguishing characteristic between leaders and managers is the 
ability to create and change culture. The leader’s ability to create, manage and destroy 
culture is one of the primary reasons that “leadership and culture are conceptually 
intertwined” (p. 370).
Schein (1992) argues that effective leaders manipulate culture to create and 
manage change in the organization. According to Schein, culture is created, developed 
and destroyed by those in formal authority positions. He suggests that developing one’s 
culture to be adaptive to organizational change is the “essence and ultimate challenge of 
leadership” (p. 2).
Kotter (1996) also supports the notion that leaders play a critical role in the 
change process. He argues that successful change is a result of a leader-driven process 
that creates motivation sufficient to overwhelm sources of resistance and change in 
culture. Kotter believes that leadership involves a set of processes that initially creates 
organizations or adapts them to a significantly changing environment (p. 25). He
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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indicates that the term culture refers to “norms of behavior and shared values among a 
group of people that persist over time.” When new practices are created as a result of a 
transformation effort that are not compatible with the relevant cultures, they will almost 
always be subject to regression and resistance (p. 148). Therefore, understanding an 
organization’s ability and readiness for change, and knowing how to overcome 
resistance, is a key function of leadership (see, also, Rosen, 1997).
Some have argued that the thinking of scholars such as Schein and Kotter 
represents an overly simplistic view of the relationship between culture and leadership 
(Detert, Schroeder, & Mauriel, 2000; Senge, 1990; and Cummings, 1995). In fact, 
organizations are highly complex systems and this complexity suggests that the 
relationship between individuals’ actions and their organizations’ cultures would not 
normally be linear (Katz & Kahn, 1966). Sternberg (2002), for example, provides a 
theory of organizational “modifiability” as another way to think about how leaders 
affect—and may not be able to affect—organizational change. Sternberg suggests that 
organizations differ in their capacity to change. Organization interventions may succeed 
or fail, based not only on what leaders do or do not do, but also on pre-existing levels of 
resistance in an organization and the organization’s level of modifiability.
Statement of the Problem
There is a growing consensus within the literature about the relationship among 
organizational culture, understanding (and overcoming) resistance to change, and 
leadership. There is disagreement, however, about how these factors are related to each 
other. One reason for this confusion is the lack of empirical studies that specifically focus 
on how leaders use the culture construct to minimize resistance during formal change 
efforts. There are certainly many studies about the change process (e.g., Levesque,
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Prochaska, & Prochaska, 1999; Cummings, 1995; Burke, 1993; Hammer, 1997; Champy, 
1997; & Kotter, 1996); there are many discussions about the phenomenon of resistance, 
some of which are grounded empirically (e.g., Oreg, 2003; Linstead, 1997; & Agocs, 
1997); there is a growing literature on the topics of organizational culture (e.g., Detert, 
Schroeder, & Mauriel; 2000; Schein, 1993; 1992; Galpin, 1996; Hofstede, 1991) and 
leadership (e.g.. Schein, 1999; 1993; Heifetz, 1994; Bums, 1978) and some arm chair 
theorizing and “how-to” manuals that try to link the two topics (Freedman, 1997,
Champy, 1997, Galpin, 1996). But an extensive literature search revealed virtually no 
specific studies that focused directly on how leaders use culture to minimize resistance 
during planned change initiatives. Furthermore, no literature was found that focused on 
leaders’ use of culture within governmental and military organizations.
In addition, the majority of empirical research that has focused on large-scale, 
planned, organizational change has relied on quantitative studies that have used surveys 
to gather data (Oreg, 2003). After multiple searches of a number of different electronic 
databases using a number of key terms, very few studies were found that have 
qualitatively investigated change resistance using the construct of organizational culture 
in public industry.1 Thus, there is a need to understand, from a qualitative perspective, 
leaders’ perceptions of how organizational culture influences change resistance in 
planned change efforts. There is also a need to examine this phenomenon particularly in 
public sector organizations.
1 Literature review searches were performed on the terms: “Change, Resistance, Culture,
Government, Public Sector, etc.” using psycARTICLES®, ERIC and Dissertation Abstracts ® (the 
Dissertation Abstract search was based on a 426 record search conducted on 10-25-03).
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The Purpose of the Study
This study begins to respond to the issues raised in the previous section. It will 
explore leaders’ use of the construct of culture to anticipate and respond to resistance 
during a planned change initiative. The study also examined how these leaders’ actions 
were shaped and constrained by the culture that already existed within the organization in 
which the planned initiatives occurred. In particular, the study explored the mental 
constructs leaders (i.e., individuals in positions of formal authority) used to make sense of 
and influence the organization’s culture in order to promote the change initiative and 
minimize resistance to it.
This study was conducted in an organization located in the under-researched 
public sector. More specifically, the research was done in a setting that is a combined 
government and military organization. This sort of setting—with elements of the 
government’s civil service rules and regulations (and the worker protection such rules 
and regulations provide) and the military with its emphasis on hierarchical control— 
provided a robust environment for an empirically based study geared toward expanding 
our knowledge of the cultural dimension of organizational behavior and examining how 
leaders used the construct of culture to manage a large-scale change effort and minimize 
resistance to change.
Research Questions
During the course of this investigation, the following questions guided the study:
1. In what ways, if any, do the designated leaders of a large-scale planned change 
initiative use the construct of culture—either consciously or unconsciously—in 
thinking about and promoting change and, especially, in attempting to anticipate and 
respond to resistance to change.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
■ What do designated leaders say about the role they played in a large-scale planned 
change initiative within a military and government-staffed organization?
■ What culture-embedding mechanisms (e.g., language, mental schemas) and 
change strategies do designated leaders indicate they used to shape the 
organization culture in general and resistance in particular during the change 
process; to what extent do they themselves characterize these mechanisms and 
strategies in cultural terms?
■ How are these mechanisms and strategies similar to, or different from, the various 
organizational culture and resistance constructs discussed in the literature?
2. How does the existing culture appear to shape and constrain what leaders do to
promote change and minimize resistance during a large-scale change effort?
Methodology
The research for this dissertation involved a qualitative single-case study of 
leadership perceptions of organizational change resistance at a large combined military 
and government organization. This organization was selected not only because of the 
dynamic change occurring in military and government organizations in general, but also 
because it was a rich environment to study due to the changes that were occurring in this 
particular organization.
A qualitative research approach was used to study the perceptions of leaders who 
have experienced planned organizational change (Spradley, 1979). This study was a 
continuation and expansion of preliminary fieldwork and analysis conducted in prior 
study to add to the field’s understanding of organizational change resistance. My prior 
role as a change management consultant within the organization studied helped me gain 
access to the organization in which the research was conducted.
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For this study, I purposely selected six participants from a government/military 
organization that had recently experienced a planned change effort. To counteract any 
sampling bias that might have been associated with my selection of the six interviewees, 
these interviewees were asked to identify anyone in the organization familiar with the 
planned change effort that sees the effort substantially differently than they do. This 
procedure resulted in two additional participants for the study for a total of eight 
individuals.
Data were collected primarily through interviews. The questions in the 
dissertation study interview guide were open-ended. The interview guide included 
follow-up probes that could be used to encourage interviewees to expand initial 
responses. To supplement the Interview Guide, two timeline analysis tools were used.
The first timeline, the Life Timeline Analysis (LTA), represented the participant’s life. 
The second timeline, the Functionality Assessment Timeline Analysis (FATA), was 
similar to the LTA but offered a tool for participants to reflect on events and dates that 
stood out about the FA change initiative. Although interviewing was the major source of 
data in this study, other data sources were used to triangulate interview findings. 
Documents related to the FA initiative were gathered, for instance. Additionally, notes I 
took in my consultant role in this organization were also used for triangulation purposes.
Each interview was audio taped and the tape was transcribed for data analysis. To 
ensure accuracy, participants were asked via email to review transcripts and provide 
changes or clarifications. During the individual case analysis, I relied on the research 
questions and the data themselves and the themes that emerged from these data to guide 
the purpose of this inquiry. After the individual cases were analyzed, I looked for patterns 
across the codes and categories of each of the eight cases. Once again, codes derived
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11
from the interview questions were used to organize the analysis initially; then the more 
emergent codes associated with each of the initial codes were compared and contrasted 
across the eight cases. Matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1984) were used during this part 
of the analysis process. To analyze and interpret the data, I used the process of analysis 
o f narrative as discussed by Polkinghome (1995).
A case study approach was used to organize and describe an analysis o f narrative 
form of each participant’s experience in the organizational change projects. Initially, I 
examined the experiences of each of these eight leaders individually as a case and utilized 
traditional case analysis procedures to organize and analyze my data. Later, an approach 
similar to a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) approach was used to analyze 
findings across of individual experiences (Patton, 2002).
Significance of the Study
This study will begin to provide an empirical basis for assessing leadership’s role 
in change resistance from an organizational culture perspective. For those engaged in 
such relationships, the research should help identify reasonable and realistic strategies 
and expectations. Organizational leaders should also have more of a basis than they 
currently have for approaching organizational change initiatives of a similar nature. More 
specifically, I hope to add to the literature that to date has given little attention to 
qualitative, change resistance studies in public industry. Through this research, I expect 
to further understand the strategies that leaders employ to manage change resistance and 
build acceptance. Additionally, it is my aim to illuminate some of the systemic issues and 
factors associated with organizational culture and change resistance. Finally, this research 
will attempt to provide a new way of thinking about the role of leadership in public 
industry in a dynamic world of increasing change.
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Limitations
This study sought to examine leaders’ responses about their lived experience 
related to organizational change resistance. Some will be concerned that this study 
initially focused on the experiences of six individuals in a large-scale change initiative in 
one government/military organization. A few may be concerned that the organization’s 
hierarchy is unique to the Community Support Services organization under study and not 
representative of other organizations. The fact that this study seeks to examine 
participant’s views of the FA change effort “post-facto”, that is, after its been conducted, 
may also give rise to concern. Additionally, others will be apprehensive that the study 
employed a qualitative approach. Finally, some may see the fact that the principal 
investigator previously served as a consultant on this project with the organization as a 
considerable limitation.
External Validity
While I acknowledge the potential legitimacy of the concerns expressed above, I 
would like to raise the following points: Although there is concern that social 
phenomenon has only limited application, the notion of generalizability and 
transferability in the study of an individual case study is applicable. As Donmoyer (1990) 
reminds us, the researcher is interested in individuals and not aggregates. More 
specifically, Donmoyer states, “it no longer makes sense to think of generalizability as 
synonymous with the use of large samples and statistical procedures designed to insure 
that the large samples accurately represent the population” (p. 181). The experience that 
one has in one situation, whether considered unique or typical, offers a basis to develop 
questions or, as Donmoyer describes, a “working hypothesis” to form questions to inform 
and apply those hypotheses to the new situation or experience as appropriate (p. 187).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
The advantages of the case study is gained through at least three characteristics including, 
(a) the ability to provide access to places or experiences otherwise not accessible, (b) 
providing a perspective from the researcher’s view that might not otherwise be 
considered or seen, and finally, (c) increasing the others’ openness to learning through a 
vicarious situation—i.e., the FA change initiative.
In the case of this proposed research study, these all, to some degree, apply. 
Additionally, the case can be made that through qualitative methodology and systematic 
rigor, external validity can be strengthened. The notion that the research will only focus 
on one government/military organization with a unique hierarchical structure does not 
limit the meaning and findings that emerge from this research study. Again, the focus is 
more on the depth and quality of research and the characteristics associated with the 
organization that may generate additional hypotheses, inspire new change resistance 
language, and introduce novel working schemas helpful when applied to organizations 
other than the one studied.
Internal Validity
The second point addresses the notion of internal validity. The fact that good 
qualitative data depends on the methodological skill, sensitivity, and integrity of the 
researcher is important to all qualitative research (Patton, 2002; p. 5). No research can 
provide complete internal validity. Qualitative inquiry methods, however, can provide 
opportunities for researchers to achieve empathic neutrality and provide an empirical 
basis for describing the perspectives of others (Patton, 2002; p. 53). Additionally, the role 
of observer-as-participant is well established in sociological literature. In qualitative 
research, the researcher is the primary instrument of inquiry for data collection and 
analysis (Merriam, 1998; p. 7; Patton, p. 14). However, there are costs associated with
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this approach, the researcher has already played the role of outside observer and 
consultant in the past with this same organizational unit, thus minimizing the potential for 
undue hardships.
Peshkin (1988) asserts that subjectivity is inevitable when conducting qualitative 
research. My previous role as a consultant to the organization studied could lead some to 
have concerns with subjectivity in this study since I served as the primary data collection 
instrument. Additionally, this may lead to other concerns associated with doing backyard 
research since I worked with an organization with which I was familiar. Glesne (1999) 
defines backyard research as studying one’s own institution or organization. While my 
own consulting organization was not the focus of my research, concerns around this 
limitation may lead to critique of how I conducted qualitative research and analyzed data 
and findings. Concerning the issue of subjectivity, I carefully monitored others and 
myself throughout the process to maintain awareness of these potential problems. I used 
my research journal throughout the study to vigilantly monitor my thoughts and 
document all concerns that arose related to backyard research considerations, and 
structured my data collection and analysis steps to try to minimize possible effects. 
Finally, I used “triangulation of data sources and analytical perspectives” to increase the 
accuracy and credibility of findings (Patton, 2002; p. 93). According to Patton, every 
method, to some extent has limitations, therefore multiple methods are typically 
required (p. 247).
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Organization of the Dissertation
This first chapter provided the background to the dissertation. It discussed the 
statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, and the importance of studying 
culture and change resistance. In addition, the research questions were articulated.
Finally, the significance and limitations of the dissertation were discussed. The second 
chapter reviews the relevant literature in the field of organization change, resistance, 
culture, and leadership, which laid the foundation for the study and informed the 
research. The third chapter outlines in detail the methodological procedures that guided 
the research process for this study. The fourth chapter presents the findings of the 
dissertation through a narrative analysis framework and borrowing loosely from a case 
approach. Finally, the fifth chapter summarizes the dissertation, provides succinct 
answers to the research questions, presents some methodological reflections, and reviews 
recommendations for practice as well as recommendations for future inquiry.
Summary
This chapter provided an introduction to the study about leaders’ use of the 
construct of culture to anticipate and respond to resistance during a planned change 
initiative. The chapter began with a background to the study. The emergence of planned 
organizational change and the constructs of organizational culture, resistance, and 
leadership in the literature were discussed.
Next, a statement of the problem was provided and suggested that there is 
disagreement in the literature among how the constructs of organizational culture, 
resistance, and leadership relate to one another. The study’s purpose and specific research 
questions were also presented. The particular focus was on identifying (a) any culture-
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oriented change strategies leaders use to overcome resistance to change and (b) specific 
ways in which the organizational culture shapes and constrains leaders’ actions.
The study’s methodology was introduced. Specifically, I discussed how 
qualitative methods was used to collect and analyze data, primarily through interviews, in 
a combined government and military organization. The significance of the study was then 
presented. The study proposed to provide an empirical basis for assessing leadership’s 
role in change resistance from an organizational culture perspective. External and internal 
validity concerns were discussed in the limitations section of the chapter. Finally, the 
organization of the dissertation was reviewed.
The next Chapter, the Literature Review, provides a brief review of the literature 
important to the study of organizational culture construct and its relationship to 
leadership and change. Specifically, the next section will present the recent history of 
private and public sector change; the factors surrounding organizational change 
resistance; the development of the organizational culture construct; and the role of 
leadership in influencing, shaping and changing culture.




This chapter is designed to orient the reader toward the topic of the study and, in 
the process, help to situate the dissertation within a larger intellectual context. This 
chapter will focus on four broad topics that appear to be relevant to the study conducted. 
These topics are: (a) the recent history of private and public sector change; (b) the factors 
surrounding organizational change resistance; (c) the development of the organizational 
culture construct; and (d) the role of leadership in influencing, shaping and changing 
culture.
The Recent History of Private and Public Sector Change 
The opening section to the literature review explores the recent organizational 
change movement in both the private and public sector. The first section briefly discusses 
what the literature says about (a) the origins and nature of organizational change, (b) 
organizational change in the private sector, and (c) the recent history of organizational 
change in the public sector, particularly the movement to “reinvent” government.
The Origins and Nature o f Organizational Change
The first part of section one will briefly discuss what the literature says about the 
origins, nature, and evolution of organizational change. Essentially, this discussion 
expands the discussion found in the “Background to the Study” section of Chapter 1.
An historical perspective. The early growth and advancement of organizational 
change theory and practice is often linked to the organizational development (OD) 
movement (Shafritz & Ott, 2001, p. 147; Goodstein & Burke, (1991). OD has its roots in 
scientific management dating back to the 1930s and the work of Fredrick Taylor. One of 
the best-known historical studies influenced by Taylor’s notion of scientific management
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is the so-called “Hawthorne Experiments.” The purpose of the experiments—which were 
conducted by the Elton Mayo team at the Hawthorne (Mayo, 1933) plant of the Western 
Electric Company beginning in 1927—was to find out if the relationship between quality 
and quantity of illumination influenced the efficiency of industrial workers.
The results indicated that, regardless of the differences in illumination at the plant, 
employee productivity improved. This improvement was later attributed to the increased 
attention that industrial workers received during the study (Roethlisberger, 1941). This 
focus on the human dimension of organizations and the so-called “Hawthorne effect” set 
the stage for advancing behavioral science, the change theory and the OD movement.
OD is defined as planned, organization-wide, managed change (Vamey, 1996; 
Worren, et. al, 1999). OD uses intentional interventions to target organizational processes 
using behavioral science knowledge. Four core elements are associated with this strategy. 
These elements are: (a) planned interventions targeted at increasing organizational 
effectiveness, (b) heavy reliance on concepts and research from behavior sciences, (c) 
long-term and continuous effort, and (d) focused practice utilizing human relations 
variables (Worren, et al., 1999; French & Bell, 1990; Vamey, 1996;).
The notion of large-scale, planned organizational change became popular during 
the 40’s, 50’s, & 60’s through “National Training Laboratories” also known as 
“reinvention labs.” As noted by Schein (1993), “the fundamental assumptions underlying 
any change in a human system are derived originally from Kurt Lewin” (p. 298). Lewin 
(1951) identified various stages of organizational change. His three stages of change 
include unfreezing, moving or changing, and then freezing again. Lewin’s change model 
also focused on three levels within the organization: the individual, the interpersonal, and 
structures and systems.
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Lewin’s concepts remain relevant today. The notion that change occurs in stages 
and that various levels must be examined when studying the change process have been 
utilized in this study.
Recent developments. In recent years, organizational development work, 
especially work inspired by the NTL, frequently focused more on Lewin’s individual and 
interpersonal levels and ignored the importance of systems. Consequently, the notion of 
change management has tended to be used by those who manage and study 
organizational change concepts. Although the definitions of terms like OD and change 
management can vary—i.e., different individuals can use the same terms in somewhat 
different ways—the concept of change management normally implies a more 
comprehensive and systematic approach to organizational change, an approach focused 
on multiple systems and the interaction of these systems, while contemporary talk of 
organizational development tends to emphasize the individual and interpersonal aspects 
of organizational life and organizational change. Change management, in fact, has been 
defined as “a wide range of intervention strategies that may enhance human performance 
directly or indirectly” (Worren et al., 1999). Change management, in other words, covers 
a broad perspective that includes individual change as part of a larger strategic, enterprise 
transformation.
A key aspect of change management is the idea that the notion of organizational 
development, at least as it has come to be used, is only one component of a large 
organizational change effort. Other elements are strategy, processes, and technology; the 
primary objective being to integrate these components. Worren et al. (1999) support the 
notion that change management is broader than OD since it includes a wide range of 
interventions and approaches that cross over most organizational systems. One of the
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characteristics of change management that differentiates it from OD is that change 
management consultants work in teams, often with specialties in areas of strategy, IT, 
process analysis and organizational design.
In other respects, however, the change management concept seems to channel 
much of Lewin’s original thinking as well as the Hawthome experiments that gave rise to 
the OD movement. In an article published in Booz Allen Hamiliton’s Strategy + Business 
Magazine, Jones, Staub & Powers (2004) identify “10 Principles of Change 
Management.” In the process of discussing their ten principles, the authors highlight the 
need to systematically address the “human side” of change, while working from the top 
of the organization down through every layer, and assessing the cultural landscape along 
the way (p. 4).
Other practitioners and researchers, including Senge (1999,1990), Argyris 
(Argyris & Schon, 1974), and Schein (1999, 1993), have contributed significantly to the 
field of change management. Collectively they seem to suggest that the notion of change 
management has the potential to integrate other planned change strategies including 
contemporary interpretations of the OD approach as well as other strategies alluded to in 
Chapter 1 (Shafritz & Ott, 2001).
Organizational Change in the Private Sector
During the past few decades the private sector has focused on major reform 
efforts during the past few decades (Hughes, 2000; Kotter, 1996; Hammer & Champy, 
1993) in large part because of the perceived need to remain competitive in a changing 
global marketplace that has forced organizations to look for ways to reduce costs by 
becoming more efficient (Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002, Rousseu & Tijoriwala, 1999; 
Winum, Ryterband, & Stephenson, 1997, Cummings, 1995). Indeed, even before the
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concept of change management became part of the nomenclature in the 1990s, a range of 
strategies began to be promoted as a way to structure and manage the change process. As 
noted in Chapter 1, these strategies included downsizing, reengineering, quality 
management, and, of course, organizational development. At times, many or all of these 
concepts have been subsumed under the change management concept, and are viewed as 
a kind of smorgasbord of strategies for engaging an organization in a systematic change 
process (Sternberg, 2002; Vamey, 1996; Burke, 1993).
During the 1990s, the impetus for change brought on by global competition was 
especially strong. During that time, the ideas of three theorists—Hammer (1993),
Champy (1997), and Kotter (1996)—became quite influential in the private sector. This 
portion of the review will focus on their ideas.
Michael Hammer is linked to the creation of the business process reengineering 
(BPR) movement (Champy, 1997). He later joined with Champy to more fully develop 
this concept. Hammer and Champy (1993) define BPR, which was developed from the 
disciplines of operations research and industrial engineering, as “the fundamental 
rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements 
in critical, contemporary measures of performance such as cost, quality, service and 
speed” (p. 19).
In many respects, BPR could be seen as a form of change management (which, in 
turn, could be seen as harking back to the original concept of OD inspired by Kurt 
Lewin). Hammer’s unique contribution, however, is BPR’s focus on orienting business 
improvement around customers’ needs and maximizing customer satisfaction. Champy 
(1993) added a concern with articulating a clearly defined organizational change process 
(sequence of events) and organizational structure that are needed to help transform the
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organization. Champy (1997) also states that major organizational change programs must 
be top-down, vision-driven, and require broader participation in the design and 
implementation stages.
BPR also emphasizes that a business’ senior management team members must be 
in agreement about the desired direction of change. More specifically, the emphasis is on 
agreement about three things: the business case for change, the scope and scale of the 
change, and a process for managing the change. Despite this emphasis on process—and 
the fact that process is part of the label they use to characterize their strategy—Hammer 
and Champy make clear that BPR requires that organizational change always be focused 
on the outcome and the customer instead of the mechanism or events. Stated another way, 
organizational change should be results-oriented rather activities-oriented.
Unfortunately, the results of BPR—and other change strategies employed during 
the 1980s and 1990s were often less positive than anticipated (Hughes, 2000; Champy, 
1997; Kotter, 1996; Hammer & Champy, 1993). Another influential change theorist 
during the 1990s, John Kotter, helps us understand why this occured. In the summer of 
1994, Kotter wrote the article “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail.” The 
widely-cited article is based on Kotter’s experience with several organizations using 
change initiatives to institute organizational transformation. Kotter’s (1996) follow-up 
book, Leading Change, documents the problems of change and links leadership to 
successful organizational transformation.
Kotter (1996) identifies eight reasons why many change improvement initiatives 
have been disappointing and ineffective. These include: (a) allowing too much 
complacency; (b) failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition; (c) 
underestimating the power of vision; (d) under-communicating the vision by a factor of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
10; (e) permitting obstacles to block the new vision; (f) failing to create short-term wins; 
(g) declaring victory too soon; (h) neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the corporate 
culture.
Of the eight primary errors that he cites as reasons for failure, nearly all pertain to 
how the functions of leadership effectively guide organizational change (p. 21). For 
instance, Kotter establishes that having a sense of urgency is not enough, and in fact, 
having a strong, clear vision is the most important aspect of any successful change. He 
argues that one of the primary reasons that change fails, is that power of the vision is 
underestimated and under communicated.
The Recent History o f Public Sector Organizational Change: The Effort to Reinvent 
Government
While the contributions of Hammer, Champy and Kotter have focused almost 
exclusively on the private sector, this dissertation has focused on a very different sort of 
organization, i.e., that is a sort of hybrid of the public and private sector. This part of the 
review, will focus on literature about organizations that have not generally been 
addressed by Hammer, Champy, or Kotter. Although the differences between private and 
the public sector are great, there are many similarities that merit consideration and further 
exploration.
It must be noted that there is no literature about the sort of hybrid organization 
that was studied for this dissertation. Furthermore, until recently, there has been 
surprisingly little in the literature to help us understand the change process in public 
organizations until recently.
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The one possible exception to this is the area of educational change (see, for 
example, Fullan 1993; Miles & Hubberman 1984; Sarason, 1996). The theoretical 
literature on school change, however, tends to be derivative of work in business (see, for 
example, the work on adapting the total quality management concept to schools (Fullan 
2000 & Sarason, 1996), while the more empirical work on school change describes a 
context which is radically different from the quasi-military organization that was the 
focal point for this study. Consequently the education change literature will not be 
reviewed here. Rather, the focus will be on literature about attempts to adapt some of the 
change management strategies discussed above to public organizations other than 
schools.
One of these attempts at adaptation was the recent effort to reinvent government. 
In the last part of section one I will briefly discuss Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) book 
Reinventing Government and the contributions it has made to changing the public sector, 
as well as Hughes (2000) and Holman’s (1993) account of the impact of Osborne and 
Gaebler’s reinventing government notion. (The reader may also wish to reread the 
sections pertaining to organizational change in the public sector included in the 
“Background-to-the-Study section” of Chapter 1.)
Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) book Reinventing Government sparked a new focus 
in organizational reform in the public sector. The authors’ premise is that government 
must redefine itself and adapt to the times. The notion of bureaucracy has long been 
synonymous with government. Although the term bureaucracy had a positive meaning 
when it was originally introduced and connoted “a rational, efficient method of 
organization,” the meaning of the term has a decidedly negative valance today, at least 
among the public. Osborne and Gaebler state that “people in government are not the
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problem, the system is” (p. 8). Put differently, the current bureaucratic state of 
government is no longer effective or viable. Even as they advocate looking to the private 
sector for models of reform, however, Osborne and Gaebler also emphasize that the 
government sector is not the same as private business and, hence, cannot simply mimic 
private business practices.
The authors suggest “ten principles of new government” that can serve as a guide 
to changing the existing state of government practices (and that are quite reminiscent of 
the principles associated with BPR). These are as follows: (a) promote competition 
between service providers; (b) empower citizens in the community; (c) measure 
performance by outcome; (d) be driven by goals or missions; (e) see your clients as 
customers; (f) prevent problems before they emerge; (g) encourage people to both earn 
and save money; (h) decentralize and encourage participatory management; (i) use 
market mechanisms; and (j) catalyze all sectors (i.e., public, private and voluntary) into 
action. These ideas promote two central ideas—government accountability and 
entrepreneurial action. In their final chapter entitled, “Putting It All Together”, Osborne 
and Gaebler suggest the need for a new framework to understand and change 
government.
Other authors have reviewed Osbom and Gaebler’s seminal work as well. Hughes 
(2000), for example, argues that the last two decades have been marked by significant 
organizational reform in the public, as well as the private sector. He credits Osborne & 
Gaebler’s work, Reinventing Government, with being the “driving spirit behind these 
reforms” (p. 256). Hughes makes the case that the workplace is in transition as a result of 
a competitive and changing marketplace. Discontent within the public sector has sparked 
a need for radical reform and change in the way government and the public sector
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operates. Hughes, however, does caution against unnecessary pain caused from 
reengineering and suggests ways to honor the “psychological contract”—a term initially 
coined by Levinson to refer to an implicit set of expectations between employer and 
employee that implied lifetime employment in exchange for loyalty and hard work (p. 
257). He notes for example, that after a restructuring effort “leaders (should) strive to 
define and clearly communicate to employees the new organizational objectives as well 
as individual job requirements” (p. 267).
Holman (1993) also reflected on Osbom & Gaebler’s thesis. Holman agrees that 
government cannot be run the same as private businesses because they have different 
motivations, goals and missions. A somewhat different philosophical orientation and 
different organizational structures, however, do not mean that government cannot be 
more entrepreneurial, according to Holman. Holman (1993), in fact, states, “hierarchical, 
centralized and bureaucratized governments, designed and developed during the 
industrial era, do not work well in the rapidly-changing, information-based, knowledge- 
rich 1990s” (p. 26). Both Holman and Hughes seem to agree that while Osborne and 
Gaebler’s work has sparked a movement in the public sector for business reform, more 
work is needed to advance the cause.
The Literature on Resistance to Change 
The literature about resistance to change is voluminous. To bring some order to 
this abundance of literature, I will organize this discussion around two general 
perspectives used to study resistance, and then summarize literature related to each 
perspective.
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The Two General Perspectives Used to Study Resistance
One perspective that has been used to study resistance could be labeled the 
organizational perspective. From this perspective, resistance is seen as a sociological 
phenomenon and as a response to the structural dimensions of an organization. The 
second perspective, which can be labeled the individual perspective, views resistance 
more psychologically than sociologically, and analyzes resistance from a 
phenomenological rather than a structural perspective. As its label implies, this 
perspective attempts to make sense of change resistance at the individual, or worker, 
level and employs an emic or “insider” point of view. Work that is classified from this 
perspective can display considerable variation.
Examples o f Work Influenced by the Organizational Perspective
Certainly one of the most highly influential theories within the organizational 
perspective is the systems theory. The notion of systems, in fact, has been a key concept 
used in understanding organizational change in general, and resistance to change, in 
particular. Katz and Kahn (1966) define systems theory as basically “concerned with 
problems of relationships, of structures, and of interdependence, rather than with the 
constant attributes of object.” They suggest that one important aspect of organizations is 
the need for both growth and conservation (i.e., maintaining enough of a steady state or 
“status quo” to keep an organization stable enough to be functional). One example of 
maintaining a steady state is the way the human body maintains a constant temperature of 
98.6 degrees despite changes in the external environment. The authors describe this 
conservation process as dynamic homeostasis. Katz and Kahn argue that organizations 
also must experience homeostasis in order to stay healthy.
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Open systems are analogous to biological organisms in the sense that they interact 
and import energy from the environment and transform imported energy into some 
product. Open systems share several common characteristics that influence their ability to 
change, one of which, is negative entropy. According to Katz and Kahn, “the law of 
negative entropy states that systems survive and maintain their characteristic internal 
order only so long as they import from the environment more energy than they expend in 
the process of transformation and exportation” (p. 259). Put another way, open systems 
strive to reverse the entropic process in order to survive. Yet, there is also a need to 
simultaneously promote entropy so there is enough stability to maintain functionality 
within the organization. Indeed, the presence of at least a modicum of stability is a 
prerequisite for something being considered an organization. An organization cannot 
exist without some commonly held beliefs and agreed upon standard operating 
procedures. Thus, from the perspective of open systems theory, employee resistance is a 
necessary component of the ongoing tightrope walking act between change and stability 
that organizations must engage in to remain healthy.
Katz and Kahn indicate that open system theorists’ concept of homeostasis 
borrows from Lewin’s notion of “equilibrium,” a term that Lewin uses to characterize 
what happens over time after an organization has experienced the “unfreezing” phase of a 
planned organizational change process. Edgar Schein (1992) also relates the notion of 
homestasis with Lewin’s notion of equilibrium:
All human systems attempt to maintain equilibrium and to maximize their 
autonomy vis-a-vis their environment. Coping, growth, and survival all involve 
maintaining the integrity of the system in the face of a changing environment that 
is constantly causing various kinds of disequilibriums. (Schein, 1992; pg. 298)
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Katz and Kahn extend this thinking, and point out that as organizations adapt to 
their environments, they will attempt to cope with external forces by acquiring control 
over them. They argue that the underlying basic principle of organizational life is 
preservation of the organization’s character. In other words, an organization will try to 
protect itself, or from a anthropomorphic perspective, it will attempt to protect its 
essential character during the move toward a new state of equilibrium. Thus, those who 
resist change prior to the establishment of a new equilibrium in an organization can be 
seen as being engaged in the highly important task of retaining an organization’s essence 
and preserving the essential character of the organization even as novel aspects of the 
external environment are being accommodated. Once again, those who resist are seen as 
having an exceedingly important role to play in the change process.
Lewin (1951) also provided a stage theory to understand the organizational 
change process. Lewin’s “unfreezing”, “moving”, and “refreezing” phases of planned 
organizational change suggests that change occurs as a result of turbulence in the 
stabilizing mechanisms, or force field, of an organization (p. 228). In other words, when 
the forces of change are greater than the resistance, change will result. To achieve 
planned change in the organization, Lewin suggested unfreezing the organizational 
equilibrium to create a surge of change and then refreezing the new equilibrium. Since 
Lewin’s contribution to stage theory, numerous scholars have used this model to begin to 
understand change and resistance in organizations (see for example, Oreg, 2003; Kotter, 
1996; Schein, 1993; 2000; Senge, 1990; & Trice & Beyer, 1993).
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Examples o f Work Emerging from the Individual Perspective
Although organizational analysis in general, and systems theory in particular, 
provide a somewhat counterintuitive and, hence, intriguing perspective on the whole 
issue of resistance, most of the empirical literature about resistance takes a more 
individualistic stance. This empirical literature is capacious and reflects a wide variety of 
individualistic perspectives. Consequently, the vast empirical literature on change and 
resistance has been organized into the following categories: (a) the phenomenological 
view of individual change resistance (Kotter & Schlesinger, 1993 & Stebel, 1996); (b) 
stage-oriented literature (Levesque, Prochaska & Prochaska, 1999 & Lewin, 1951); (c) 
causal frameworks used to understand resistance (Rousseau & Tijoriwala,1999; Senge, 
1990; Bowman & Deal, 1997); and (d) strategies that can be used to overcome resistance 
(Rosen, 1997; Argyris, 1990; & Champy, 1997). Examples of the literature associated 
with each of these categories are presented below.
Phenomenological view o f individual change resistance. While an organizational 
perspective, and, more specifically, a systems perspective, provides a functional 
explanation of the role of resistance in organizational life, literature included in this first 
subcategory operates out of and, consequently, provides a more phenomenological view 
of resistance to change. It does this by focusing on the specific reasons employees resist 
change. Kotter & Schlesinger (1993), for instance, provide four of the most common 
reasons: (a) a desire not to lose something of value; (b) a misunderstanding of the change 
and its implications; (c) a belief that the change does not make sense for the organization; 
and (d) a low tolerance for change (p. 396).
Paul Stebel (1996) also writes from what is being referred to here as a 
phenomenological perspective of sorts, but he also links his phenomenological analysis to
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the traditional sociological concept of role. He suggests that part of the fundamental issue 
is that executives and employees see change differently. In this regard, senior managers 
generally see change as an opportunity to make improvements or advance the 
organization in a new way, while employees view change as a disruption of their normal 
work life. He suggests that managers must leam to see what it is that individuals expect 
to give and get out of their employment with the organization (p. 139).
Stage-oriented literature. Some individualistic literature has also focused on the 
stages of change. Levesque, Prochaska & Prochaska (1999), for example, indicate that 
individuals experience five relatively distinct stages as they move through the change 
process within an organization. These stages include: (a) pre-contemplation, i.e., not 
intending to engage in action before the change occurs; (b) contemplation, i.e., intending 
to take some type of action before the change occurs; (c) preparation, i.e., intending to 
take action just before the change occurs; (d) action, i.e., making overt changes before 
change occurs; and (e) maintenance, i.e., overt changes made after planned change 
occurs.
Levesque, Prochaska & Prochaska’s stage theory differs from the change theory 
of Lewin that was discussed in the previous section of the review. The difference, of 
course, is that Lewin conceptualizes stages in organizational terms while Levesque, 
Prochaska & Prochaska talk about the stages that individuals go through.
Causal frameworks used to understand resistance. Some literature has focused on 
establishing causal relationships as a means of understanding resistance to change. 
Rousseau & Tijoriwala (1999), for example, point out the frameworks employees use to 
understand change are not well understood given the variety of ways that employees 
interpret reasons for change (p. 514). In a field study, authors Rousseau and Tijoriwala
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(1999) examined what are considered good factors or reasons for employees to want to 
change. For example, they noted the beliefs that other co-workers held about the change 
were influential. In other words, knowing how other employees felt or reacted to the 
change affected how they would adopt the change. Another factor was the amount of 
trust employees had in management and in the organization. These factors serve as a type 
of “mental model” that employees use to shape and define their interpretation of reality in 
a change context (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1999, p. 526; Bowman & Deal, 1997; Senge, 
1990).
Another example of the causal frameworks used to understand change is provided 
by Bowman & Deal. Bowman & Deal (1997) inform us that, from a human resources 
perspective, employees have good reason to resist change. Changes in routines and 
standard procedures diminish people’s ability to perform with confidence and success (p. 
323). The authors also indicate that organizational structures must be aligned in order to 
support changes in individuals. They conclude by articulating four causes of resistance. 
They state that resistance occurs: (a) when individuals’ ability to feel effective, valued 
and in control is threatened; (b) when change upsets existing relationships and established 
working roles; (c) when change creates winners and losers; and lastly (d) when change 
causes a loss of meaning for people.
Rosen (1997) also explored casual reasons for change, and he, too, indicates that 
leaders need to pay attention to why and how employees deal with change. Rosen 
supports the notion that everyone resists change, primarily because of our human nature 
for control and predictability. To move through the protective barriers that all people put 
up, people need time to work through the change process. An effort must also be made to 
build organizational commitment and trust. Organizational commitment and trust occurs
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by building relationships one person at a time in order to help people feel engaged and 
committed to the organization’s future (p. 310). Consequently, pre-planned or 
preprogrammed change initiatives are not likely to achieve high-levels of trust and 
commitment due to limited stakeholder involvement (Rosen, 1997; Cummings, 1995).
Argyris (1990) also uses a causal framework perspective and points out human 
defense structures play a major role in resistance to change. The author submits that 
deep-seeded defensive routines account for the seemingly hard to explain reaction of 
individuals resistance to change. These defenses play out in various ways. The first 
limitation of defenses is that an individual may not be willing to share feedback because 
of the lack of trust toward the organization. The second limitation results from the first 
because the organization never learns of the individual’s causal reasoning behind their 
beliefs toward organizational change in the first place. Both of these limitations 
underscore how individual defensive reasoning creates consequences that are 
counterproductive to the subject’s intentions (p. 374).
Champy (1997) adds that fear and cynicism are real feelings associated with 
organizational changes. The author identifies that fear comes from the real possibility of a 
significant change in job or possibility of job loss. He contrasts fear with cynicism which 
can come from distrusting that managers will indeed follow through with what they say 
will happen. The author supports the notion that cynicism and fear can be reduced 
through open conversations. If fear is legitimate it may not go away, but cynicism can be 
displaced if mangers act on what is said (p. 15).
Strategies used to overcome resistance. Finally, some of the literature on 
resistance has focused on ways to overcome resistance to change. Kotter (1996) provided 
eight-steps for creating an environment that is supportive for major change. The steps
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include: (a) establishing a sense of urgency; (b) creating the guiding coalition; (c) 
developing a vision and strategy; (d) communicating the change vision; (e) empowering 
broad-based action; (f) generating short-term wins; (g) consolidating gains and producing 
more change; and (h) anchoring new approaches in the culture.
Freedman (1997) also articulated different approaches to overcoming resistance to 
change; his approaches are rooted in a socio-technical systems frame perspective. He 
notes that a common element in all change models has been the level and/or kind of 
attention that practitioners and theorists devote to managing resistance for change. Those 
least attentive to resistance believe that a change “system”—e.g., business process 
reengineering (BPR), a computer system, or total quality management (TQM)—will 
overcome resistance automatically. Time and again, this thinking has proven to be 
problematic. An example of a misguided kind of attention is attention focused on “fixing” 
individuals who resist. He suggests that this type of thinking is grounded in a more 
traditional and out-dated “mental model” held by most people about organizational 
change and resistance. Freedman’s socio-technical perspective, on the other hand, offers 
another view of overcoming resistance to change. He suggests that complex 
transformational processes should be viewed and managed as a series of interrelated, 
stand-alone transitions. Freedman offers that this approach offers more “breathing space” 
between efforts and breaks up change into more manageable parts.
Summarization o f Organizational and Individual Resistance Categories
In summary, it must be noted that the two change resistance perspectives that 
have been used to organize this section are ideal types. In reality, organizational and 
individual perspectives get merged in the literature all the time. This is a good thing 
because no single ideal type can account for and accommodate the complexity of
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organizational life or even the phenomenon of change resistance. The ideal types are 
helpful, however, in simplifying our thinking about the theories and research that attempt 
to make sense of the complexity of organizational life, they also are essential tools for 
critique.
Indeed, when we look at the literature through individual and organizational 
lenses, something quite interesting appears: The literature is skewed toward an individual 
rather than an organizational view of resistance. Kotter & Schlesinger (1993), Stebel 
(1996), Agocs, 1997; Levesque, Prochaska & Prochaska, 1999; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 
1999; and Senge, 1990, all operate primarily from individual perspective. Although the 
individual perspective provides a useful view of change resistance that cannot be 
overlooked, it represents only one side of the change resistance phenomenon. The 
organizational resistance perspective offers a view of the other side, and also a more 
macro view of change resistance (Oreg, 2003; Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002; Trice & 
Beyer, 1993). Trice and Beyer (1993) support the idea that resistance to change does not 
only take place at an individual level and argue that it is also important to look at 
resistance as a group or organizational phenomenon. The authors suggest that any of 
these levels may be impacted during change efforts. In fact, the authors provide a list of 
“common sources of resistance to change” and suggest that these are different at the 
individual and organizational level. At the individual level, these include: (a) fear of the 
unknown, (b) self-interest, (c) selective attention and retention, (d) disruption of habits,
(e) dependence on authority, and (f) need for security. At the organizational level, the 
sources of resistance include: (a) threats to a group’s power, (b) lack of organizational 
trust, (c) different group perceptions and goals, (d) social disruption, (e) resource 
limitation, (f) fixed investments, and (g) inter-organizational agreements.
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In recent years, organizational theorists have turned to the construct of 
organizational culture as a framework to help understand and explain factors surrounding 
organizational change and resistance (Bowman & Deal, 1997; Schein, 1993; T Beyer, 
1993, Akin & Palmer, 2000) at the macro/organizational level. This construct, of course, 
was a centerpiece of the research that will be reported in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
Summary
The first section of Chapter 2 reviewed what the literature said about the origins, 
nature, and evolution of organizational change. This section presented the evolution of 
organizational change from its roots in scientific management and organizational 
development to modem business process reengineering, change management, and 
organizational transformation theories. Studies about the recent history of public sector 
organization change and specifically, Osborne and Gabeler’s notion of reinventing 
government, were discussed. Organizing the vast organizational change and resistance 
literature into two broad categories—organizational and individual change—helped 
examine change at two different levels and was central to the review of literature for this 
study. Additionally, sorting the literature in this way highlighted the lack of change and 
resistance literature from an organizational perspective. This review essentially expanded 
on the discussion from the “Background to the Study” section of Chapter 1.
The following section explores the emergence and contemporary use of the 
organizational culture construct and will examine three aspects of this literature including 
the origins and definition of the organizational culture constmct, attempts to use the 
notion of culture help make sense of organizational behavior and change, and what the 
literature says about the culture of the public government and military organizations.
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The Emergence and Contemporary Use of the Organizational Culture Construct 
This section of the literature review on the emergence and contemporary use of 
the organizational culture construct will elaborate on some key concepts and ideas 
discussed in the “background to the research” section above. Despite the relatively brief 
history of the use of culture as a construct in the organization field, the amount of 
literature on the topic is still substantial. This section will examine three aspects of this 
literature: (a) the origins and definition of the organizational culture construct; (b) 
attempts to use the notion of culture help make sense of organizational behavior and 
change; and (c) what the literature says about the culture of the public 
(government/military) organizations.
The Origins and Definition o f the Organizational Culture Construct
Although the concept of organizational culture is a relatively new construct in the 
literature on organizations, theorist such as Edgar Schein (1992) emphasize that the 
concept has had a “long and checkered history” (p. 3) (See, also, Detert, 2000). A brief 
account of the organizational culture concept and how its definition has evolved, will 
begin this section. Then, a brief history of the emergence and use of the construct of 
culture in the study of organizations, will be followed by an examination of evolution of 
the culture construct and how organizational culture has grown to encompass other 
meanings beyond its original meaning. Finally, a number of influential definitions of 
organizational culture will be introduced, including Schein’s seminal definition.
A brief history o f the emergence and use o f the construct o f culture in the study o f 
organizations. Over the past three decades, culture has emerged in organizational theory 
as an important construct for understanding organizational behavior in general, and the 
change process in particular (Detert, Schroeder, & Mauriel, 2000; Strebel 1996; Schein,
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1992; Hofstede, 1991; Rousseau, 1990). The concept of organizational culture originated 
in several fields of study. The notion of culture was initially used in the discipline of 
anthropology—or, the study human societies. Initially, anthropology’s focus was on so- 
called tribal or primitive societies (Hofstede, 1991). The norms and standard operating 
procedures in these cultures were so obviously different than the norms and standard 
operating procedures in our own environment, that a name was required to characterize 
the source of these differences. That name, for anthropologists, was culture. The 
construct of culture has since been appropriated—and adapted—by numerous other fields 
and disciplines ranging from psychology and sociology to political science (Schein, 1993; 
p. 369). Eventually, organizational theorists also began to employ the construct to talk 
about organizational life.
The term culture also has a number of other meanings associated with it, 
including a way to designate sophistication (e.g., we talk of sophisticated people as being 
“cultured”), national identify (e.g., we talk of “American culture” or “Arab culture”), and 
the ways a business or organization operates (e.g., we talk of competitive cultures) 
(Schein, 1993; p. 369; Hofstede, 1994; 1991; p. 5). Despite this widespread use and 
growing acceptance of the concept in popular culture, the business and organization 
fields have only recently embraced the concept (Hofstede, 1991; p. 18).
The evolution o f the culture construct. Once the notion of culture began to be used 
by those who study and attempt to make sense of organizations, it began to be associated 
with two other concepts: climate (e.g., practices of an organization including individual 
motivations and specific behaviors) (Michela, & Burke, 2000; Dennison, 1996;
Schneider, 1990; 1970; 1968) and environment (e.g., the pervasive characteristics that 
define how members of an organization interact with each other) (Schein, 1992; Deal &
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Kennedy, 1982). At times, each of these terms has been used as a synonym for the term 
culture. While organizational climate is, in many respects, similar to what theorist mean 
when they use the term organizational culture, some theorists argue that the two concepts 
are different from organizational culture.
In the last decade or so, organizational culture has been used generally to indicate 
the “climate and environment practices that organizations develop” (Schein, 1993; p.
369). Schein emphasizes that the climate concept refers to situational variables that 
influence an individual’s motives and specific behaviors. These situation variables are 
subject to change much as weather conditions (i.e., the literal meaning of climate) can 
change and, consequently, the employee attitudes can also be changed relatively easily. 
By contrast, organizational culture is more a sociological rather than a largely 
psychological construct, and references the more enduring and pervasive beliefs, routines 
and rituals of an organization (Schein, 1992,1993; Hofstede, 1991).
Another term that is often used interchangeably with culture is environment 
(Hofstede, 1991). Within the organization literature, the term organizational environment 
is frequently used to refer to the pervasive characteristics in an organization that 
influence and help define how members of an organization behave and interact with one 
anothher. This focus on pervasiveness, of course, suggests that the meaning of 
environment is quite similar to the meaning of culture, as that term has been used in the 
organizational literature. The notion of culture, however, places the human dimensions of 
organizational life front and center (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, Schein, 1992,1993). For this 
reason, and because the culture construct is more frequently used within the organization 
literature, I have chosen to use the term culture in this dissertation.
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Influential definitions o f organizational culture (including Schein’s seminal 
definition). Theorists, researchers, and practitioners have long discussed and debated the 
definition and meaning of organization culture. Although many definitions exist, a few 
tend to be influential and frequently quoted. These include:
■ Culture is a system of publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a 
given group at a given time. This system of terms, forms, categories, and images 
interprets a people’s own situation to themselves. (Pettigrew, 1979; p. 574)
■ Culture refers to the knowledge members of a given group are thought to more or 
less share.. .A culture is expressed (or constituted) only through the actions and 
words of its members....Culture is not itself visible, but is made visible only 
through its representation. (Van Mannen, 1988; p. 3)
■ Culture is always a collective phenomenon, because it is at least partly shared 
with people who live or lived within the same social environment, which is where 
it was learned.... (Hofstede, 1991; p. 5)
■ Organizational culture is the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one organization from another.... (Hofstede, 1994;
p. 180)
■ Cultures are collective phenomena that embody people’s responses to the 
uncertainties and chaos that are inevitable in human experience. These responses
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fall into two major categories. The first is the substance of a culture— shared, 
emotionally charged belief systems that we call ideologies. The second is cultural 
forms—observable entities, including actions, through which members of a 
culture express, affirm, and communicate the substance of their culture to one 
another. (Trice and Beyer, 1993; p. 2)
■ The way we do things around here. ( Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 4)
Of all of the numerous definitions of culture, Edgar Schein’s view of 
organizational culture is perhaps the most widely accepted. Schein (1992) indicates that 
organizational culture is:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved 
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems (p. 12).
Although the concept of organizational culture is described somewhat differently 
in the literature, most researchers agree that culture relates to a system of shared beliefs, 
assumptions, norms, values, symbols, understanding and knowledge held by its 
membership (Schein, 1993; 1996; Hofstede, 1991; Galpin, 1996 & Detert, Schroeder, & 
Mauriel, 2000; Hammer, 1997). They also mostly agree with Schein that culture is 
exemplified—and can be accessed by examining—artifacts (symbols or practices), 
values, and the beliefs (underlying assumptions) that members share about appropriate
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behavior (Detert, 2000). Therefore, Schein’s definition and his view of organizational 
culture served as a kind of conceptual framework for this research study.
Exemplary studies that used the cultural construct. The literature shows how 
organizational theorists have used the notion of organizational culture as a frame to 
interpret and understand an extensive range of organizational behavior (Bowman & Deal, 
1997, Detert, et. al., 2000, Schein, 2000; 1992; Cook & Yanow; 2001). In this section, I 
will review some of the studies and literature that have popularized the study of 
organizational culture. Specifically, the following highly influential and frequently cited 
works will be reviewed: Peters and Waterman’s In Search o f Excellence (1982); Deal & 
Kennedy’s (1982) Corporate Culture: The Rites and Rituals o f Corporate Life (1982); 
Hofstede’s Cultures and Organizations (1991)', and Schein’s Organizational Culture and 
Leadership (1992).
Peters and Waterman’s (1982) seminal work, In Search o f Excellence, provided 
ground-breaking research on organizational culture. The researchers looked at forty-three 
of Fortune 500’s top American companies in an attempt to discover what characteristics 
made these organizations successful. As a result, they determined that the primary key to 
success shared by the organizations studied was their focus on strategy and organizational 
structure (“hardware”), and shared values and culture (“software”). Peters and Waterman 
went on in the study to suggest that organizational culture was the most prominent 
component of successful organizations. They argued, “Without exception, the dominance 
and coherence of culture proved to be an essential quality of the excellent companies” (p. 
75). The findings from their study helped forge the importance of culture in 
organizational research.
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Deal & Kennedy’s (1982) study on corporate cultures also helped focus attention 
on an area of business that had typically been ignored in previous studies. In contrast to 
the structural elements of organizations (e.g., organization structure, formal processes) 
that researchers normally had examined in past studies, Deal and Kennedy looked at the 
symbolic and ritualistic aspects of corporations. After collecting data from nearly 80 
companies, they revealed that all organizations have some form of culture, whether weak 
or strong, and that culture has a powerful affect on every aspect of the organization.
Scholars have also looked at organizational culture and change from an 
international perspective. For example, in his book Cultures and Organizations, Hofstede 
(1991) related the notion of culture to software for the mind. In this regard, culture 
influenced how one would think and behave in organizations. Hofstede focused on three 
levels of uniqueness in human mental programming that include personality, culture and 
human nature.










Note: From Hofstede, 1991. Cultures and organizations. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
(p. 6).
Hofstede’s view of mental programming, highlighted by differences between 
human nature (inherited) and personality (inherited and learned traits), demonstrated 
levels of culture. He pointed out that cultural traits have traditionally been attributed to
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inherited traits because scholars did not know how to explain these differences (p. 6). 
Hofstede also examined the various layers of culture. Through his study with IBM and 
over 50 countries that he researched, he found that people belonged to different groups 
and categories at the same time. The layers, for instance, could include: a national level, a 
regional level, an ethnic level, a religious level, a gender level, a social class level, and an 
organizational level (p. 10). As a result of studying the impact of national culture within 
IBM’s organizational cultures, Hofstede (1991) found evidence for dimensions of 
uncertainty avoidance, collectivism versus individualism, femininity versus masculinity, 
and power distance. While Hofstede (1994) agrees that national culture studies have only 
limited application for understanding organizational cultures, his work is regularly 
mentioned by scholars in providing further insight into the organizational culture 
construct (Ashkanasy, Wilderom & Peterson, 2001; Robbins, 2001; Schein, 1992).
Edgar Schein (1999,1996,1993,1992), the eminent MIT psychologist turned 
organizational theorist, is often cited for his contribution of understanding how 
organizational culture influences human behavior. Schein’s (1992) work, suggests that 
the best way to think about and analyze an organization’s culture is to understand the 
similarities that exist at various levels in an organization’s belief system. Schein referred 
to different cultural layers as “the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to 
the observer” (p. 16). He suggests that these levels range from tangible to intangible 
levels.
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Note: From Schein, E.H. (1992) Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers (p. 17).
Schein argues that artifacts are the first level and consist of what is visible at the 
surface of an organization, such as the organization’s “language” or “products.” He 
points out that this level is easy to see, but hard to understand. The next level is espoused 
values. This level refers to the strategies, goals and philosophies supported by leaders of 
the organization. At this level, a set of values becomes embodied as part an ideology that 
serves to guide events and behavior, but “may be out of line with what they will actually 
do in situations where those values should, in fact, be operating” (Schein, 1992, p. 21). 
The third level is referred to as basic assumptions. This level is “taken for granted” and is 
often so strongly held by the membership of the organization that different ways of 
thinking or acting are almost “inconceivable”. In this regard, basic assumptions are 
similar to what Chris Argyris introduced as “theories-in-use” (Argyris & Schon, 1974, 
Argyris, 1993). Schein sees these basic assumptions as concepts that are very hard to 
recognize so they are “extremely difficult to change.” This helps explain why resistance 
in organizational change is so difficult to manage since it is hard for people for people to 
see and understand how the change affects their basic assumptions. As Schein states:
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The human mind needs cognitive stability. Therefore, any challenge to or 
questioning of a basic assumption will release anxiety and defensiveness. 
In this sense, the shared basic assumptions that make up the culture of a 
group can be thought of at both the individual and group levels as 
psychological cognitive defense mechanisms (p. 23).
Schein links the notion of various levels of culture to resistance to change in 
organizations. He points out that when managers or leaders try to change the behavior of 
subordinates they “often encounter resistance to change at a level that seems beyond 
reason.” He contends that this is in part because an attempt to influence change on the 
surface may not be as effective if deeply held beliefs and assumptions are at work.
The findings from Peters and Waterman’s, Deal and Kennedy’s, Hofstede’s, and 
Schein’s studies have enhanced our understanding of the organizational culture construct 
and its relevance for making sense of the phenomenon of resistance. Other contemporary 
organizational scientists and scholars also have added insight about how organizational 
cultures function and how this functioning impacts the phenomenon of resistance. For 
instance, Galpin (1996) sees organizational culture as a primary lever for initiating and 
implementing organizational change. He argues that effective change requires changes in 
operations, systems, and procedures to be clearly aligned to an organization’s culture. In 
other words, most theorists described above seem to share the perspective that 
organizational change cannot take place without taking into account the 
interconnectedness of an organization’s systems and preparing these systems for change. 
The Culture O f The Public (Government/Military) Organizations
In the last part of this section, I will look at the culture of public sector (i.e., 
government, military, and combined government/military) organizations. Almost no
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literature exists on the subject of change and resistance in combined government/military 
organizations. Therefore, I will highlight the long, established history associated with 
government and military organizations. Specifically, I will point out what the literature 
says about how military and government culture influences and guides behavior in 
organizational change efforts.
Military & government culture. As described earlier in the background chapter 
and the discussion of organizational culture in this chapter, major cultural reform 
movements have set the stage for government and military reform (see for example, 
Reinventing Government, Osborne and Gaebler (1992); Business Process Reengineering, 
Hammer and Champy (1993); Leading Change, Kotter (1996); and Change Management 
(Worren, et al., 1999). Although parallels exist between private and public sector 
organizational culture, many would argue that the public sector has different goals and 
purposes that distinguish its culture from the cultures of for-profit businesses (Linstead, 
1997, Ouchi, 1981). In the early 80s’, William Ouchi (1981) examined different cultural 
characteristics associated with different types of organizations, including private sector 
and public sector organizations. His findings demonstrate that these different types of 
organizations are both similar and different (p. 434). The similarities include the 
expectation of long-term employment and even an unspoken desire for a lifetime 
relationship. Conversely, Ouchi also found that the United States military culture was 
different from other large, multi-national corporations. He points out that military and 
government organizations differ from public sector organizations in terms of their 
emphasis on hierarchy and bureaucracy. In fact, Ouchi calls military and government 
organizations “type Z” organizations. Ouchi (1981) defines type Z organizations as 
organizations that have achieved a degree of consistency in their culture, similar to clans.
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He suggests that the only way to change behavior in type Z organizations is to change 
culture. However, culture changes slowly because the members of a type Z organization 
hold deeply rooted values and beliefs that tend to maintain the status quo. Therefore, the 
implication for any culture change in public sector organizations is bound to be a time 
intensive and lengthy process.
In addition to Ouchi’s comparison study, there also has been at least one study 
that has looked in depth at military culture in its own right. While military culture has not 
been given much attention in the literature (and joint military and public organizational 
culture hardly none at all), Murray (1999) argues that culture matters, and should be 
examined to understand its effects and influence on military organizations. Murray 
(1999) submits that military culture is shaped by natural cultures as well as factors such 
as geography and historical experiences that shape American military. Although typically 
described as unchangeable, military culture is susceptible to the influences of human 
affairs such as changes in leadership, military education, doctrinal preferences and 
technology. All of these result in the evolution of the culture of military organizations. 
Murray (1999), however, goes on to suggest that the effects on military culture are slow 
and gradual and may not be evident for years. One example of this is the early German 
battlefield successes of World War II that are traceable to changing cultural patterns in 
the German army dating back to the 1920’s. When the Germans were forced to reduce 
their army size by the Treaty of Versailles, the German officer corps changed their 
culture to emphasize performance in leadership positions and intellectual achievements.
Military culture at West Point. One military organization that has been studied 
extensively is West Point. West Point is a long established organization that has 
embodied and shaped the culture of American military. From the time when George
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Washington first proposed the idea of a military academy in 1783, West Point has 
developed military leaders and helped construct an enduring military culture for the 
United States.
Recently, a number of researchers and organizational theorists have focused their 
attention on West Point. For example, Ruvolo and Bullis (2003) examined the lessons 
learned from a failed culture change initiative that occurred at West Point. Just prior to a 
leadership succession at the academy, a department head had cultivated an open 
atmosphere of acceptance and learning. Some members of the greater community were 
threatened by this perceived antithetical “warrior spirit” culture and, as a result, brought 
in a new department head with an outstanding reputation as a warrior. To the surprise of 
many, within ten months, the department was in turmoil, morale and productivity were 
down, and the new department head was relieved of his duties. Although several “lessons 
learned” can be gleamed from this senior leader derailment case study, perhaps the most 
important point is that change failed largely because of the incongruence between 
traditional and non-traditional military culture. According to Ruvolo and Bullis:
At times the emphasis has been on training, following orders, and being prepared 
for military activity while at other times education, independent thinking, and 
individual development have been emphasized, (p. 161)
The authors conclude that change is difficult because of the propensity to hold on 
to this deep-embedded culture.
Others have argued that different factors can influence the enduring culture of the 
military. For example, the events and impact of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) on military 
organizations has been significant. While it is difficult to assess the long-term impact of 
9/11, Noonan and Hillen (2002) point out that the terrorist’s attacks to the World Trade
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Center will change the nature of war and how military and government organizations will 
respond in the future. In summary, it is clear that change is difficult in military and 
government organizations where culture is deeply-rooted and particularly resistant to 
change.
Summary
This section of the literature reviewed the emergence and contemporary use of the 
organizational culture construct. Despite the relatively brief history of the use of culture 
as a construct in the organization field, this review reveals that the amount of literature on 
the topic is vast and growing. This section examined three aspects of the culture literature 
including the origins and definition of the organizational culture construct, how theorists 
use the notion of culture to help make sense of organizational behavior and change, and 
what the literature says about the culture of combined government and military public 
organizations. Schein’s influential definition and notion of culture were presented. In 
particular, Schein’s phenomenological view of different layers of culture, and, 
specifically, the underlying assumptions and beliefs that an organization’s membership 
holds, seemed to be particularly important to understanding how culture influences 
human behavior and change resistance and were also reviewed in this section.
In conclusion, the literature substantiates the need for a modem concept of 
culture to help understand cultural change. From this review it became clear that almost 
no literature exists on the subject of cultural change and resistance in combined 
government and military organizations. Additionally, most theorists reflections on the 
subject of culture suggest that the role of leadership is intertwined and is an essential 
construct to help understand organizational culture. This next section explores some of
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the relevant conceptualizations about what the literature says about the role of leaders in 
influencing, shaping and changing organizational culture.
The Role of Leadership in Influencing, Shaping and Changing Culture 
This section will discuss what the literature says about the role of leaders in 
influencing, shaping and changing organizational culture. Once again, some of the topics 
raised in the “background to the study” section of Chapter 1 will be developed more 
fully. This section will be organized around the following topics: (a) the concept of 
leadership and (b) how leaders influence, shape and change the culture and organizational 
resistance to change.
The Concept o f Leadership
The first part of this section will focus on what the literature says about the 
concept of leadership. Leadership is one of the most researched concepts in 
organizational theory (Leonard, 2003; Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee 2002; Ridgway, 
2001; Dess & Picken, 2000; Sims, 2000; Conger, Spreitzer, & Edward, 1999; Homer, 
1997). In addition, in the last half of the 20th century, significant attention has been given 
to the study of the relationship between leadership and the construct of change. Bums 
(1979), Greenleaf (1970), Rost (1991), Heifetz (1994) and Kotter (1996) have made some 
of the most notable contributions to the study of leadership and change.
Bum s’ view o f leadership. Despite the extensive attention given to the topic and 
study of leadership and its contributions to the change process, Bums (1978) argues that 
leadership is “one of the least understood phenomena on earth” (p.2). Bums seminal 
work, aptly titled Leadership, has laid the foundation for practitioners and scholars to 
further understand and explore the leadership construct.
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Bums (1978) suggests that leadership involves a process of exchange between 
leaders and followers. He states, “Leadership over human beings is exercised when 
persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with 
others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage 
and satisfy the motives of followers” (p. 18). Bums argues that this is done in order to 
attain the goals mutually shared by leaders and followers.
Another prominent theme in Bums’ work is the distinction between management 
and leadership (Also see Heifetz, 1994, p.15 and Rost, 1991). Bums (1978) describes 
managers as transactors and leaders as transformers. He states that managers are focused 
on maintaining and running organizations by following the organizations rules and 
procedures. He refers to this managerial activity as transactional leadership. Bums 
contrasts transactional leadership with what he calls transformational leadership, a type of 
leadership that occurs when one or more people influence one another so that leaders and 
followers raise each other to “higher levels of motivation and morality” (p. 20). Bums 
also argues that transformational change is associated with real change. He describes 
real change as the creation of new conditions that generates changes in motivation and 
goals; real change also sets in motion ongoing change (p. 441). Bums’ definition of 
leadership in general, and his distinction between transactional and transformational 
forms of leadership, seem significant for making sense of the process of organizational 
change.
Greenleafs view o f leadership. Greenleaf (1970), another commonly cited 
researcher, provides a similar view of leadership, albeit with somewhat different 
language and a different focus. Greenleaf, for example, supports the notion that 
leadership cannot be adequately understood without considering the relationship of
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leaders and followers. In fact, Greenleaf offers a unique view about who leaders are and 
what they do in organizations, one built around the notion of servant leadership. 
According to Greenleaf “the servant-leader is servant first... [Servant leadership] begins 
with the natural feeling that one wants to serve, to serve first. The conscious choice 
brings one to aspire to lead” (Greenleaf, 1970). A servant-leader focuses on others’ 
highest priority needs and helps them to become more knowledgeable, autonomous and 
more like servants themselves (Northouse, p. 309). While many characteristics can be 
associated with the notion of servant-leadership, Greenleaf emphasized ten essential 
traits: (a) listening, (b) empathy, (c) healing, (d) awareness, (e) persuasion, (f) 
conceptualization, (g) foresight, (h) stewardship, (I) commitment to the growth of people, 
and (J) building community. These traits serve as the foundation of Greenleaf’s thinking 
about leadership. For Greenleaf, the ultimate test of servant-leadership is “do those 
served grow as persons; do they, while being served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more 
autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants (Greenleaf, 1970; see also 
Ferch, 2004).
While there does seem to be some similarities between Greenleaf and Bums on 
the notion of the leader and follower relationship, there is a subtle distinction. Bums 
tends to emphasize the leader’s positional authority while Greenleaf’s emphasis on the 
leader’s servant status intentionally minimizes whatever power a leader has by virtue of 
his or her position.
Rost’s views o f leadership. Like Bums, another influential leadership theorist, 
Joseph Rost, emphasizes that leadership must be distinguished from management. 
Through his in-depth analysis of leadership, Rost (1991) points out that scholars and 
practitioners historically have explored leadership from multiple perspectives. Several
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leadership theories emerged in the literature including: trait theory (also referred to as 
“great man theory”); group and behavior theories; contingency theory and situational 
theory (Rost, p. 17). Rost (1991) argues that these theories and models primarily focus on 
an industrial paradigm, and do not sufficiently account for the essence of leadership. He 
contends that the study of leadership in most of the twentieth century can be summed up 
as a misguided study of “leadership as good management” (p. 94).
Rost notes that over 220 definitions of leadership had been documented in the 
literature by the end of the 20th Century. He suggests that this proliferation of definitions 
is one of the primary reasons the discipline of leadership studies has had a problem of 
“definition ambiguity and confusion” (p. 6). Rost, himself, endorses Bums’ (1978) 
definition and concept of leadership that was discussed above. Specifically, Rost (1991) 
defines leadership as “an influence relationship among leaders and collaborators who 
intend significant changes that reflect their mutual purposes” (Rost, 1991, p. 102). He 
notes that there are “essential elements” to this definition including leaders and followers 
in an influence relationship with one another developing shared purposes with the 
intention of real (i.e., transforming) change.
While a debate continues over the leadership and management distinction and its 
overlapping aspects, scholars generally agree that leadership and management can be 
distinguished (Bums, 1978; Kotter, 1996; Rost, 1991). This distinction will be useful in 
this dissertation’s attempt to analyze how a group of leaders used culture to promote 
organizational change.
Heifetz’s view o f leadership. In recent years, Heifetz (1994) has added yet another 
influential definition of leadership that is compatible with the Bums’ and Rost’s notions 
but also extends their perspectives. Like Bums and Rost, for example, Heifetz defines
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leadership as the act of mobilizing people to face problems (Heifetz, 1994; p. 20). But 
there are also some unique subtleties with the Heifetz definition to which one must 
attend. These subtleties can be seen by looking more closely at the words Heifetz uses in 
his definion.
Heifetz’s definition, for example, emphasizes that leadership is best described as 
an activity rather than a position of authority or a personal set of characteristics. This 
point is not as clear in either Bums’ or Rost’s writing. Indeed, each of them tend to 
conceive of leaders as people who hold leadership positions. Heifetz, on the other hand, 
emphasizes that leadership exists in multiple positions in a social structure; whether one 
is a president or a clerk, both have the potential to lead.
Heifetz also uses the word “mobilize” in his definition of leadership to connote 
motivating, organizing, orienting, or focusing attention to a goal or problem. On the 
surface at least, this assumption, seems consistent with the leadership theories of Bums 
and Rost, but Heifetz also distinguishes between two different sorts of challenges leaders 
and followers face, and he suggests that leaders, in fact, mobilize people differently to 
meet each type of challenge. Heifetz labels these two types of challenges technical and 
adaptive.
A technical challenge involves daily operational issues and, consequently, 
technical leadership is concerned with handling such issues. As such, technical 
leadership is more or less analogous to Bums’ notion of transactional leadership and 
Rost’s notion of management (a concept that Rost suggests is not even encompassed by 
the notion of leadership).
By contrast, adaptive involves addressing “the conflicts in the values people 
hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face”
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(p. 22). Stated simply, adaptive work means leadership helping people to face tough 
problems. This meaning, of course, seems more or less compatible with Bums’ notion of 
transformational leadership and Rost’s view of leadership as opposed to management.
Heifetz’s view of adaptive work includes the notion of resistance to change.
Using a living systems perspective, Heifetz sees adaptive work as requiring sustained 
periods of disequilibrium for change to occur. He points out that during this state of 
disquilibrium, resistance is often a common response that prevents people from adapting 
to change. Heifetz labels this resistance to disequilibrium as work avoidance and suggests 
that work avoidance is often unconscious and is similar to the defensive routines that are 
found in individuals, groups and organizations. He concludes that one of the major 
challenges of leadership is learning how to “counteract the expected work avoidances and 
help people learn despite resistance” (p. 37).
Kotter’s view o f leadership. Finally, Kotter (1996) articulates a definition of 
leadership that places little to no emphasis on the notions of mutuality and shared 
leadership, notions that were central to the thinking of Heifeitz, Rost, Greenleaf, and 
Bums. Rather, Kotter suggests that leadership is
A set of processes that creates organizations in the first place or adapts them to 
significantly changing circumstances. Leadership defines what the future should 
look like, aligns people with that vision, and inspires them to make it happen 
despite the obstacles, (p. 25)
Like Bums and Rost, however, Kotter does distinguish between management and 
leadership, though the way he does this is decidedly different and consistent with his 
more leader-centered view of organizational life: “Management is about coping with
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complexity,” Kotter writes; “leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change” (1991, 
p. 103).
Although additional definitions and conceptualizations of leadership could be 
cited, this literature review is already long and complex. The discussions of the major 
theorists’ ideas presented here should be sufficient to capture most of the key ideas about 
leadership that have been written about during the past 50 years.
Perspectives on How Leaders Influence, Shape and Change Organizational Culture in 
General and Organizational Resistance to Change in Particular
The next section reviews what the literature says about how leaders influence, 
shape and change organizational culture in general, and resistance to change, in 
particular. This section will be divided into two parts. The first will focus on general 
theory, and will build on the notion of culture that was introduced in earlier parts of this 
chapter, and review the concept of cultural leadership for change provided by four 
theorists : (a) Schein, (b) Trice and Beyer, (c) Lewin, and (d) Senge. The second part of 
this section will focus on specific procedures that leaders might use to change a culture 
and mute resistance, and will discuss the views of two theorists: (a) Kotter, (b) Kotter & 
Schlesinger, and (c) Bowman & Deal.
General views o f how leadership influences cultural change in organizations.
Two theorists, Schein, Trice and Beyer, who provide broad-spectrum views of cultural 
change will be discussed first, followed by two people who are not typically considered 
“cultural theorists”, but who espouse views that are compatible with the cultural change 
notion. One is the sociologist Kurt Lewin, an historical giant in the organizational theory 
field; the other is the more contemporary theorist, Peter Senge.
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Schein’s views o f how leadership influences cultural change in organizations. As 
discussed in the background section of Chapter 1, increased emphasis has been placed on 
understanding the relationship between culture and leadership in recent years (Schein, 
1992, Bowman & Deal, 1997). While the notions of leadership and culture have been 
around for some time, the concept of cultural leadership is newer. Despite the attention 
given each of the constructs that make up the concept of cultural leadership, few theorists 
have connected the concepts of culture and leadership prior to Edgar Schein discussing 
such a connection.
In his book, Organizational Culture and Leadership, Schein (1992) explores the 
central characteristics of cultural leadership. Schein (1992), for example, makes the 
argument that leadership cannot be defined outside of culture. He states, “Culture 
creation, culture evolution, and culture management are what ultimately define 
leadership” (p. xv). For Schein, the most important functions of leadership can be boiled 
down to creating, managing and even destroying culture (p. 5). He states that “these 
dynamic processes of culture creation and management are the essence of leadership and 
make one realize that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin” (p. 1). He 
contends that leaders, or those in formal authority, play a role in creating cultures when 
they create groups and organizations. Schein suggests “culture is one of the most difficult 
aspects to manage in a climate of perpetual change” (p. xiv). He asserts that culture 
creation takes place as an evolutionary process:
Culture begins with leaders who impose their own values and assumptions 
on a group. If that group is successful and the assumptions come to be 
taken for granted, we have then a culture that will define for later
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generations of members what kinds of leadership are acceptable. The 
culture now defines leadership (pp. 1-2).
In short, Schein associates leadership with creating and changing organizational 
culture (Schein, 1992,1993; Gagliardi, 1986).
Schein suggests different ways leaders can promote organizational change 
depending on the stage of the organization. The strategies appropriate for organizations at 
different levels of development are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Cultural Change Mechanisms
Organizational Stage Change Mechanism
Founding and early growth 1. Incremental change through general and specific 
evolution
2. Change through insight from organizational
therapy
3. Change through promotion of hybrids within the 
culture
Midlife 4. Change through systematic promotion from 
selected subcultures
5. Planned change through organization 
development projects and the creation of parallel 
learning structures
6. Unfreezing and change through technological 
seduction
Maturity and decline 7. Change through infusion of outsiders
8. Unfreezing through scandal and myth explosion
9. Change through turnarounds
10. Change through coercive persuasion
11. Destruction and rebirth
Note: From Schein, E. H. (1992) Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers (p. 304).
In general, Schein seems to share a similar view to Heifetz’s notion of leadership 
and adaptive challenges. Clearly Schein’s unique contribution is an emphasis on how 
leaders influence and change culture to be adaptive. According to Schein, “to develop the 
culture adaptively is the essence and ultimate challenge of leadership” (Schein, 1992; p.
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2). Although Schein does not specifically reference Heifetz in his definition, they both 
seem to be using the term adaptive in a similar way. The main difference here again is 
that Schein’s model of cultural change appears to be operating from a positional leader- 
centric perspective and does not seem to account for a distributed model of leadership 
and culture change. Still, Schein’s notion of cultural leadership continues to be highly 
influential, and other theorists also have begun to provide insights that often extend or 
compliment Schein’s work about how leaders influence, shape and change the cultures of 
organizations (see for example, Hatch, 2000; 1997; Sims, 2000; Detert, Schroeder, & 
Mauriel, 2000; Senge, 1999; 1990; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Kotter, 1996; Heifetz, 1994; 
and Trice & Beyer, 1993).
Trice and Beyer’s views o f how leadership influences cultural change in 
organizations. Trice and Beyer (1993; 1991) also explore the notion of cultural 
leadership. Like Schein, they suggest that cultural innovation involves the duality of 
creation and destruction (Trice and Beyer, 1993). Also like Schein, the two authors argue 
that a cultural approach to leadership is unlike previous conceptualizations because it 
supports “the other side of leadership.. .(that is) how leaders influence the 
development... of culture in their organizations” (Trice & Beyer, 1991; p. 255). Put 
another way, cultural leadership can help explain how leaders influence the 
interrelationships of behavior in organizations.
Trice and Beyer’s (1993) unique contribution comes from attempting to define 
four types of culture-based leadership that are certainly consistent with Schein’s thinking, 
but that package different dimensions of cultural leadership in a somewhat different way. 
Trice and Beyer’s four types of cultural leadership are: (a) leadership that creates
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cultures; (b) leadership that changes cultures; (c) leadership that embodies cultures; and 
(d) leadership that integrates cultures.
The first type of leadership suggests that cultures are created from the vision of 
leaders in new organizations, a vision that then becomes solidified as organizational 
cultures. The next type suggests that cultures move toward change when the change is 
actively sought and consciously intended by the leader. The third type supports the notion 
that cultures are maintained and preserved when the leader attempts to uphold the 
mission, roles, commitments, and values of the organization. The last type focuses on 
organizational integration. Here, the authors suggest that leaders try to integrate and share 
power among various subcultures.
Trice and Beyer argue that these four types are not necessarily discrete because 
cultural leadership at any given time often exhibits two or more types simultaneously. 
Additionally, they suggest that many members often share cultural leadership, formally 
and informally, which may cause organizational dissonance (p. 286).
Trice and Beyer (1993) have distinguished between organizational change that is 
planned versus unplanned. The authors define cultural change as:
Planned, more encompassing, and more substantial kinds of changes than 
those which arise spontaneously within cultures or as part of conscious 
efforts to keep an existing culture vital. Culture change involves a break 
with the past; cultural continuity is noticeably disrupted. It is an inherently 
disequilibriating process (p. 40).
They define the types of cultural change by at least three different degrees of 
change: (a) revolutionary and comprehensive efforts to change the cultures of entire 
organizations; (b) efforts confined largely to changing specific subcultures or subunits
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within the organization; and (c) efforts that are gradual and incremental, but culminate in 
comprehensive reshaping of an entire organization’s culture (p. 415).
Another important aspect of Trice and Beyer’s work is their distinct perspective 
of seeing culture change as a range of processes with different characteristics. The 
authors’ suggest that change processes can be described along four specific dimensions. 
These dimensions are pervasiveness, magnitude, innovativeness, and duration of a 
change process (p. 415). By analyzing these dimensions, managers and leaders involved 
in change efforts will have a better understanding of the complexity and scope of the 
change effort.
Table 2. Types and Dimensions of Culture Change
Types of Culture Change Placement on Dimensions




2. Subunit or subculture Pervasiveness: low 
Magnitude: moderate to high 
Innovativeness: variable 
Duration: variable




Note: From Trice, H. M., & Beyer, J. M. (1991). Cultural leadership in organizations 
[Electronic version]. Organization Science, 2(2), (p. 149).
Trice and Beyer (1993) contend that “changing organizational culture requires not 
one change, but many changes in many different cultural elements...change efforts must 
encompass both ideologies and the accumulated cultural forms that express them” (p. 
419). Therefore, using a process perspective, as suggested by Trice and Beyer, to
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understand organizational change may be helpful to understand and manage 
organizational change and to determine ways to mitigate resistance.
It is interesting to note that both Schein and Trice and Beyer seem to be operating 
with a much more leader-centered view of organizations than Bums, Rost, Greenleaf or 
Heifetz. Although the final point made about Trice and Beyer in the last sentence of the 
previous paragraph sounds a bit like Heifetz’s notion of distributed leadership, it is fairly 
obvious that Trice and Beyer are talking about a much more limited definition of shared 
leadership than Heifetz’s theorizing envisions. In addition, while Heifetz seems to view 
the fact that leadership is distributed positively, Trice and Beyer see as a complication 
and, hence, as something that is, at base, problematic.
Lewin’s views o f how leadership influences cultural change in organizations.
Kurt Lewin offered a traditional view of cultural change before the term culture became 
widely used and accepted. Although the literature contains a number of change models 
that those who lead a cultural change process might use to guide their work, Lewin’s 
(1951) work has been particularly influential among practitioners and researchers who 
have used the organizational culture construct (Detert et al, 2000; Schein, 1992). Central 
to Lewin’s (1951) model of planned organizational change are the concepts of 
“unfreezing, changing, and refreezing”; these concepts imply that change happens when 
an organizations stabilizing systems are interrupted. According to Lewin, planned 
organizational change starts with “unfreezing” the organization in order to create an 
influx of change. This is followed by the second step of “moving” or making changes in 
the organization. The last step is “refreezing” and is the equivalent of resetting the 
organization with the new changes (p. 227-228).
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Lewin also introduced the term “force field” analysis to describe the powers that 
interact during a change process. He points out that the forces involved in the change are 
either positive (proponent of change) or negative (opponent of change). A force field 
analysis simply identifies the positive or negative forces involved in a change process to 
determine whether or not change will occur. For instance, when the forces of change are 
greater than the resistance, change will result. Several theorists have referred to Lewin’s 
“unfreezing, changing, and refreezing” model and “force field” analysis for 
organizational change and specifically to understand change resistance. Although Lewin 
does not explicitly talk about these phenomena in cultural terms, they fit nicely with a 
cultural perspective of organizations.
Senge’s views o f how leadership influences cultural change in organizations. 
Although Senge’s view of leadership does not primarily focus on cultural change in 
organizations, his ideas do seem to compliment and extend the views of other cultural 
theorists, particularly with regards to resistance to change. Senge (1990,1999) argues 
that organizations are made up of interrelated systems. These systems influence and get 
influenced by members of the organization.
For Senge, “systems thinking” serves as a discipline for seeing the whole 
organization and understanding the subsystems that comprise it. Senge describes systems 
thinking as “the fifth discipline” because it underlies all learning disciplines. Systems 
thinking serves as a framework for seeing interrelationships and “patterns of change” in 
an organization (p. 451). Like Argyris, Senge sees “feedback loops” as an vital part of 
organizational learning, growth and change. According to Senge, there are two distinct 
types of feedback processes—reinforcing (or amplifying) and balancing (or stabilizing).
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He describes that leaders who attempt organizational change find themselves in a 
“balancing process” (p. 457). As Senge describes:
To leaders, it looks as though their efforts are clashing with sudden 
resistance that seems to come from nowhere. In fact, as my friend found 
when he tried to reduce burnout, the resistance is a response by the 
system, trying to maintain an implicit system goal. Until the goal is 
recognized, the change effort is doomed to failure, (p. 457).
Senge suggests that the leader must change members’ habits or create new and 
different models in order to set the norm that the members of the organization will 
follow. He suggests that deep seeded values and beliefs in members’ minds guide their 
behavior during organizational change initiatives. He states:
Whenever there is ‘resistance to change,’ you can count on there being 
one or more ‘hidden’ balancing processes. Resistance to change is neither 
capricious nor mysterious. It almost always arises from threats to 
traditional norms and ways of doing things. Often these norms are woven 
into the fabric of established power relationships. The norm is entrenched 
because the distribution of authority and control is entrenched.
Finally, Senge describes the process of leading organizational change as artful and 
delicate. He suggests that “rather than pushing harder to overcome resistance to change, 
artful leaders discern the source of resistance. They focus directly on the implicit norms 
and power relationships within which the norms are embedded, (p. 458).
Specific procedures o f theory and application fo r how leadership influences 
cultural change in organizations. This next section, I discusses the contributions of three 
theorist that provide defined steps and procedures for how leaders can influence cultural
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change. Specifically, Kotter’s ways to overcome resistance, Kotter & Schlesinger’s 
change influence strategies, Bowman and Deal’s view of reframing organizational 
change.
Kotter’s views o f how leadership influences cultural change in organizations. In 
his landmark book, Leading Change, Kotter (1996) focuses on ways to overcome 
resistance to change. According to Kotter, change initiatives often fail because leaders 
ignore norms and values that could be considered the bedrock of an organization’s 
culture. He proposes that “cultural renewal” can be the result of working systematically 
through an eight-stage change framework which includes: (a) establishing a sense of 
urgency; (b) creating the guiding coalition; (c) developing a vision and strategy; (d) 
communicating the change vision; (e) empowering broad-based action; (f) generating 
short-term wins; (g) consolidating gains and producing more change; and (h) anchoring 
new approaches in the culture. According to Kotter, any successful change effort needs to 
be “anchored” into the culture. He warns, “When the new practices made in a 
transformation effort are not compatible with the relevant cultures, they will always be 
subject to regression” (p. 148). In other words, resistance will be a factor when change 
efforts do not account for the culture.
Kotter & Schlesinger’s views o f how leadership influences cultural change in 
organizations. Although Kotter and Schlesinger offer views about leadership and change 
resistance that do not focus specifically on cultural leadership, they seem to extend the 
cultural literature in a helpful way. As noted earlier, Kotter & Schlesinger (1992) suggest 
that as business environments become more competitive and organizations are forced to 
change, leadership will play an increasingly critical role in understanding and responding 
to organizational resistance. Several strategies have been proposed to help leaders
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influence the change process and outcome. These change influence strategies include: (a) 
education and communication; (b) participation and involvement; (c) facilitation and 
support; (d) negotiation and agreement; (e) manipulation and co-optation; and (f) explicit 
and implicit coercion. The authors also point out that other situational factors influence 
the effectiveness of these strategies. The amount and type of resistance that is anticipated, 
the position of the initiator in relation to the resistors, the people designing and 
implementing the change, and finally the stakes that are involved in the change initiative.
Bowman and Deal’s views o f how leadership influences cultural change in 
organizations. Bowman and Deal (1997) also examined culture and its role in 
organizations in their book Reframing Organizations. The authors generally support 
Schein’s formal definition of culture that said culture is “a pattern of shared beliefs” but 
point out that there is controversy about the relationship between culture and leadership 
(p. 231). They argue that there is a lack of clarity about whether leaders shape culture or 
are shaped by culture. Bowman and Deal suggest that each organization develops 
different beliefs and patterns over time.
Bowman and Deal point out that major organizational change creates four 
different issues. First, it affects people’s ability to feel effective, valued and in control. 
Second, change disrupts existing roles and working relationships yielding uncertainty and 
confusion. Third, change creates conflict between winners and losers, that is, those who 
benefit from the change and those who don’t. Finally, change causes a loss of meaning 
for people on the receiving end of the change (Bowman and Deal, 1997). The authors 
conclude that successful change requires a well orchestrated, integrated design that 
responds to the needs for learning and alignment, negotiation, and grieving (p. 339).
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Summary
This last section presented some of the seminal ideas in the literature about the 
role of leaders in influencing, shaping and changing organizational culture that are 
relevant to this dissertation. Several important leadership theorists of the last half of the 
21st century—Bums, Greenleaf, Rost, Heifetz and Kotter—were discussed. Additionally, 
a review of the cultural leadership literature was divided into two parts: (a) general views 
of how leadership influences cultural change in organizations (i.e., Schein; Trice and 
Beyer; Lewin; and Senge) and (b) specific procedures of theory and application for how 
leadership influences cultural change in organizations (i.e., Kotter; Kotter & Schlesinger; 
and Bowman & Deal). These theorists view’s provided both common constructs and 
specific steps that are helpful for understanding the process of creating and managing 
organizational culture and applications for overcoming resistance to change. Despite the 
apparent similarities and overlap among some of the theorists’ views, some fundamental 
differences of note are discussed in the conclusion.
Conclusion
At a general level, there appears to be two different views about the notion of 
leadership— transactional/technical vs. transformational/adaptive leadership. 
Transactional/technical leadership is similar to Bums’ view of transactional leadership, 
Rost’s view of management, and Heifetz’s view of leadership that focuses on technical 
challenges. The main focus of these views are that leadership contains a kind of intrinsic 
power that is equated with either positional authority or personal characteristics.
The contrast of this view is transformational/adaptive leadership. By 
transformational/adaptive leadership the literature seems to identify leadership as an act 
or process that is shared by many people to accomplish a collective goal or moral
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purpose. This view of modem leadership that has recently emerged emphasizes shared- 
leadership and “other-focused” leadership is similar to Heifetz’s view of leadership, 
aspects of Bums’ transformational leadership, and Greenleaf’s view of servant- 
leadership.
The importance of the distinction drawn in the literature between 
transactional/technical and transformational/adaptive leadership is how theorists have 
used each construct. One would expect that cultural theorists would use transformational 
and adaptive views of leadership for change. The literature presents a different view that 
seems to indicate cultural theorists views are more aligned with transactional/technical 
leadership. As a result, most of the literature to date on the subject has been generated 
based on this view of leadership. The implications for change resistance are significant. 
For example, rather than looking to a person in a positional leadership role or with 
specific personal characteristics to manage resistance in a large-scale change initiative, a 
transformational/adaptive leadership view takes a human-centered and distributed 
leadership approach to change management. The emphasis, from this perspective, is to 
try and understand why individuals resistant change and how to foster a community or 
culture that can adaptively respond to change.
Therefore, an overview of the relevant literature appears to support the rationale 
for my study about organizational change and culture. While this chapter examined 
previous research that is of particular importance to this study, the following chapter 
provides the methodology that guided my study.




The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed overview of the research 
design and methodology for the study being reported here. The chapter begins with a 
brief overview of the research methodology employed, and then specific information is 
presented about the procedures of the study. This information includes discussions of: the 
site and participants; the steps used to gain access to the organization studied; the 
researcher’s role in the study; and the data collection and analysis procedures. Finally, the 
procedures included to assure trustworthiness are discussed.
Research Methodology Overview 
Spurred on by the National Performance Review (NPR) and the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in 1993, the public sector pursued reinvention and 
transformation change initiatives. Based on what happened in the private sector, it is 
unlikely that all or even most of these public sector planned change initiatives have been 
successful. Clearly, organizational culture could be thought of as an intervening variable 
in any change initiative; in addition, leadership is a key contributor to the success or 
failure of a large-scale organizational change initiative (Lakomski, 2001; Hatch, 2000). I 
am interested in learning about leaders’ perceptions about how they have influenced 
large-scale, planned organizational change. More specifically, in this study, I wanted to 
investigate how leaders in one organization undergoing a large change initiative say they 
used—and were constrained by—organizational culture in efforts to minimize resistance 
and maximize acceptance of organizational change.
The interpretative tradition of qualitative research (Spradley, 1979) was deemed 
the most appropriate by the researcher for studying the perceptions of leaders who have
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experienced planned organizational change. This study was a continuation and expansion 
of preliminary fieldwork and analysis conducted prior to—and with the goal of 
informing—the proposal development process; both the preliminary project and this 
expansion of it were designed to add to the field’s understanding of organizational 
change resistance.
For this study, I selected six participants from a combined government and 
military organization that had recently experienced a planned change effort. Participants 
were chosen purposefully in order to “focus on selecting information-rich cases whose 
study will illuminate the questions under study” (Patton, 2003, p. 230). In this regard, I 
chose participants that I judged would provide information that would address the 
purpose of this study. The specific criteria employed to select these individuals are 
detailed below. In addition, to counteract any sampling bias that might have been 
associated with my selection of the six interviewees, these interviewees were asked to 
identify anyone in the organization familiar with the planned change effort that sees the 
effort substantially differently than they do. This procedure netted two additional 
participants for the study.
Data were collected primarily through interviews. Initially, I examined the 
experiences of each of these six leaders individually; I treated each of these individuals as 
a case and utilized traditional case analysis procedures that are described in detail in the 
next section to organize and analyze my data initially. I then used a qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) approach to analyze findings across cases (Patton, 2002). 
This cross-case pattern analysis was used to “retain the strength of holism embedded in 
context-rich individual cases while making possible systematic comparisons o f ... [a 
number] of cases” (Patton, 2002, p. 492). My prior role as a change management
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consultant within the organization studied helped me gain access to the organization in 
which the research was conducted. The notes I took in my consultant role in this 
organization were used for triangulation purposes.
Specific Procedures
This study built on preliminary research that functioned, in essence, as a pilot for 
the work done in this dissertation study. This preliminary study was conducted in March- 
April 2003 to fulfill a requirement for the Advanced Qualitative Research Methods 
course at the University of San Diego. Two leaders of a government/military organization 
(i.e., members of the internal change team that had been designated by the organization to 
lead the FA effort while continuing to play their designated leadership/management role 
within the organization) that had recently undergone a major change effort were 
interviewed, and the data from these interviews were analyzed along with other data (e.g., 
relevant documents and artifacts) that were used primarily for triangulation purposes. The 
procedures used in the preliminary study were nearly identical to the procedures that 
were used in the subsequent dissertation study that are described below. A limited 
number of differences—some of which were responses to issues that arise during the 
preliminary work—will be highlighted in the discussion that follows.
The remainder of this section discusses the following topics: the researcher’s role, 
site selection, access, participant selection, data collection, and data analysis.
Researcher Role
Glesne (1999) suggests that there are “predispositions” that qualitative researchers 
should carry with them into all research situations (p. 41). Glesne advises, for example, 
that qualitative researchers should be “ever conscious of [their] verbal and nonverbal 
behavior” and attend to their “behavior and it’s impact” on participants (Glesne, p. 41). In
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
both the preliminary study and the study being reported here, I attempted to use this 
advice as I played a number of different roles in the study: interviewer, participant 
observer, and learner.
In my primary role of interviewer, I used a range of strategies. These are detailed 
in the discussion of data collection procedures below. In addition to serving as an 
interviewer, I had, prior to the actual start of the study, worked as a member of the 
external consulting firm the group had hired to assist them with the change effort. 
Consequently, in some respects, it could be said that I also functioned as a “participant 
observer” (Glesne, p. 41), especially since I used notes written while functioning as a 
consultant to triangulate the interview data I had gathered.
Throughout the study, I also attempted to play the role of researcher as “learner” 
(Glesne, p. 41). I strived to keep a “sense of self from the beginning” and “reflect on all 
aspects of research procedures and findings” while in this role (p. 41). During interviews, 
for example, I approached each situation interested in learning about the participants and 
their perspective of the phenomenon under study. In this sense, I tried to encourage the 
respondents to speak freely and not to make them feel that I was an “expert or an 
authority.” My own interest as a learner was to understand and explore perceptions about 
leadership, organizational change resistance, and culture. I should add that I approached 
playing the consultant role with a similar sort of mind set: Any good consultant, in my 
judgment, is a learner before he or she can function as a teacher.
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Site Selection
Both the preliminary and the pilot studies were conducted in an organization that 
is being referred to by the pseudonym, Southern California Support Services (SCSS).2 
The SCSS, a U.S. Navy organization that is a somewhat unique blend of military and 
civilian personnel, is located in Southern California and was identified from my previous 
consulting work the SCSS was chosen because it embodies a number of characteristics 
that constitute a good environment for looking at leaders perceptions of a substantial 
change initiative in a large and complex organization.
The organization, for example, has over 2,000 employees, a multi-tiered 
hierarchical structure (e.g., executive level, management level, and staff level 
employees), and multiple departments (e.g., community support services division, 
housing division, food services, etc.) . The organization also is dispersed over a number 
of geographic locations. Even more important, the organization had recently completed a 
large-scale, planned organizational change initiative—the Functionality Assessment 
(FA). The FA took place over two and one-half years, from 1999 to 2002. This change 
initiative involved five divisions in the SCSS organization and included significant 
reform in operations, staffing, organizational structure and facilities. The FA process is 
similar to other large planned change efforts commonly referred to as Business Process 
Reengineering (Hammer, 1993). (Please see Appendix D for definitions and additional 
explanations of terminology particular to the study.)
Access
As a former consultant to the Community Support Service organization, and 
current consultant and advisor to the Navy, I made use of relationships I had established
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with former clients. These clients served in a leadership role during the FA change effort 
and expressed interest in participating in a study of this nature. In order to conduct 
research in the SCSS organization, I contacted the organization’s gatekeeper, i.e., “the 
person... who must give their consent before you may enter a research setting, and with 
whom you must negotiate the conditions of access” (Glesne, 1999; pg. 39). The Navy’s 
Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) for the SCSS organization served in this role and gave 
permission on two occasions, once for the preliminary study and again for the 
dissertation, to conduct the study (See Appendix E & F for the study approval letters). 
Participant Selection
As mentioned above, within the organization itself, I used a purposeful, intensive 
sampling strategy to identify a group of potential participants (Patton, 2003). Specifically, 
I decided to target the members of the internal change team that had been designated by 
the organization to lead the FA effort with the assistance of a group of external 
consultants.3 The change team consisted of organizational members who performed a 
dual role that entailed serving as an internal change agents while continuing to play their 
designated leadership/management role within the organization. These roles included: 
Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS), Director of Bachelor Housing, Director of Military 
Family Housing, Director of Moral, Welfare & Recreation; Director of Food Services, 
and Director of Marriage and Family Services. The person who played the last role also 
served as the FA Director.
1 The Southern California Support Services (SCSS) organization had a different organizational
name identity before the Change Study.
3 The term leadership has been extensively used by academics and practitioners and can vary
widely in its meaning and intent (Bums, 1978; Rost, 1993). For purposes of this study, leadership refers to 
those serving in a formal position of authority in the organization. Thus, the candidates for participation in 
the study made up the team o f individuals that was designated to lead the FA change initiative.
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During the preliminary study, two of six team members were randomly identified 
and asked to participate; during the dissertation study, all six members were asked to 
participate and all six agreed to be interviewed. The original plan for the dissertation 
study was to interview only the four additional team members who had not been 
interviewed in the preliminary study and to use the preliminary study interview data in 
the dissertation work. However, after I decided to substantially revise the interview guide 
used in the preliminary study in order to hopefully net richer and more detailed 
information (See Appendix A for the Preliminary Study Interview Guide and Appendix B 
for a copy of the Interview Guide that was used in this study), I decided to re-interview 
two original members from the preliminary project.
In addition, to guard against sampling bias, I decided to employ an additional 
sampling technique, a version of snowball sampling (Patton, 2002; p. 237). At the end of 
each of the initial six interviews, I asked interviewees whether there was any member of 
the organization who had a substantially different view of the change process than the 
one they had just articulated. Several participants identified other participants that had 
already been interviewed or were slated to be interviewed. Four different people were 
named by three different leadership team members. Two of the four had either moved or 
retired and were not available for interview. I then made arrangements to interview the 
other two identified persons.
Access to the six leadership members—and to the additional two participants 
identified by snowball sampling techniques—was facilitated by my previous consulting 
role with the organization that assisted with the change effort. The contact procedures 
used in the dissertation study were the same as the procedures used in the preliminary 
study. Potential interviewees were contacted by phone. During the phone conversation,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
the study was described and the person was invited to participate in the study. After 
individuals agreed to participate, I made arrangements to meet with each participant in 
person to explain the informed consent form and, after an explanation was provided and a 
participant’s questions were answered, to have the participant sign the form. After the 
form was signed, the interview was conducted.
All readily agreed to participate when I contacted them. That meant that I was 
able to interview the entire leadership team (as opposed to selecting interviewees 
randomly as was done in the preliminary study). The leadership team had members from 
all five-business divisions within the organization.
The two additional interviewees identified during the snowball technique were 
managers within the organization who were familiar with the FA change initiative. They 
worked in two different divisions within the company.
Data Collection
Interview procedures. As has already been noted, the primary data collection 
strategy used in this dissertation was interviewing. An Interview Guide approach was 
used (Patton, 2002; p. 343) in the study. With this approach, possible questions are 
defined in advance, but not necessarily asked in precisely the way they were formulated 
in the guide or in the exact order. By using this approach, I retained the freedom to 
explore topics and create something resembling a natural conversation with the 
participants. The interview guide approach, however, also provided a degree of structure 
even as I attempted to make the interview “feel” as natural as possible within reasonable 
limits. Among other things, the guide helped insure that our “conversations” did not 
deviate too far from the topic of the research and that key questions did not get ignored.
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In addition, the use of preformed questions—unless there was a good reason to deviate 
from them—minimized inappropriate variance across interviews.
The questions in the dissertation study interview guide were open-ended. Open- 
ended questions gave each participant considerable opportunity to frame and structure his 
or her response. Questions began with the general and moved to more specific topics. 
Initially, for example, I asked participants to describe their experience of the FA and their 
perceptions of the role they played. Later, the guide listed more specific questions 
focused on the respondent’s strategies for influencing resistance to, or acceptance of, 
organization change during the FA.
The interview guide included follow-up probes that could be used to encourage 
interviewees to expand upon cryptic or overly general responses. In addition, the guide 
had space in which I could record notes about things that were observed during the 
interview or later reflections about behaviors exhibited by interviewees. These notes 
supplemented the transcriptions from tapes of the interviews. (The taping and 
transcription process is discussed below.)
As already noted, experiences with the guide developed for use during the 
preliminary study led to a revised guide that was used during dissertation study. 
Specifically, the Interview Guide asked for more information about the person’s 
background, including their prior leadership experiences. This additional information 
allowed me to assess the different perspectives I heard in context and, consequently, to 
construct a richer understanding of each case. The Interview Guide questions were also 
rearranged to introduce research questions in a more logical sequence, while still 
allowing for flexibility to address “unscripted” discussions that emerge during the
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interview. A copy of the Interview Guides for both the preliminary study and dissertation 
study can be found in Appendices A and B.
To supplement the Interview Guide, I used two timeline analysis tools. The first 
timeline, the Life Timeline Analysis (LTA), represented the participant’s life. A blank 
timeline was presented to participants at the beginning of the interview and participants 
were asked to notate key events and milestones that have occurred in their life up to this 
point. The timeline included a single blank line with a portion above the timeline to 
provide dates and a portion below to list the milestones and events. This format provided 
participants a chance to reflect freely and provide background and insight into particular 
events hat occurred in their personal life prior to the FA experience. The second timeline, 
the Functionality Assessment Timeline Analysis (FATA), was similar to the LTA but 
offered a tool for participants to reflect on events and dates that stood out about the FA 
change initiative. As was the case with the personal life history timeline, participants 
were given a sheet of paper with a single blank line on it. In this case, however, because 
there were some key events such as the official start of the project and its official 
conclusion, participants were also allowed to see a timeline prepared by me that listed 
some key events that were a matter of record. This partially filled-in timeline, as well as 
the two open-ended timelines, are included in Appendices D and C.
Additional data collection methods. Although interviewing was the major source 
of data in this study, other data sources were used to triangulate interview findings. 
Documents related to the FA initiative were also gathered. These documents included 
information about the organization’s history, the staff, financial records, processes, 
structure, systems and strategies. As a former consultant to the organization during the 
FA change effort, I had access to these documents. In addition, as part of my consultant
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role, I had taken notes during meetings I attended and while interviewing staff. These 
notes also functioned as another source of triangulation.
Also, after I had traded in my consultant role for the role of a researcher, I used a 
research journal to document my observations, my reactions to, and my reflections on 
interviews. Glesne (1999) recommends using analytic notes to record things that occur; 
she refers to these as memos to oneself. She notes that “reflective and analytic thoughts 
may come to you during participant observation and other times too” and it is important 
to record these thoughts (p. 53). When recording journal notes, I heeded the advice given 
by Patton (2002) and relied on personal reflexivity as one of the strategies I employed 
throughout the study. In this regard, I reflected on my own self-awareness and on my 
political and cultural perspective throughout the research process (p. 299). Such 
reflection seemed especially important in this study because of the role I, and the 
company I work for, had previously played within this organization’s change initiative. 
Data Analysis
Individual case analysis. As was suggested above, data analysis was done in two 
stages. Initially, the responses of each individual were treated as an individual case and 
analyzed accordingly. Each interview was audio taped and the tape was transcribed for 
data analysis. To ensure accuracy, participants were asked via E-mail to review 
transcripts and provide changes or clarifications. (E-mail was also used during a later part 
of the analysis process to clarify something that was unclear in the interview transcript.)
During the individual case analysis, I relied on two principal sources for 
categories with which to organize and analyze the case data recorded after these data had 
been reviewed and, if necessary, modified by the relevant interviewee. The first source
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
were the research questions that guided the inquiry and reflected the purpose of the study. 
The second was the data themselves and the themes that emerged from these data.
This second source of categories (and also the relatively open-ended nature of the 
research questions) suggest that, at least to some extent, I approached analysis with a 
grounded-theory sensibility oriented toward building rather than testing theory, though, 
of course, the literature on organizational culture and resistance influenced the initial 
conceptualization of the study and its research questions. During analysis, therefore, I 
attempted to be both systematic and creative, in an effort to understand participants' 
viewpoints and to use these viewpoints to establish building blocks for theory (Patton, 
2002; p. 127).
Operationally, this translated into, first, transforming the interview guide 
questions—which were created from my research questions—into coding categories, and 
using these categories to do an initial coding of the data (i.e., the transcripts themselves 
and the notes that had been written on the interview guides during and after the 
interviews). Then, I sought subcodes within each of the general codes that had been 
created from the interview guide questions by reading and rereading the data that had 
been associated with each of the first cut codes. In time, themes and patterns emerged and 
these themes and patterns were translated into new codes to further categorize the data 
that had been put into the preliminary coding categories. This process was similar to what 
Patton (2002, p. 453) describes as content analysis, a process of qualitative data reduction 
steps to make sense of the voluminous data and sifting out the key meanings and patterns.
The various FA initiative documents were used to triangulate the various 
categories and their contents that had been developed to organize the information that 
each interviewee provided. For example, documents that illustrated the organization’s
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structure were used to understand the reporting relationships between FA leaders and 
other organization leaders, managers and staff. I also reviewed a newsletter, the 
FANewsletter, which provided a monthly update of FA activities, progress being made on 
the project, and a section devoted to FA questions and concerns. Additionally, I reviewed 
presentations and documents that focused on the methodology or approach being used to 
execute the FA project. Various other documents were also consulted including program 
financial information, personnel lists, strategic plans, and business plans. All of these 
documents, or what Edgar Schein (1992) refers to as artifacts, were consulted to shed 
light on the “visible” level of the organization and use to triangulate interview data and 
understand the specific language and events unique to the FA initiative (p. 17).
Cross case analysis. After the individual cases were analyzed, I looked for 
patterns across the codes and categories of each of the eight cases. Once again, codes 
derived from the interview questions were used to organize the analysis initially; then the 
more emergent codes associated with each of the initial codes were compared and 
contrasted across the eight cases. Matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1984) were used during 
this part of the analysis process. Specifically, the data matrix contains a top row for 
participant pseudonyms and left column for key categories based on the interview guide 
and research questions. At least some of the matrices contains direct quotes from 
participant interviews. Other matrices contain researcher comments on categories and 
themes. I used a word processor, ATLAS.ti® and Microsoft Word® to help organize and 
relate information in the matrices. Atlas.ti was used to uncover complex phenomenona 
hidden in text in an exploratory way. This tool provided a means to extract, code, 
compare, explore, and reassemble meaningful pieces from extensive amounts of data in
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creative, flexible and systematic ways. The data analysis matrix is provided in 
Appendix E.
A combination of two analysis approaches, which Polkinghome (1995) refers to 
as the analysis o f narrative and narrative analysis, were employed. Primarily, I used the 
technique of analysis o f narrative to make sense of the interview responses and 
experiences described by participants. Polkinghome (1995) describes this technique in 
the following way:
[In] analysis of narratives, researchers collect stories as data and analyze them 
with paradigmatic processes. The paradigmatic analysis results in descriptions of 
themes that hold across the stories in or taxonomies of types of stories, characters, 
or settings...Thus, analysis of narrative moves from stories to common 
elements, (p. 12)
The narrative analysis approach was used to arrange the chronology of events and 
organize many of the research findings.
Throughout this narrative, I have used pseudonyms for both the organization and 
the central actors/characters in the story. For Institutional Review Board (IRB) issues 
related to confidentiality, the other members of the leadership team who participated in 
the study are mentioned by pseudonym name or position. The information provided by 
these actors—along with the information gleaned from the analysis of documents and 
participant observation in the organization—was synthesized (Polkinghome, 1995) into 
one story. The multiple data sources used to construct the case “story” presented below 
helped link events chronologically and thematically and also made it possible to 
triangulate data and the interpretations of data implicit in the story.
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The eight participants (leaders) who are referred to here as: CDR Kelly Valencia, 
Dr. Mary Rotterman, Sr. Chief Norma Lewis, Linda McGinn, Ruth Christopherson, 
Barbara Montoya, Damaris Wilson, and CAPT Nancy Avila.
Products
A case study approach was used to organize and describe in analysis of narrative 
form each participant’s experience in the organizational change projects. The first part of 
analysis included a case approach of individual cases to explore emergent qualitative 
findings. Using a technique similar to what Patton (2002) describes as a qualitative 
comparative analysis approach (QCA), the second part of analysis analyzed data across 
cases. The analysis from this study serves as the written product of my dissertation and a 
qualitative framework for guiding follow-on research.
Summary
This chapter of the dissertation provided an overview of the methods employed in 
this study. Detailed steps were described about the study and how the research questions 
would be explored through scientific inquiry and methodological rigor. Specifically, this 
chapter outlined the steps employed in this research study.
General procedures and guidelines for this research study were informed by a 
preliminary study. Changes to the research study included selecting four additional 
participants, identifying two more participants through a snowballing technique, changes 
to the interview guide and modifications in data analysis procedures.
This chapter also discusses my role in the study, criterion for site selection and 
access to the organization. The process of participant selection and how data was 
collected was outlined, and a review of the products from this dissertation study
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concluded the second phase. Finally, a brief sketch of the dissertation’s organization was 
presented.
The next chapter presents the findings of the research study. This section 
discusses the story of major organizational change at SCSS. Specifically, the chapter 
analyzes the narratives of eight primary characters and their experiences before, during 
and after the Functionality Assessment (FA).




THE STORY OF MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AT SCSS—LIFE 
BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE FUNCTIONALITY ASSESSMENT (FA)
This chapter presents the findings regarding the ways in which leaders use and are 
constrained by organizational culture to respond to resistance to change. The primary 
methodology used to describe the contents of this study was analysis of narrative 
(Polkinghome, 1995). This qualitative approach was discussed in more detail in Chapter 
3, which focused on the methodology.
This story is about leaders’ perceptions of change and the influence that culture 
has on resistance to change throughout a two and half year organization transformation 
effort. Specifically, I looked at how leaders thought culture influenced change and 
resistance during the Functionality Assessment (FA) at the Southern California Support 
Services (SCSS) organization.4 As with most stories, the FA change effort has a 
beginning, middle and an end. To help guide the story and configure the primary themes,
I used three sections to organize the main themes and findings of the research. The three 
sections focus on: (a) life before the FA; (b) life during the FA; and (c) life after the FA. 
Each section is described in detail below.
Life Before the FA
This first section, “Life Before the FA,” provides an overview of the team, central 
character descriptions, initial views about the FA and the key characteristics of this 
particular mixed military and government culture.
4 As discussed in the Chapter 3, the SCSS is a large combined military and civilian U.S. Navy 
organization located in Southern California.
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Assembling the Change Team
The primary actors in the FA are central to recounting the story of change in the 
SCSS organization and are a central focus of this narrative. The FA leadership team 
consisted of managers from the various support service organizations that made up the 
overall SCSS organization. As discussed Chapter 3, the change team consisted of 
organizational members who performed a dual role that entailed serving as internal 
change agents while continuing to play their designated leadership/management role 
within the organization.
The FA team make-up went through different staff during the project. At the onset 
of the FA, the team consisted of three men and five women. All were Caucasian and in 
their 40s or 50s. The civilian/military ratio of the team was 3 to 5. All team members had 
worked predominantly in public sector organizations for most of their professional lives; 
some, however, had worked primarily in government while others had had experience in 
military organizations.
During the FA study, one of the men left the organization to take another job, and 
two of the men retired. When they left, the civilian/military ratio within the team and the 
age and work experience of participants did not change, but there was a significant 
change in the gender of the team. All three of the men who left the organization were 
replaced by Caucasian women, and each of these women assumed the FA team 
responsibilities that their male predecessors had had prior to leaving the organization. 
Thus, over time, the FA team became entirely female. Consequently, the story of the 
leadership of the FA change effort is largely the story of these women’s leadership.
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The Main Characters
The personalities and background of each FA team member are important 
components of the FA story. This section provides brief descriptions of each team 
member and some telling data about each person that emerged from the interviews and 
observations.
Captain (CAPT) Nora Avian. CAPT Avian held the highest military position in 
the SCSS organization. Her position was roughly equivalent to the position of CEO in 
private industry. The only difference is that, in the military chain of command, she did 
not report to a board of trustees; rather she reported to an even higher ranking officer, the 
chief of staff.
Physically, Nora5 was hardly imposing; she had a small frame and was barely five 
feet tall. Nevertheless, her high military ranking and enthusiasm captured people’s 
attention and demanded respect. Nora, in fact, had a reputation among the team and 
throughout the organization for making quick decisions. This characteristic was very 
evident during the FA process.
Although Nora was not the FA team lead, she did serve as the ultimate authority 
in the organization for making final decisions regarding FA changes and 
recommendations. Interview data also indicate that Nora’s authoritative leadership 
approach to staff, process, operation, and finance decisions often intimidated staff and 
employees; these data also were triangulated by observations of the FA process.
Dr. Martha Ritter. Dr. Ritter was the designated FA team lead for the FA change 
project. She has “been working for the Navy for over fifteen years in social service
5 A military officer is typically addressed by their formal title and last name (i.e., CAPT Avian), 
however, as a result of working closely with the FA team I had developed rapport and felt comfortable 
addressing them by their first name.
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programs” and was the resident expert for large change projects. Prior to coming to work 
for the Navy, she “owned a consulting business” on the east coast. Mary had an 
entrepreneurial approach to the FA and pushed other team members hard to make 
significant changes and achieve savings for the Navy.
Commander (CDR) Kelsey Vega. CDR Vega replaced the male Bachelor Housing 
manager that left the organization and she joined the FA team. Kelsey was an up-and- 
coming junior career military officer. She knew how to get respect from personnel at all 
levels in both civilian and military organizations. Kelsey described a situation which 
occurred early in her career of standing up to a male military officer who was not 
showing her respect, “This is still the military, where you will salute me and call me by 
my military name.” She was not afraid to roll-up her sleeves and to do the hard work of 
organizational change and lead the way, even when she was challenged by the different 
views of other team members wanting to protect the “status quo” in the organization. 
Kelsey took full responsibility for the outcomes associated with her actions.
Senior Chief Nancy Lewin. Senior Chief Nancy Lewin became a team member 
when a senior male military member was transferred to a position out of state. She often 
focused on the human aspect of change and reminded the leadership team of this quality 
when sensitive personnel decisions were being made. Nancy’s focus was on doing the 
best thing for the sailor and for the organization.
Lauren Maggin. Lauren supported the Military Family Housing division. She 
assumed the head role over the division when her boss, who, like Kelsey Vega, retired 
and moved overseas; she assumed all of their predecessor’s responsibilities including his 
responsibilities as a member of the FA leadership team. Lauren was skeptical of the 
change effort throughout most of the FA and often tried to protect her employees from
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change. Lauren saw that military and government approached FA issues differently and 
usually sided with the government. Lauren had been a government housing employee 
since the beginning of her career.
Rachel Christian. Rachel, who headed the Morale, Welfare and Recreation 
(MWR) department, was one of the only FA team members to have worked in private 
industry. Her private industry experience gave her a different perspective of the FA from 
other leadership members. Rachel understood the business aspects of the FA and often 
attempted to present multiple views of FA change issues to military and government 
leadership members. She valued the outside advice provided by the consultant team and 
promoted their viewpoints within the FA leadership team.
Brenda Menton. Brenda became head of the Food Services organization in the 
early part of the FA change initiative after the prior head retired. Brenda had work 
experience in the private industry before coming to the Navy. Brenda’s prior work 
experience, like Rachel’s, made her more sensitive to the business “bottom line” often 
associated with private industry. Nevertheless, Brenda was protective of the way that her 
department conducted its business and took issue when told another way to run her 
business.
Dedra Wesson. Unlike the other members of the FA team, Dedra did not have a 
formal leadership position in the organization. Rather, she supported Dr. Ritter in the 
Social Services department. Dedra was selected to the FA team based on her two 
previous experiences with large-scale government change efforts. Dedra was skeptical 
about the consulting team that assisted with the FA (i.e., the organization I was a part of) 
and often challenged recommendations based on her previous change experiences.
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Summary. The eight individuals briefly described in this section made up the FA 
team. Their combined experiences and unique personalities were key components of the 
FA change story being recounted here. Other key components are described below.
A “Mixed” View o f Change
Each the team members thought of the FA effort differently. While everyone 
agreed that the FA was a significant “change effort” for the SCSS organization, each 
individual tended to see the FA as either a negative or positive initiative. Certain 
individual’s views shifted about the initiative during the process. What follows, however, 
is a summary of the thinking that different subgroups articulated at the start of the FA 
initiative.
Negative views o f the FA and their causes. Even before the FA started, the 
majority of the team members had negative views about the change initiative. Team 
members identified various factors that accounted for their negative perceptions: (a) 
negative experiences with other change efforts in the past; (b) a history of unsuccessful 
change in SCSS organization; and (c) the Navy’s approach to rapid organizational 
change; and (d) turnover in military leadership positions. Each of these views is discussed 
in some detail below.
Most members recalled negative experiences with other significant change events 
that occurred during their careers in the Navy and saw the FA through the lenses these 
earlier change initiatives had created. Several members had worked in the SCSS 
organization prior to FA and remember undergoing “regionalization.” Regionalization 
was described as the process the Navy went through to consolidate and standardize 
similar services (e.g., recreation, food, counseling, and housing services) that were 
provided to service men and women across all SCSS organizations in the South Western
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region of the United States. Regionalization required major personnel and organizational 
structure changes. As CAPT Avian recalled, “We went through regionalization and 
people went away.” These changes created a separation between central headquarters and 
remote SCSS sites, referred to as “Metropolitan” (Metro) and “Over-the-Horizon”
(OTH), respectively. The regionalization initiative stood out in leaders’ minds because it 
was a major change event that affected the entire region (e.g., employees were required to 
move, employees’ jobs changed, and many staff experienced stressful change and 
uncertainty). Although the outcomes from regionalization helped reduce government 
costs and standardize services between organizations, most people in the SCSS 
organization felt that employee morale suffered as a result of the tremendous adjustment. 
As a result, most of the FA team members saw regionalization as a failure and wondered 
if the FA would play out in similar ways.
Several members also were skeptical about the history of effective change within 
the SSCS itself. Some members reflected on their earlier experiences with unsuccessful 
change initiatives and described the feeling as, “Oh, no, here we go again.” A few of the 
members who had been in the organization for more than five years, viewed the FA as an 
attempt to “fix something [that wasn’t broke].” Although these views were not equally 
shared by all members, it was generally agreed that the Navy in general, and the SCSS 
organization in particular, did not have the best track record when it came to 
organizational change.
The Navy’s continuous and rapid approach to organizational change also surfaced 
as a reason why the organization had struggled with past change initiatives. Those who 
stated that the Navy was changing too rapidly, and too often, felt that the Navy’s change 
approach was ineffective in accomplishing the goals of change initiatives. This view was
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shared by at least one of the team members who explained that the Navy had undergone 
organizational change for as long as she could recall. She warned that “too much change 
too quickly... is hard for the organization to absorb.” Others agreed that the Navy’s 
approach of continuous change, or one change happening on top of another, was simply 
more than the organization could sustain.
Another reason why leaders seemed apprehensive about the FA was related to the 
ongoing turnover in military-occupied leadership positions in the SCSS organization. 
Military staff requirements necessitate military personnel to rotate or turn-over typically 
every three years. This constant turnover of personnel already caused ongoing 
disturbance throughout the organization, independent of specific change initiatives. Some 
members, including a military Commander, saw this constant change in military 
leadership as “disruptive to the organization.” Not surprisingly, these individuals did not 
welcome an additional change initiative and the additional disruptions it would cause.
Positive views o f the FA: two variations. Despite the dissenting views 
characterized above, some members of leadership team viewed the FA positively. They 
saw that the FA provided an opportunity to bring needed changes to the SCSS 
organization. Although the organization had gone through regionalization and made some 
changes a few years earlier, the FA provided what one member called a “fresh 
perspective” and more encompassing change that would, from this member’s perspective, 
help improve the services offered to SCSS’s customers.
There were also some leadership team members whose thinking could be 
characterized as positive, but who were not especially enthusiastic about the FA project. 
From their perspective, the FA was better than the consequences of not doing anything. 
Those who felt this way viewed the FA as a way to avoid an even worse fate—changes
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mandated by the Navy. From their perspective, the decision to conduct the FA study, at 
least in part, was seen as a way to avoid an alternative government change effort that 
might have more drastic consequences.
Life in the Real World
One theme that was discussed by the team members during interviews was the 
relative effectiveness of the SCSS organization when compared to comparable private 
industry organizations. The vast majority of team members thought that private 
organizations were more effective, had more freedom, and respected their employees 
more than the SCSS organization did. Team members often referred to private industry 
organizations as the “real world” versus life in the military or public industry. One 
military member, for example, said that “in private organizations, as opposed to working 
in the military, private organizations rely on results...to achieve their goals.” Team 
members also attributed other benefits to private industry’s focus on profit and “bottom- 
line” results. One team member, for instance, said: “The [private] organization worked as 
a team in harmony, with as little turnover and with as much productivity as possible so 
that [the organization] achieved where they were going.” The leaders and managers in 
these “outside” organizations were seen as being “less intrusive into the process” and just 
saying, “Here is your goal.” This was not seen as being the case in the SSCS 
organization.
The concept of competition and good leadership skills were seen as missing in the 
government workplace. Dr. Ritter commented that “there’s less competition [in the 
military and public sector organizations]”; she also noted that, in private industry, 
competition drives performance and results. In the private industry, she said, “Your folks 
knew what they needed. They felt empowered to help you get there. They were part of a
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team. You were a good leader...you achieved your goals and you helped the company 
make it’s profit.”
Another civilian team member who had also worked in private industry said, “It’s 
different here because there isn’t as much emphasis put on the total quality leadership 
skills.. .the total package of a leader.” As a result of this organization’s less than holistic 
approach, one team member described feeling a little lost and confused “working in this 
environment.. .there’s too many cook’s in the kitchen. I don’t even know how to define 
who is the leader.”
A somewhat different perspective was exhibited by certain other team members. 
These members did not necessarily view the public sector as being superior to private 
industry, however. Rather, they felt that the mixed military and civilian organization was 
a more challenging environment to operate in than private industry and, consequently, 
believed that those who successfully negotiated this more challenging environment were 
more savvy and competent than their counterparts in the private sector. As one person put 
it, “Explaining [the ways we do business], is always interesting to [private industry] 
because I don’t think [they] think we do business as they do.” Another team member 
shared a similar view when she said the following:
I tried to infiltrate the outside because I felt like they were further advanced in 
technology and in ideas [that gave them the] competitive edge in San Diego. So I 
tried to bring somebody in from the outside. They found it very hard, truthfully 
they couldn't cope. The rules were so tight, rules were so much tighter than on the 
outside.
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A “Mixed” Breed: The Combined Military & Civilian Organization
Another theme emerging from the analysis of the interview data related to the 
unique characteristics of a hybrid organization. Team members described an organization 
that was very different from both an all-civilian or an all-military organization. One 
civilian described the type of organization as “the melding of different cultures.”
Similarly one military member suggested that “the two groups really do come from two 
different worlds.. .and that there are things in common and there are things that are not.” 
Not surprisingly, civilian and military team members held different views about 
each other. These different views created a number of dynamics around issues of 
equality, authority, and values. These dynamics are characterized in the remainder of this 
section and in the discussion about culture and its impact on the FA initiative later in this 
chapter.
Us vs. them: a top-down view. The issue of civilian equality in a military 
organization was something FA members commented on and was described as an “us vs. 
them” attitude. One civilian member said that the military had the view that
I’m ultimately in charge and you are subordinate. It’s very much a 
subordinate mentality in the military with the civilian workforce. There’s 
an attitude that the civilian can be replaced as easily as a hammer in a 
toolbox. It’s just another tool in the box.
Another civilian member expressed a similar view when she stated, “I’ve gotten used to 
it., .but you know where you stand as a civilian within the organization; more like a 
second-class citizen.” She went on to note that “there’s always pressure to conform to the 
military environment and you’re not always able to be yourself, which is not a good thing 
for a lot of people.”
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To some extent, the above views might be seen as simply a reflection of the top- 
down nature of the military, an organization which is, after all, built around the chain of 
command. A civilian member of the team, however, did speak of variation even within 
military contexts. She noted: “Sometimes the military accepts and teams with their 
civilian workforce better than others—from the president's administration on down, how 
they value and enforce the relationship and the equality of the civilian and military 
workforce varies in different situations.” In the SCSS, however, civilian members 
perceived both that they were being treated as second class citizens and working for a 
very top-down organization.
Different views on work and change. Military and civilian team members held 
different views of each other with regards to work and change in the organization. One 
military member commented that “civil service really has huge job security. It is hard to 
fire them. They are definitely an eight to four kind of group.” From the civilian side, FA 
members also viewed the military work culture as unique. “It’s a different perspective. 
Theirs is more of a temporary kind of lifestyle, and so some of the [issues] of 
management...are arrived [at] from a different perspective than...from the civilian side.”
Team members also pointed out that because of their different views of work and 
different statuses within the work culture (e.g., the security provided by civil service 
protection), military and civilians respond differently to organizational change. Military 
work requires a job change every two to three years, and sometimes a relocation or 
completely new job. In general, FA team members who were from the military side of the 
organization felt that, because of this characteristic of their work, military personnel are 
more used to change than their civilian counterparts are. Even civilian members took note 
of this characteristic. One civilian commented, for example, “It [frequent change] can be
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a benefit because you get a fresh look at an organization every two to three years...and 
sometimes status quo is not necessarily the best way to go.” However, several FA 
civilians saw a downside to the transient nature associated with the military work culture. 
Since the military were always rotating jobs, there is usually a “lack of continuity at 
work,” one civilian team member noted. Some members also felt that this lack of 
continuity contributed to a loss of organizational memory and continually imposed a 
steep learning curve that can be really disruptive to the organization (LM). One military 
member also admitted that the Navy’s way of business requires military to be constantly 
on the move in order to advance in the organization. She noted that military personnel 
“can’t just sit in the cubicle being a military person. You’ve got to be the hamster on the 
wheel or you’re not promoted.” These fundamental differences in work perspectives 
created tension between how military and civilians viewed the FA.
On the other hand, civilian personnel are seen as much more stable at work. Some 
FA members saw this stability as being positive; others saw it as negative. One 
interviewee who viewed civilians’ stability as positive, for example, said, “The good side 
is that you’ve got a knowledge base there and a lot of experience that the organization 
can take advantage of.” The Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) and head of the SCSS 
organization said much the same thing when she noted that
they’re [civilians] just as good as any military person, and in some ways 
they’re better; because one becomes the expert in their fields and their 
functions...without them this organization would not function. They made 
it.. .they were the backbone of it and it was not the sailors.. .it wasn’t the 
marines.. .it was the civilians and I was proud to work with them.
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CDR Vega, another military team leader, on the other hand, pointed out some of 
the downsides of stability. She suggested that civilians can “plod along in the same job 
for twenty to forty years. It’s very comforting to them.” According to this FA team 
member, change is difficult for civilians. She stated, “So when you try to change 
something that they’ve been doing for the last twenty years, [it’s], “Don’t mess with my 
cubicle!” [They get] extremely comfortable, and they can’t be fired.” Military members 
pointed out that this type of attitude makes it hard because there is constant change in the 
Navy. One civilian also shared this less-than-positive perspective of civilian stability. She 
stated that “when you have a civilian workforce with not a lot of change.. .you can get 
stuck in a rut.”
The benefits o f a mixed organization. Some members of the FA team held a 
positive view about working in a combined military and civilian organization. They felt 
that having an organization made up of military and civilians provided the best of both 
worlds. As one military officer said about the FA, “I rather enjoyed it because, as I got to 
know people— and you got to really work with... a lot of different backgrounds—I just 
got a lot of good input... [and] I think it was very helpful.” One civilian member also saw 
the advantages of military change and civilian stability and called it “a good pairing.”
Still another civilian viewed the relationship as positive and said, “I think it’s very much 
a workable arrangement; we have a mutual respect and we work very well together.”
The lay o f the land. Both military and civilians held similar views about ways to 
be successful and ways to avoid problems in the SCSS organization. Most members 
agreed that, in order to be successful, you needed to support the leader’s vision and be 
open to change. Aligning with the leader’s goals was important even in the midst of 
uncertainty and in unsteady times. As one person put it, “[You need] to be able to keep
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that focus while being tasked in what seems to appear to be pulled in many different 
directions.” One member suggested that you did this by saying, “Yes sir.” She added that 
these two words seem “to be by far the most valuable two words that you can own in 
order to be successful in this organization; it only took me fifteen years to figure this 
out.”
According to many interviewees, another key to being successful was being able 
to adapt to change. “They have to be willing to change,” one military member of the 
leadership team noted; “it’s a constant change these days [and] it’s a brand new way of 
doing business. You just have to be on board with that not only to survive but to help the 
organization survive.”
Some members mentioned additional notions of how to be successful in the 
organization. For some, following the rules and knowing the politics of the organization 
were good ways to avoid encountering problems at SCSS. One woman, for instance, 
talked about “making sure that you know what the law and the rules are because there are 
still procurement issues and go-to-jail-type things that you certainly need to know and be 
aware of.” Another woman also highlighted the need to be political and understand the 
rules that govern the SCSS organization. She suggested that having at least knowledge of 
politics is good because if you are sensitive you know the rules to go by. This person also 
indicated that it is important to “make friendships...I don’t mean friendships where 
you’re trying to manipulate but I mean... finding a way to connect with people in a 
caring kind of way.” Another team member stated, “You need a book about how to be 
political. If you’re not political, learn what that means.”
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According to at least two other members, communication was the most important 
way to stay out of trouble. One of these persons stated, “You have to 
communicate.. .communication has got to be the key.” The other woman commented
If you can't talk to that captain on the base and think you're going to run a 
program, a successful program, forget it. You have to talk to the 
command. You have your commander in chief, you have your XOs, COs 
and you need to communicate with them.. .everybody has to be on board 
with what you're doing and how you're doing it. That's the only way I 
could see to be successful—total communication.6
Life During the FA
The second part of the chapter, which I have titled “Life During the FA,” explores 
(a) the main events of the FA, (b) how the team and organization responded to these 
events, (c) the different views about the leadership team’s responses, and (d) examples of 
resistance to change that occurred at various points during the change process.
Significant Events in the FA
As was noted in Chapter 3, during each interview a copy of an FA timeline, with a 
limited number of key dates and events highlighted on it, was presented to the 
interviewee (See Figure 3.0). These can be described in three distinct phases that 
members readily understood. The first four events made up the “AS-IS” phase.7 This 
phase included the announcement of the study, the official “kick-off’ (i.e., start) of the 
FA, a data collection period, and a benchmarking period. The second phase was the ‘TO- 
BE.”5 This phase included three primary events: a redesign of the organization, visits
6 CO refers to the Commanding Officer o f a ship or base; XO refers to the next in command to the CO
7 The “AS-IS” refers to the baseline or current state o f the organization.
5  The “TO-BE” refers to the designs and plans (i.e., blueprint) for the future state o f the organization.
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with the Base Commanders, and revisions to the “TO-BE” plan. The third phase was the 
implementation of the design and included developing an implementation plan and a 
performance metrics plan and executing the plan. The following timeline depicts the 
major events described above.
Fisure 3. Functionality Assessment (FA) Timeline
1999 2000 2001 2002
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Team members were asked to discuss their perspectives of the major milestones 
listed on the timeline and to add additional milestones that they believed were important 
and then discuss these events. Most team members agreed that three major events stood 
out as particularly important to the FA. One was the decision to conduct the FA study. 
Another related event was the decision to hire an outside consulting company to assist 
with the change effort. The third event was the resistance that team members experienced 
during the Base Commander site visits. These events are described further.
Decision to conduct the FA. The decision to conduct the FA change effort was 
described by most team members as a significant event. Following the Navy’s decision to 
formally study the SCSS organization, the SCSS organization was given a choice to
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either conduct a Functionality Assessment (FA) or a Commercial Activity (CA) study. 
The FA meant that SCSS would essentially study itself as opposed to an outside 
organization making change recommendations. Several of the SCSS leaders, who also 
became members of the FA team, chose to conduct the FA study. According to Dr. Ritter, 
“In ’99 we submitted our proposal to do an FA from the [Navy] fleet.” The process of 
getting the FA started was very long and time consuming. Rachel recalls, “[When] we 
started out, we had a lot of meetings with Dr. Ritter heading up most of those [meetings], 
and I was identified as the MWR [Morale, Welfare & Recreation] team lead at that time.
I just remember numerous meetings, briefings with folks and employees as to what was 
going on and how long the time period would be.”
Decision to hire a consulting company. The decision to hire an outside consulting 
team to assist with the FA change effort was highlighted during the interviews by team 
members as another important event in this study. Team members had different reactions 
to bringing an outside consulting company in to assist with the FA. For some members, 
the consultant support was appreciated. Rachel mentioned, “We brought you guys on 
board in September. I put that it was a very good thing because we certainly needed the 
support and then we worked with you to develop the [plan] of where we go from here.” 
Others were less positive about the consulting company’s help. One individual expressed 
that the consulting team did not provide the right type of support for this large-scale, 
change effort. She critiqued, “I didn’t really see that much of a focus on change 
management.” Additional observations from other FA members are described in more 
detail later.
Site visits with Base Commanding Officers (COs). Another major event discussed 
by team members during this study’s interviews were the site visits with the Commander
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Navy Region Southwest base COs. The FA team met a significant amount of resistance 
when they presented the FA plan to the base COs. According to the FA lead, “We 
allowed the COs in the Navy Region Southwest at that time to drive the cart instead of us 
[driving the cart]. They stayed out of the way only to sabotage it later on and say, ‘I didn't 
agree.’ And that was the whole passive aggressive nature of the study.... We were 
ambushed at the end, because they could nod their head and let us believe that we were 
going along on the right track, but we really never pinned them down and put the 
responsibility on their back.”
Insiders’ Views about Change Process
Members of the team described different perspectives of what they saw and heard 
from other team members and employees during the FA the change process. According to 
most people who were interviewed, most employees generally recognized the need for 
organizational change and agreed with it on the surface, but beneath the surface they 
were often skeptical and opposed to change. Team members indicated that employees 
were likely to say, “I know I have to make changes, and I know I need to make sure 
they’re significant changes, because there is a mandate and an expectation that there will 
be a certain amount of reengineering that will cause [the SCSS organization] to be able to 
reduce [cost] significantly, but I don’t know that I really agree [with these changes].”
One member doubted that the FA would make real change in the organization. 
According to her, “When [the FA change effort] was happening; a lot of us were very 
unsure that this was going to take effect or really mean anything. I’m not sure that in food 
service that we were heading in the right [direction]; we met with a lot of opposition.
[The Command leaders] didn’t like it.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
Overall, the effectiveness of the FA was viewed differently by various stakeholder 
groups in the organization. From one member’s perspective, “It depends on who you talk 
to.” She mentioned that some people would say that “we didn't do a very good job in the 
FA.” This same person admitted that this is was a “very hard pill for me to swallow 
because I happen to believe that we did do a very good job within the FA.”
Groups that Played a Major Role in the FA
FA team members discussed the various groups that impacted the FA change 
process. According to one member, “There [were] plenty of people who were involved.” 
In general, team members mentioned internal support groups (i.e., SCSS departments), 
external customer groups (i.e., the Base Commanders), and an outside support group (i.e., 
my consulting team). Team members were generally positive about the role that insider 
groups played in the FA. The other two groups mentioned will be discussed in the next 
part of this section.
The role o f the outside consulting team. Several team members commented on the 
role that the outside consulting organization had in the FA. Overall, most team members 
held a positive view about the consultants’ role in the SCSS organization and their impact 
on the FA. Many team members indicated that the consulting team was helpful and 
supportive during the change process. According to one member, “The Booz Allen 
people were very professional. That was the general consensus, everybody felt the same 
way.” Another member suggested that the SCSS organization would not have been able 
to conduct the FA without the help and support of an outside consulting team. She stated: 
I don't think it would have unfolded at all if it hadn't been for 
your organization. We knew nothing of conducting an FA and we needed
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your guidance to kind of carry us along. Again, to be very honest, 
sometimes you pushed us but that was necessary and I think we would 
have become stuck in a few different places.... So looking back on it I 
think we needed that.
A few team members, however, offered a contrasting perspective. These team 
members commented that they didn’t always feel that the consultants fulfilled the role 
that they were expected to play. This perception was attributed to the experience level of 
the Booz Allen team and the strong personalities of the SCSS leadership. One female 
member observed, “I think some of the players involved in the FA functionality 
assessment on the contractor's side were influenced by some of our people.” From her 
point of view, some of the “best decisions” weren't made because some folks in the SCSS 
organization “influenced them.” In other words, there was a perception that the 
consultants did not do their job because they were persuaded by others in the organization 
who resisted the change that was being suggested.
Another person felt that the Booz Allen team didn’t push hard enough during 
some aspects of the change process. This person stated:
I think in general the team assigned was understandably timid because of 
the personalities of the leadership they're dealing with. I really feel like it 
was doing what was being told rather than giving hardball responses and 
pushing the management here to do a real FA.
This same person noted, “Under many circumstances I felt kind of like the team backed 
down and became cautious. Kind of like you were being political about it.” Still, in 
contrast, others felt that the consultants were effective in their approach and helped push 
organization members to make difficult and unpopular decisions. For example, one
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woman recalled a meeting with a consultant, “he really pushed the bar and he brought 
some stuff that we really never dealt with and never dealt with again but he really opened 
[the SCSS organization] up for more critical thinking and revision.”
Other groups that impacted the FA process. Finally, a few team members 
described different views from the ones mentioned above. One team member had a 
different view of the groups that were involved in the FA. This person dichotomized the 
groups into those that supported the FA and those who did not. She stated:
I believe that you had two groups of people. You had the Base COs and 
the Site Manager's who were on one team and you had those of that were 
trying to lead the FA effort on the other team and we didn't always see 
eye-to-eye on things and we saw that when we had to go back and change 
a lot of things from our original to be plan.
Another team member also mentioned the impact of the Base COs in the FA. According 
to her, “the COs or the site managers over the bases maybe should have been more 
involved. I don't think we would have had as much controversy if they would have been 
involved.”
One other team member described three different groups that she felt were 
significant to the FA process. She described the differences between subordinates, peers, 
and superiors. She stated that “my subordinates are supportive. My peers are not 
supportive. My superiors I think are supportive of it, but there's so many other things 
happening now with the change in the Navy.”
The Resistance Factor
Nearly all team members felt that there was resistance experienced during the FA. 
Resistance was generally described as a group or individual who was opposing the
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change that was being made. Although resistance occurred in different ways, FA 
members described various sources of resistance experienced during the FA.
Sources o f resistance. When people talk about resistance, they normally are 
talking about a bottom-up phenomenon: Those who must implement initiatives developed 
at the top of the organization are either unenthusiastic or downright hostile and behave in 
ways that can sabotage the innovation. Here the situation was somewhat different. Team 
members generally agreed that push back from the top was a major source of resistance 
during the FA. One member of the organization described this resistance and lack of 
support from the top as “roadblocks” that the FA team experienced along the way. The 
leader of the FA team also agreed and commented, “I think the greatest resistance, or 
maybe it was a lack of action, was by upper echelon COs [Commanding Officers]—they 
did not want to make the [cost, people, and programs] cuts that needed to be made and 
that was with the leadership.” Another FA team member explained that the COs resisted 
change because “they were reluctant to give up what they want on their base. ” From her 
perspective, “[the COs] supported each other, no matter what—kind of like a club.” 
Another FA team member recalled experiencing push back and resistance from her 
supervisor. She commented, “I just didn't feel that he was willing to open up his mind 
enough to change...it was more comfortable to stay status quo than it was to step outside 
of that box, to truly do something different.”
Resistance did not only come from the top, however. Another interviewee 
suggested that there was even resistance from within the FA team. She recalled, “There 
was not complete buy-in to thoroughly look at the programs with an open mind and to 
develop better ways to do business.” From her perspective, the FA team was “having to 
swim through sharks to try and accomplish a goal that we weren’t really getting
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supported for fully.” Furthermore, some of these sharks, according to her, were members 
of the leadership team.
According to some interviewees, one consequence of the top-down and lateral 
resistance described above was that some areas were not adequately looked at during the 
FA. A few team members felt that there was a concerted effort from those higher up in 
the organization to protect certain programs and areas from undergoing change. One team 
member stated, “There were lots of resistance to sacred cows and manipulation in what 
the outcome was to look a certain way.” Another member suggested that “there were 
certainly areas within several of the programs where there was either a spoken or an 
unspoken protection of that area getting a thorough look.”
Ancillary consequences o f resistance. FA team members also observed particular 
effects that change resistance had on the organization. Some members described that sick 
leave and personnel issues increased. One member recalled, “We had personnel issues 
that we've never had before. Employees arguing over, you know, trivial things...almost 
tattling, childish kind of things.” This same team member provided an explanation of 
why employees exhibited this type of behavior. She concluded, “I guess it's a natural 
reaction...to the fear, the unknown and, you know... it's people's livelihood and when 
that's threatened it creates a huge issue in an organization.” Other effects from change 
resistance were also mentioned, but were more subtle. Overall, team members described 
a general feeling of what they characterized as “push-back” (e.g., resistance) from both 
the top of the organizational hierarchy and the bottom. In addition, within the unit itself, 
they reported greatly lowered morale.
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Change Agent Intervention Strategies
Most FA members described an intentional role that they played to influence 
change and resistance during the FA study. Although different types of interventions 
were used, I will call attention to a few of the most common interventions discussed by 
team members.
Communication strategies. In general, most team members mentioned their 
efforts to use communication as a strategy to manage change resistance within the SCSS 
organization. One member described the need to “get the word out early” about the FA 
changes. Another member supported this approach and explained that it was important to 
communicate early in the process and throughout the entire effort to address employee 
concerns about change. She explained that “the rumors got out very quickly and people 
thought we were taking jobs away and taking people’s positions away.” Therefore, team 
members’ decision to communicate early was both a response and a preventative strategy 
to “get rid of these rumors that were just floating.”
Members also used different methods to communicate horizontally and vertically 
in the organization. For example, one member had meetings with organizational leaders 
once a month to provide a status of the FA change process, discuss planned events and to 
hear feedback. Another member stated having regular meetings with employees to “try to 
keep them well informed.” She explained, “I think sharing information is a very vital 
thing and I tried to do that through those meetings that I had on a periodic basis.” The 
interviewee also used training programs to help employees with the change process. For 
instance, the training programs assisted employees with “how to deal with stress, how to 
deal with change, and how to write a resume...so that employees felt as if they weren’t 
being left without any options.”
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Confrontation strategies. Another strategy used was confrontation. One member 
stated, “I confronted everyone” with organizational changes. She explained, “I would 
bring it out, lay it on the table, look at it.. .try to find out if there was any possibility that 
we were going to be able to break through that resistance and get some support for it.”
She also described “socializing” (i.e., sharing and familiarizing) the proposed changes 
“up and down the chain [of command]” in order obtain support and understand where 
there was resistance. As she recalled, “I worked very aggressively on trying to get at 
these pockets [of resistance].” Another team member was even more direct in her 
approach when faced with “push-back” (i.e., resistance) from employees in the 
organization. She explained that “[resistance] is not an option. You can’t put your head in 
the sand and if you’re not use to change then maybe you’d better think about going.” As a 
result of this type of intervention, she explained, “Some employees left the organization 
and some people waited until I left.”
Consensus building strategies. Another approach taken by a few FA members 
was to develop consensus about the changes among the leaders within the SCSS 
organization. This approach, while adequate early on, was not very effective later on and 
met with considerable resistance from organizational leaders (i.e., Base Commanders).
As the head of the FA team recalled:
I think I was pretty straightforward, diplomatic and attempted to build 
consensus until it got to a point of the final briefing and where I had to 
stand fast and say, ‘we went through this, we spent all this money and now 
you all are backing off.’ They weren't going to change their minds. I 
couldn't do it with kindness. The old [adage] ‘kill them with kindness.’
So, take the honey away and what do you have left?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
112
Other conscious and unconscious change strategies. FA members described using 
other strategies and mechanisms to shape the organization’s culture. For instance, one FA 
member described using the notion of culture and mental schemas to influence the 
“attitude of the people” and to “make people change their minds to see it our way—the 
way that the FA team looked at it.” A few FA members described putting themselves in 
the place of others to think about what they might be experiencing. One FA leadership 
member stated, “I always looked inside myself and said, ‘okay, let me think about this. 
Now I am still doing what I believe, which is taking care of the sailor.’ That was 
important to me.” One other woman shared, “It has made me personally take a step back 
and try to look at things in a different light.. .it’s kind of like, well maybe there’s another 
way to look at this or another way to react. It has helped me.”
A few FA members added that, in addition to, or in lieu of, using conscious and 
planned intervention strategies, they also used unconscious and automatic strategies. 
These FA members attributed this difference mostly to their experience with similar 
large-scale change initiatives. As one member put it: “It was automatic and it was 
planned because of having done these before—this was my third study by the time this 
came up, so it was from a lot of lessons learned.”
Overall, despite the different strategies employed, several team members admitted 
being surprised by the type of resistance that they experienced during the FA. As one 
member explained, “I wasn’t prepared for the insidious sabotage that was going on in this 
process.” Some members attributed this change resistance to the organization’s culture. 
The impact that organizational culture had on individuals in the organization is discussed 
next.
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Organizational Culture: A Broader Perspective o f Organizational Change
The SCSS and Navy’s organizational culture played a significant role in the FA 
according to team members. This section will discuss FA members’ definition of 
organizational culture, perspective of different types of culture in FA initiative, and view 
of how the culture impacted the organization.
A varied definition o f organizational culture. Although FA members were 
familiar with the concept of organizational culture, the specific definitions they attached 
to the term often were somewhat different. Some of the descriptions of organizational 
culture included “a complete way of doing business,” the “environment you are trying to 
create for yourself,” the “attitude of the people,” the “organization’s being and the 
innards” and “a new way of thinking.” Despite these differences, there seems to be an 
underlying similarity with each other and also with the view of organizational culture 
promoted by Schein (1992), a view that was discussed in Chapter 2.
Other people’s definitions do not fit so neatly or tidily under the Schein umbrella. 
One team member, for example, equated culture with politics. She said, “When I talk 
about culture, it’s political.”
Different types cultures. FA members acknowledged that there were at least three 
different types of organizational culture—government, military, and private industry— 
operative in the organization that was being studied. The first two types of cultures were 
present because this was, in fact, a hybrid organization which was part governmental and 
part military. The culture of the private sector came into play in three ways. First, the 
change initiative that had been undertaken was inspired by and modeled after similar 
sorts of change initiatives in the private sector. Second, a number of FA team members
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had come from the private sector and brought private sector values with them. Third, the 
consulting team brought in the private industry perspective.
According to interviewees, each of the three cultural contexts influenced the 
organization in general and the change process in particular. Government culture, for 
instance was described as “bureaucracy.” One member explained, “We look at making 
things hard by imposing more rules and more paperwork and more regulations.” She 
contrasted government and business culture and said that they were at “opposite ends.” 
She suggested that “the government culture does not look at things in a business way. We 
don’t look at it in terms of how much it costs or how can you do it cheaper.” (Of course, 
this sort of thinking was precisely what the change initiative was attempting to promote.)
The military culture was different from government and private industry cultures. 
One member explained that “the [military] culture was like ‘don’t tell us to run like a 
business’. The military is not a business.”
The head of the FA described the military culture as static and enduring. She 
commented:
There is such a long tradition in the Navy and the culture has been there 
for a long time. You and I are not going to change that except little by 
little.... Tradition will be tradition, will be tradition. That's what this 
culture is. The culture being, “I'm in charge and that's all there is to it so 
shut up and listen to me and do what I say.”
Other members also held the perception that military culture is very “top-down,” 
“hierarchical” and follows a “chain-of-command” structure. Others commented about the 
“temporary” nature of military staff who transfer positions every few years. They pointed 
out that this characteristic affected the way that military staff viewed work and business.
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Team members also viewed private industry differently than government and 
military organizational cultures. In general, private industry, or civilian culture was seen 
as being more focused on the “bottom-line” and is “results-oriented.” Employees that 
work for private industry are more “competitive” and “driven by profit.” The FA 
members equated this view of business with the outside consulting company and the 
mindset they used to implement change in the SCSS organization.
Finally, some members commented about the combined SCSS government and 
military organizational culture. One member suggested that there “doesn’t seem to be an 
overlap [between the two cultures that make up the organization].” Another interviewee 
commented that “it’s very much a subordinate mentality in the military with the civilian 
workforce.” Others agreed that the military had more authority and power than civilians 
in the organization. Overall, FA members concluded that government, military, and 
private industry had different organizational goals that affected each of their cultures.
Impact o f culture. Most team members agreed that the organization’s culture 
influenced how leaders and employees thought about and responded to organizational 
change. As one interviewee put it, “The culture can make you perform one way or the 
other.” A different person noted that leadership played an important role in the culture 
and needed to make changes to the culture in the SCSS organization. She suggested that 
“the whole culture had to change and it had to change at the top first.”
Others felt that military culture, in general, and Navy culture, in particular, caused 
organizational leaders to respond to change in a certain way. For example, one FA team 
member commented, “I don't think [organizational change] really had anything to do with 
the FA. I just think the whole change culture is extremely difficult for military because 
they are such a culture of tradition.” This notion that the military’s culture as a culture of
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tradition was supported by other team members too. The head of the FA agreed that 
“[SCSS and Navy leadership] maintain the culture that’s been there for eons but needs to 
change.” This perspective is also consistent with Schein’s (1992) notion of leadership 
that creates and maintains organizational culture.
Some people on the FA team saw culture as a way to influence people to change 
in a particular way. One FA member who joined the team later explained that the concept 
of culture was useful in communicating change throughout the organization. She stated,
“I think [culture] was helpful in making people change their minds to see it our way. The 
way that the FA team looked at it and wanted us to be.”
Lastly, some of the FA members saw organizational culture as a facilitating and 
constraining force. A few members felt that culture was a useful construct to think about 
and communicate change throughout the organization. As one person put it, “[Culture] 
was helpful to making people change their minds.” Others, however, felt that culture, and 
particularly military culture, limited what could be done in the FA change process. Some 
members of the FA team spoke about the military’s hierarchy and chain of command as 
factors that “blocked” change in the organization. One FA team member commented, 
“The whole change culture is extremely difficult for military because they are such a 
culture of tradition.” Even military members of the FA team felt this way. For example, 
one military team member stated:
I’m very used to an extremely structured environment, someone telling me what 
to do and then I can do it. With the FA, I had to come up with the ideas myself 
and then convince these people who have never changed, that change is now 
good.
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In summary, the various conceptualizations of culture discussed above affected 
how FA leadership members defined and viewed organizational culture. More 
specifically, the characteristics and contexts of the three cultures discussed (i.e., 
government, military and private industry) influenced how organizational members 
thought about culture and responded to organizational change.
Life After the FA
In many respects, an organization is a living entity. Organization members come 
and go and, through various experiences, change over time. The SCSS organization and 
its membership also changed as a result of the FA initiative. This final section, “Life 
After the FA,” reviews how the organization was affected by the FA initiative. 
Specifically, I will review participants’ post reflections of the FA, the role of leadership 
and culture in the FA, and finally, lessons learned from the FA.
I f  Walls Could Speak (Post Reflections o f the FA)
FA members reflected on their perceptions of how the organization changed after 
the FA. Overall, members of the FA team held mixed views about how the FA impacted 
the organization and how others in the organization viewed this initiative. A few key 
themes emerged from interviewee reflections on their experience of the FA and are 
discussed below.
Change is threatening. In general, the FA was seen as a threatening experience 
for many of the SCSS organization’s members. As one person stated, “The FA was 
threatening.. .people lose their jobs.” Another FA member felt the same and mentioned 
that “[change] causes fear. The change, the downsizing, the possibility of losing jobs, you 
know that kind of thing creates an uneasiness in the organization.” Others shared the 
perception that even if the intention of the change initiative is good (e.g., improving
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efficiency or improving the “bottom-line”), employees felt that their job security was 
threatened and out of their control. One person commented, “They’re the worker bees. 
The rest of us are the ones that are designing and thinking about how we want the 
organization to look in the future.”
Change is disappointing. FA team members expressed some disappointment with 
the FA process and the results. In particular, team members expressed “disappointment” 
that after a long and “painful process,” not all of the recommendations were 
“implemented.” As one FA member recalled, “When you finally work your way to the 
TO-BE you expect that the TO-BE is going to be fully implemented full force.” Another 
team member remembered hearing people say that “we didn’t do a very good job in the 
FA, which is a very hard pill for me to swallow because I happen to believe that we did 
do a very good job within the FA.” Still others were disappointed because the final 
change recommendations made by the FA team and an outside consulting organization to 
the leaders in the SCSS organization were not fully accepted. As one interviewee 
recalled, “It was kind of disappointing because I felt that it was a good business decision 
that the FA team came up.” This same person concluded, “It was almost like.. .why did 
we do this?”
Change is difficult. FA members described the change process as “long and 
painful.” This sentiment was reflective not only of the change process but of the 
organizational culture that FA members were trying to change. One interviewee recalled 
her experience of trying to change the organization and stated, “I’ve been at this a very 
long time.” Another person recalled, “the change culture is extremely difficult for 
military because they are such a culture of tradition.” One FA member observed another 
reason that change was difficult in the SCSS organization culture. She explained, “It’s
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kind of the culture sometimes that if things don’t go exactly as planned or whatever it 
becomes, ‘let’s find out who we can blame or go after to hold them accountable.”
Change is satisfying. After the FA dust had settled, some of the original 
recommendations were accepted in the long run. As one person put it, “Some of the 
things that we suggested have now come to life.. .we’ve had to consolidate, combine, 
even close things down that originally people didn’t want to do.” The leader of the FA 
recalled, “I would say that actions speak louder than words. The original plan was right 
on the mark.” In summary, some of the things that leaders and employees “fought us on” 
were accepted in the end.
The Role o f Leadership and Culture in the FA
Several FA members reflected ex post facto on the role that leaders played in the 
FA initiative; and specifically, on the connection between leadership and culture. One 
team member indicated that culture “needs to be a group of people working together. 
There has to be a leader and the leader may change. Respect and communication has to 
be key...and that’s also a part of culture.” Another interviewee suggested that “culture is 
in the environment and very much dictated by the leader.” This idea of culture is similar 
to Schein’s (1993) notion. Schein also felt that culture was created by leaders and also 
influenced leaders actions and thinking (see Chapter 2).
Lessons Learned in the FA
Several FA members described lessons learned and things that they would have 
done differently during the FA initiative. The views of the FA leaders cluster around a 
few main themes.
Multiple change efforts. Some FA members commented on the challenges 
associated with overlapping change initiatives. People felt that there were too many
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changes occurring in the organization at one time. (The FA was only one of a number of 
change initiatives happening simultaneously and previously.) As one person stated, “I 
think there can be too many changes going on at one time. I think that’s disruptive to the 
organization because you kind of lose focus.” She concluded that “change is not 
necessarily bad, but too much change too quickly is hard for the organization to absorb.” 
Leadership support. FA members consistently suggested that they would have 
gotten more support for the FA change initiative and results if they would have gotten 
“buy-in” from SCSS leadership up front. For instance, the lead FA member reflected on 
what she would have done differently in the FA. She stated, “I would have gotten more 
official buy-in on the steps along the way to developing the TO-BE that held the COs feet 
to the fire.” She added, “We allowed the COs in the region to drive the cart instead of us. 
They stayed out of the way only to sabotage us later on and say ‘I didn’t agree’.” The FA 
lead concluded, along with others, that this behavior was indicative of the “whole passive 
aggressive nature” of the FA change initiative that we were “ambushed at the end.” 
Communication effectiveness. Lastly, there was a perception that the FA team 
leader did not communicate effectively with the Base Commanders and other naval 
leadership. One interviewee recalled, “I found the best thing to do is go to the bases, sit 
down and meet with the CO.” She further described, “I met with all the COs of the bases 
and I told them everything that we were doing all the time.”
FA members shared the perception that effective communication was key to 
change resistance. One member indicated that employees were very appreciative of her 
communicating changes during the FA. She stated that “they appreciated that they were 
being kept in the loop” and that “they were being given information.” She explained, “In 
fact, several people said to me, ‘it doesn’t have to be good news as long as it’s news’.”
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In some cases, FA members discussed using a different language to communicate 
changes to employees. One member used “different language to explain what I was doing 
until I could interject the language of business.” She further explained, “I would explain 
the goals of the study and the culture of the bureaucracy and government way of doing 
business... I would just translate things in another language.”
Summary
This chapter presented the findings of the research study. Specifically, this 
chapter reviewed the story of major organizational change at the SCSS including life 
before, during and after the functionality assessment (FA).
The section, “Life Before the FA,” presented the change team’s main characters 
and provided their view of the FA. Aspects of a combined government and military 
organization were discussed. Comparisons were also made between the way a combined 
government and military organization works and the way private industry works.
Next, in the “Life During the FA” section, FA member’s experiences were 
discussed. The section presented a review of: (a) significant events in the FA, (b) 
insider’s views about the change process, (c) groups that played a major role in the FA, 
(d) the resistance factor, (e) change agent intervention strategies, and (f) organizational 
culture.
In the final section I presented FA member’s reflections on “Life After the FA. 
This section included post reflections of the FA. The role of leadership and culture were 
discussed and briefly compared to the literature on the topic. Finally, I presented lessons 
learned in the FA.
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Conclusion
The findings of the study were based primarily on eight interviews of leaders with 
formal positional authority in the SCSS organization. In addition, secondary data analysis 
of documents, artifacts, participant observations, were used to triangulate the data and 
enrich the story. While this chapter provided the sort of details about the change process 
and people’s perceptions of it that implicitly answer the questions posed at the outset of 
the study, these questions are explicitly addressed in the next chapter.




“We do not know what the world of tomorrow will really look like except that it 
will be different” (Schein, 1993).
In some ways, stories never end. They only provide reflections of who we are and 
what we aspire to change or leave unaltered in our lives. In large part, the real discovery 
of this research study may have been making conscious what might have largely been 
unconscious in the SCSS organization, the experiences of the participants, and of my own 
perceptions.
This chapter will provide a brief summary and an extended discussion of the 
findings reported in the previous chapter. It begins with a brief review of the purpose and 
methods. Then the findings will be summarized; the research questions articulated in 
Chapter 1 will be used to organize this summary. After the summary of findings is 
presented, the study’s findings will be discussed and the methodology will be critiqued. 
Finally, I will discuss the implications that the study has for theorizing about culture 
change and resistance and I will make recommendations for practice, and suggestions for 
further research.
Brief Review of the Problem
The construct of organizational culture has been used to interpret various aspects 
of organizational life, including organizational leadership and organizational change. The 
literature indicates that leaders can influence organizational change by attending to and 
modifying an organization’s cultural dimensions. Much of this literature, however, is
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theoretical and speculative, and the empirical work that does exist has focused mostly on 
business.
The purpose of this case study was to develop an understanding of how leaders in 
a combined government and military organization used the notion of culture during a 
two-and-a-half year planned change initiative. The study explored the strategies and 
mental constructs those in positions of formal authority used to make sense of and 
influence the change process. The particular focus was on identifying any culture- 
oriented change strategies leaders use to overcome resistance to change. The study also 
examined how organizational culture shaped and constrained leaders’ actions.
This study employed qualitative methods. Interviews with designated leaders of 
the planned change initiative were the primary data collection method. Document 
analysis and participant observation were used to triangulate interview data.
Overview of the Research Methodology
As mentioned, this dissertation research used qualitative methods to study 
leaders’ perceptions of organizational change resistance at a large combined military and 
government organization. For this study, I interviewed eight participants. Although 
interviewing was the major source of data in this study, other data sources (i.e., notes I 
took in my consultant role and documents related to the FA initiative) were used to 
triangulate interview findings.
A combination of two analysis approaches, which Polkinghome (1995) refers to 
as the analysis of narrative and narrative analysis, were employed. The narrative analysis 
strategy was reflected in the use of chronology to organize many of the research findings. 
Within this general chronological structure, however, there was more traditional coding 
and categorization, i.e., Polkinhome’s analysis of narrative approach.
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Review of the Major Findings in Terms of the Research Questions 
This summary of the findings is organized around the research questions that were 
articulated in Chapter 1 and answered implicitly in Chapter 4. Here, the implicit answers 
will be made explicit.
Research Question #1
In what ways, i f  any, do the designated leaders o f a large-scale planned 
change initiative use the construct o f culture—either consciously or 
unconsciously—in thinking about and promoting change and, especially, 
in attempting to anticipate and respond to resistance to change.
The evidence suggests that most members of the FA leadership team used the 
construct of culture to think about organizational change. At times the use appeared to be 
conscious; at other times the culture construct appeared to influence thinking in a more 
unconscious manner.
Several members of the organization described how thinking in terms of culture 
was useful for understanding different perspectives in a mixed government and military 
organization. For instance, one FA leadership member stated, “The government culture 
does not look at things in a business like way. It's a bureaucracy.” The lead of the FA 
team described applying her understanding of the SCSS culture—which was really a 
composite of three different cultures (i.e., military, government, and private sector) to 
anticipate resistance and encourage change in the organization. She recalled using 
experiences from her own “indoctrination into the military and government bureaucratic 
culture” to develop a “workable model that this group could understand, grasp and 
embrace.”
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Other ways leaders on the FA team used culture during the change initiative are 
addressed in the following sub-research questions.
Sub-research question # la
What do designated leaders say about the role they played in a large-scale 
planned change initiative within a military and government-staffed 
organization?
FA members played various roles to actively promote change vertically (i.e., with 
those above and below them in the organizational hierarchy) and horizontally (i.e., with 
other organization leaders at comparable levels in other departments of the organization) 
during the FA change initiative. Team members used terms like “communicating 
change,” “training employees,” “confronting staff’ and “educating leaders” to describe 
and discuss their various change roles. For instance, one person recalled, “The 
implementing, where we actually let people go and had to socialize and do everything...it 
was very much a leadership issue.”
Interviewees also focused on their roles in terms of overall change effectiveness. 
In large part, members felt that the change role they played in the FA was not very 
effective (or at least did not have substantial impact at the time). This was attributed, at 
least in part, to resistance to change. For example, one person reflected on her role during 
the FA. She stated: “I had missed several opportunities in the building of the TO-BE to 
get incremental buy-in.... I had not been able to keep it from happening and intervene 
soon enough.” Another woman recalled the letdowns of playing a change role during the 
FA. She stated, “I had to push and really do a lot of promoting [change]...While I was not 
successful, I certainly gave it a lot of energy and effort.”
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Sub-research question # lb
What culture-embedding mechanisms (e.g., language and mental schemas) 
and change strategies do designated leaders indicate they used to shape 
the organization culture in general and resistance in particular during the 
change process; to what extent do they themselves characterize these 
mechanisms and strategies in cultural terms?
Most members of the FA team acknowledged using varied change strategies to 
influence organizational change during the FA initiative. Several of these change 
strategies are discussed in Chapter 4 and include: communication, confrontation, 
consensus building, and other conscious and unconscious change strategies.
Once again, team members reported mixed effectiveness with these strategies. For 
example, although communication was a commonly used strategy to influence change, a 
few members explained that the change strategies used could have been more effective. 
One person recalled that a coordinated “communication plan” was needed to ensure that 
employees and leaders knew what was happening during the change process. She stated, 
‘The fact that the COs were surprised.. .they were really never involved. There was never 
any real communication plan to get the customers involved.” Once again, according to 
interviewees, the organization’s culture and resistance from employees—but also from 
leaders at the top of the hierarchy where the change effort had initially been promoted— 
were factors in constraining the FA team members effectiveness.
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Sub-research question # lc
How are these mechanisms and strategies similar to or different from the 
various organizational culture and resistance constructs discussed in the 
literature?
For the most part, the mechanisms and strategies people used to influence culture 
change and resistance seemed to be consistent with the literature. For example, 
communication is often talked about in the literature as an important mechanism for 
organizational change (Jones, Aguirre, and Calderone 2004; Sternberg, 2002; Kotter, 
1996; Argyris, 1993). Members of the FA team also agreed that “communication was 
key” and reported using various communication strategies (i.e., newsletters, e-mails, 
websites, and face-to-face meetings) during the change initiative. Several FA members 
described conducting numerous meetings with employees and leaders to increase 
awareness of and deal with organizational change issues. As one member stated, “I had 
several meetings with employees to try to keep them well informed.”
Other change strategies and constructs were also talked about by the FA team 
leaders, however, these strategies appeared to be incomplete when compared to the 
change and culture literature. For example, Kotter (1996) suggests that change initiatives 
often fail because leaders ignore norms and values that could be considered the 
foundation of an organization’s culture. He proposes using a multi-step change 
framework to systematically work through change. The FA team also used some of these 
same steps, for instance “building a case for change” and “communicating the change 
message,” when conducting the FA initiative. However, the FA team appeared to omit 
some of the other critical steps that Kotter recommended, such as, “creating the guiding 
coalition” and “anchoring new approaches in the culture.” In hindsight, the fact that some
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of these strategies were only partially followed, or even omitted, may help explain why 
participants felt the FA initiative had limited success.
Another way that the strategies and mechanisms used were connected to the 
literature was through politics. Several of the FA team members acknowledged how other 
leaders in the organization used their power to influence change in the FA study. This 
perspective is similar to Bowman and Deal’s (1997) notion of using a political 
framework as a way to see and understand power, conflict and coalitions within in the 
organization (p. 163). In general, leaders in the SCSS organization used notions similar to 
Bowman and Deal’s (1997) view of the political lens “to influence behavior, to change 
the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things they would 
not otherwise do” (p. 165). In other words, the team members used political strategies to 
influence change in the organization. In fact, in this organization, the culture was a highly 
political one. This suggests that it may be helpful, at times, to amalgamate the sorts of 
frames Bowman and Deal talk about in their book. There will be more on this point 
below.
Research Question #2
How does the existing culture appear to shape and constrain what leaders 
do to promote change and minimize resistance during a large-scale 
change effort?
FA members consistently referred to the existing SCSS organizational culture as a 
major factor that affected how leaders influenced change in the organization. As one team 
member put it, “I just thought [culture] limited what we could do in this environment.
The scenario of the people during that period, I could tell pretty early that not much could 
come out of this [change initiative]. I mean the potential was grand.” Other team
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members also described how the existing organizational culture shaped and constrained 
what leaders were able to do during the FA. The situation in this particular organization 
was made even more complicated by the fact that there were distinctly different 
organizational cultures operating in the composite organization.
Discussion and Interpretation of the Findings 
There are a number of intriguing issues embedded in the findings that were just 
summarized and that were presented in more detail. Here, several of them will be 
discussed.
Blended Cultures — The Creation o f a New Culture
Another interesting finding that came out of the study involved the various 
cultures that merged together and created a much more complex culture. Typically, 
culture is thought of as a single entity or construct (Schein, 1999; 1993; 1992; Detert, 
Schroeder, & Mauriel, 2000; Senge, 1999; 1990; Bolman & Deal, 1997). In this study, 
however, culture consisted of at least three distinct cultures, i.e., government, military, 
and private industry. A  fourth culture, although not overtly discussed by participants, 
could be identified as the consultant culture. This blended view of culture is different 
from Schein’s view that suggests a single leader drives culture (Schein 1992, p.5; 1993). 
According to Schein (1992), “culture creation and management are the essence of 
leadership” (p. 1). However, this varied view of culture may be more indicative of most 
organizational cultures. If this is, in fact, the case, it may be necessary for those who 
promote change initiatives to gain greater awareness of the various cultures at play in the 
organization, and to develop strategies that address the specific change issues related to 
those particular cultures.
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Mixing Politics and Culture
One of the perplexing issues that I faced during the study was when I tried to 
account for organizational culture. Although several of my research questions focused on 
how interviewees defined and thought about organizational culture, the construct took on 
various meanings and seemed to almost become a secondary theme in the research. I tried 
to understand why this was the case. In large part, when participants reflected on ways 
that culture influenced change in the FA, they associated culture with politics. In some 
ways, the various cultures and political structures intertwined in the SCSS organization; 
the culture, in short, was dominated by politics and political considerations. This 
amalgam of politics and culture, to a large extent, influenced and constrained the thinking 
and strategies leaders used to influence change resistance in the organization.
Politics and Resistance to Change
As discussed, the culture of the studied organization was highly political and 
powerful political groups often were the source of resistance to change. This was due, at 
least in part, to the mixture of various cultures and their competing objectives that, in 
turn, created an environment in which conflict was inevitable and power was a viewed as 
a key resource. For instance, often when FA members recommended a “new way of 
doing business” to military leaders they met with “push-back” (i.e., resistance). This was 
partly because the proposed idea had developed outside the military hierarchy and partly 
because of the threat that COs would loose power on their bases if they were perceived as 
closing down golf courses, bowling alleys or other services. The political culture of the 
organization often resulted in the military leaders trying to protect their existing power by 
constraining, blocking, or interfering with the FA initiative in order to keep things “status 
quo.”
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This perspective highlights some of the hidden motives and agendas that leaders 
of the organization seemed to hold. Developing an awareness and understanding of the 
political framework of the organizational culture and the strategies to influence this 
framework may be a critical step for change agents. In retrospect, neither the consultants 
nor the “insiders’ on the leadership team focused on this issue sufficiently.
The Importance o f (and Problems with) Cultural Awareness
The members of the leadership team who, arguably, were most effective were 
those who knew the culture of the organization well (including its rather definitive 
subcultures) and who also had had prior experience with change. Leaders who were 
familiar with the SCSS organizational culture relied on their prior experiences to make 
change decisions. They often were able to anticipate what needed to be done and seemed 
to know how to do it. For example, knowing the chain of command was essential to 
knowing who to talk to about particular issues and whose approval was required to do 
certain things. One FA member stated, “You have to follow the chain of command and 
don’t push too hard on issues. If you disagree with something you can make it known but 
then back off.”
On the other hand, this cultural awareness also at times hindered FA participants 
effectiveness. Having prior knowledge of the SCSS culture appeared to affect participants 
differently. Knowing what the organizational culture was like and what resistance would 
likely occur could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. One individual said that she was 
more assertive through the change process because she was new to the organization and 
did not really understand the culture. She explained, “In some respects, I maybe naively 
was willing to push harder for some change than maybe someone that had more 
experience or maybe would just be more conservative.. .within that environment.”
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Resistance From Two Directions
One of the more interesting findings in the study involved the observation of 
resistance at the top of the organizational hierarchy, i.e., the level from which the change 
initiative had been promoted. Normally, resistance is conceptualized as something that 
occurs at the bottom rungs of an organizational hierarchy (Hatch 2000; Champy, 1997; 
Hammer 1997; Agocs 1997; and Kotter, 1996). In this initiative, in which middle 
managers were given considerable authority about what would be done to achieve goals 
mandated from the top, there was significant resistance coming from above as well as 
below. Both levels, in other words, were uncomfortable with the specific cultural change 
being implemented, and both levels attempted to minimize its impact.
Conceivably, as organizations increasingly attempt to provide both direction from 
the top and discretion at the grassroots level, the top-down resistance observed in this 
case may become more commonplace. If this is, indeed, the case, it may be necessary for 
those who promote change initiatives from the top to be more explicit about the degrees 
of freedom middle managers have and, then, to honor the commitments they have made 
once decisions are made at the middle management level. Resistance to change is 
difficult enough to overcome when it comes from one direction; it is exceedingly 
problematic when those who encouraged a change initiative in the first place work to 
undermine it.
Schein’s (1992) view of culture is helpful to understand the type of upward and 
downward resistance experienced by FA team members. Schein, for instance, suggests 
that culture is made of up different levels. According to Schein (1992) basic underlying 
assumptions, i.e., the deepest level, are often “taken for granted” and “extremely difficult 
to change.” Most members associated the difficulty of leading change in the organization,
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in large part, to trying to change how leaders thought about organizational change. One 
FA team member recalled, “When you are working with base COs they believe that the 
installation is ‘their team’ and they don’t want to have to close anything or have to reduce 
hours of operation on ‘their watch’.” These underlying assumptions and beliefs, at least 
in part, help explain why FA members experienced “push-back” from different directions 
and why resistance to change is so difficult to mange.
Views o f Gender, Power & Resistance
The fact that the team was mostly staffed by women and that they met with 
considerable resistance from male-dominated components of the organization during the 
FA is important to reflect on. The challenges that woman face in organizations seemed to 
be even more pronounced in this predominantly male military organization. For example, 
in some interviews, women alluded to the difficulty of being heard during the FA. In 
other instances, a few women even described that they were viewed as being masculine if 
they pushed too hard for change. In general, these women associated these challenges 
with the fact that they were trying to influence high ranking military men who “just 
wouldn’t change their minds.” This view of change resistance in the FA may also have 
broader application. In some ways, the difficulties that women on the FA team faced 
reflects some of the same challenges that women and minorities face in other 
organizations. This suggests the need for those who lead change efforts to be aware of 
these power dynamics and ways they can be overcome. One final point: Interestingly, the 
head of the FA initiative, a woman who had what might be characterized as more 
masculine than feminine, discounted the role that gender played in generating resistance 
to implementing the plan that had been developed.
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Views o f Leadership and Culture
Finally, several FA members also reflected on the role that leaders played in the 
FA initiative and also on the connection between leadership and culture. One team 
member stated, “Culture is in the environment and very much dictated by the leader.”
This notion of the leader’s role in the creation and maintenance of organizational culture 
is consistent with Schein’s (1993) thinking about leadership and culture (see Chapter 2).
As has already been alluded to, FA members also discussed the influence of those 
at the top of the hierarchy in inhibiting the change effort. In short, in this organization, at 
least, positional power mattered both within the unit undergoing change and in the larger 
organization.
Implications for Theory, Practice, and Further Research 
Implications for Theory
The purpose of this dissertation was to contribute some empirical grounding to the 
theoretical literature of organizational culture construct by studying an outlier 
organization in which change is a constant. In some ways, the constantly changing 
environment of the government and military organization studied made the organizational 
change process both easier and more difficult to accomplish. On the one hand, the FA 
team utilized these opportunities. On the other hand, the changing organization made it 
more difficult to obtain support from leaders that were changing jobs or leaving the 
organization.
In some ways, the unique nature of the combined government and military 
organization seemed to have played a significant role in the change process. Most of the 
strategies used in private sector did not appear to be easily employed in the government 
and military organization studied. This may be due, at least in part, to the political nature
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of the organization. The literature indicates that the mechanisms typically employed in 
planned change initiatives, such as process reengineering, restructuring, and 
organizational transformation, are somewhat similar across different cultures (Sternberg, 
2002; Levesque, Prochaska & Prochaska, 1999; Strebel, 1996; Hammer, 1997). This 
study, however, suggests that what works in the private sector may not comfortably 
translate to the public sector, at least the public sector in which military culture plays a 
significant role. FA leadership team members certainly supported this perspective and 
indicated that planned change efforts in the SCSS organization should not be treated the 
same way as planned change efforts in the private sector.
To summarize, theory about planned change that glosses over contextual factors 
may be problematic. At least in this study, context and politics mattered and, 
consequently, context quite possibly should be given greater attention in theorizing about 
change and the phenomenon of resistance.
Implications for Practice
In addition to the theoretical implications outlined above, there are also 
implications for practice emerging from this study. This study, for example, sensitizes 
leaders in other organizations to think about organizational change from a complex 
cultural framework. Leaders that promote change initiatives are encouraged to think 
about the interaction of various subcultures and how each subculture is uniquely affected 
by change. This change relationship (i.e., interaction), particularly with the unique 
characteristics of a combined government/military organization, has important 
implication for leaders of organizational change.
Another implication for practice is related to the change process itself. Leaders 
that promote organizational change are typically focused on change and resistance from a
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top down perspective. Many of the change strategies endorsed in the literature and used 
by change leaders also suggest a downward focus on organizational change. This study 
highlights the need for change practitioners to be aware of the need for upward change as 
well as change strategies that are focused downward and across the organization.
Additionally, the politics in the organization created an organizational culture that 
made it more difficult for change agents to accomplish their assigned task. This suggests 
that the role of change agents needs to be expanded to identify and understand the 
underlying political framework that guides decision-making in an organizational change 
initiative. Change agents may need to employ particular strategies to influence those who 
have positional power in the organization. This study also suggests that different tactics 
and strategies may be required for woman, minorities, and other groups with limited 
authority/power that play this change agent role.
In summary, traditional views about culture and resistance may not be entirely 
accurate— or at least generalizable in various contexts. In this study, the interaction of 
different subcultures was an important variable for leaders of the FA change initiative. 
Also, the way that resistance to change emerged from leaders at the top of the 
organizational structure has particular implications for leaders of large-scale, planned, 
change initiatives and should be further examined.
Implications fo r  Further Research
This study focused on only one organization and one change initiative team. As a 
result, it has a some unavoidable limitations common to single-case or “n of 1” studies. In 
time, it would be useful to have other case studies of different organizations that are 
undergoing a major organizational change initiative. The type of organization should also 
be expanded to include military, government, and private sector organizations.
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Ultimately, a cross-case analysis can be conducted using a grounded theory approach to 
culture, leadership and change using different settings and across multiple organizations.
Another implication for future research is related to the notion that organizational 
culture influences an organization’s ability to change. For example, are some 
organizations better suited and able to change than others due to the culture of the 
organization? Sternberg (2002), for instance offers an interesting perspective of 
organizational change—modifiability. The primary premise is the culture of the 
organization needs to be modifiable to begin with in order to change. Further study in the 
area of modifiability and adaptability would provide greater insight into the change and 
culture phenomenon.
Additionally, future studies that explore the phenomenon of change should focus 
on organizational resilience (see, for instance, Linstead, 1997 and Jones, Aguirre, and 
Calderone, 2004). More recently, organizations are undergoing change efforts on a 
continuous basis, and in some cases, organizations are experiencing multiple change 
initiatives simultaneously (Rousseu & Tijoriwala, 1999; Winum, Ryterband, & 
Stephenson, 1997; Cummings, 1995; Burke, 1993). In this particular study, several 
interviewees mentioned the difficulty of managing multiple change efforts. Further 
research would be useful to understand the impact of continuous and multiple change 
initiatives and may be helpful for those who are in change leadership roles.
Other studies could be conducted at other organizations that examine the different 
impacts of change both during and after a major change initiative. In the case of the 
SCSS organization, it was clear that post-reflection on a two-year long change initiative 
had particular advantages and disadvantages. One the one hand, having some time elapse 
after the FA initiative was useful for members of the change team to reflect on their
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experiences. On the other hand, particular observations and insights specific to how 
members felt during the change process may have been reported differently by 
participants. Additionally, a longitudinal study might provide further understanding about 
the leaders’ views about change and culture. A change study focused on sustainability 
might also reveal whether the effort resulted in changes to the underlying assumptions of 
the organization’s culture and were impacting in the long-run.
Finally, future case studies should look at the role of woman, minorities, and 
consultants that perform a change agent role in the organization. More research is needed 
to understand the different perspectives and strategies employed in change initiatives 
across various organizational cultures.
In summary, additional research is needed to study the phenomenon of 
organizational change. Various research designs in different organizational settings 
should be explored to more fully understand the complex nature of organizational culture 
and change.
Methodological Reflection 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a combination of two analysis approaches, which 
Polkinghome (1995) refers to as the analysis o f narrative and narrative analysis, were 
employed. The narrative analysis strategy was reflected in the use of chronology to 
organize many of the research findings. Within this general chronological structure, 
however, there was more traditional coding and categorization, i.e., Polkinhome’s 
analysis of narrative approach. Although both approaches were used throughout my 
research, I primarily employed the analysis of narrative approach.
Initially, I gained interest in Polkinghome’s two approaches after seeking 
guidance from my committee chair. Additionally, I had consulted a dissertation by Brian
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Matthews (2004) and learned about the hybrid approach used in his research 
methodology. Although our approaches were similar, Brian’s emphasis was on narrative 
analysis vs. analysis of narrative.
Overall, this hybrid approach (i.e., analysis of narrative and narrative analysis) 
was helpful to make sense of and display the data I had collected. The narrative analysis 
approach provided a way to chronology key events, and therefore add additional context 
to the underlying story of FA initiative. Additionally, this approach allowed me to use the 
two timelines to think about and make sense of participants’ experiences. Polkinghome’s 
analysis of narratives approach was also useful to analyze data and develop descriptions 
of themes across participant stories. This approach provided a systematic way to organize 
interview responses and categorize data across various themes while still allowing 
flexibility to identify and develop emergent themes.
Another aspect of my research methodology related to my role as a researcher. As 
alluded to earlier in Chapter 3, in this study, I conducted backyard research and played 
the role of a researcher as a participant observer. In other words, I was an active 
member in the FA change process that was studied. The difference between this study 
and most participant observer studies, however, was that I approached my consultant role 
and researcher role sequentially. During the FA, I participated and viewed the change 
initiative as a consultant. I conducted analysis, made recommendations and implemented 
changes as part of my role as a hired consultant for the organization. Later on, I put on 
my researcher’s hat and looked back on the FA from a different perspective. I relied on 
my notes, observations, documents and reflections as a researcher to try to make sense of 
the data I had gathered, reviewed, analyzed and presented and the notes I had taken in my 
consultant role.
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In some ways, this separation between my role as a consultant and researcher was 
helpful to objectively look at the data and the findings that emerged from this change 
story. From this perspective, the analysis of narrative approach was particularly useful for 
exploring the complex nature of culture and the phenomenon of change. On the other 
hand, at times I felt removed from how I personally experienced the FA change effort, 
both as a practitioner and as a researcher. My emphasis on using the analysis of narrative 
approach may have also led me to artificially categorize some interview responses and 
distance my own personal reflections in ways that I might not of done had I followed a 
more traditional story-telling approach. In this last section, I discuss some of these 
personal reflections and observations in more detail.
Personal Reflections
As alluded to earlier, because this was backyard research, I intentionally tried to 
remove myself from this change story. I did this to highlight the primary actresses and 
their experiences in this story, as well as to minimize my bias in my role of researcher as 
a participant observer. This was my aim up to now, but clearly, my experiences and my 
role in the FA change initiative is an important part in this story. Therefore, at this point, I 
want to tell—albeit briefly—a more personal story about the FA process.
In many ways, the role of a consultant is not glamorous. Often we are asked to 
help an organization make significant change; usually this must be done under stressful 
circumstances. This often means working long hours and late nights to analyze data and 
provide recommendations within tight deadlines that often result in little recognition. 
Additionally, consultants are frequently seen as the “bad guys” or “bearers of bad news” 
who are trying to change the organization. Frequently, I felt this description matched my 
own experiences in the FA.
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Often during the FA, I felt like our team were hired hands (which, of course, we 
literally were). One reason that this status had a negative valance was that we were seen 
as dispensable by leadership. This generally created a tenuous relationship between our 
team and the leaders who hired us. On the one hand, we were hired to provide objective 
advice. One the other hand, the advice at times was painful and difficult for the leaders to 
hear. Since we knew our contract could be terminated, this sometimes made it difficult to 
say what we really felt to avoid adversely impacting our relationships or future business 
opportunities.
The role of the consultant also meant that we were hired to do the organization’s 
dirty work. This included making—and, in a sense, “owning”—some unpopular 
recommendations, such as recommendations to cut back resources and staff to achieve 
particular organizational goals. As I reflect on Heifetz’s (1994) perspective of leadership 
and change, it seems in some ways that the leaders in the organization hired consultants 
to do their adaptive work (i.e., the work that involves making hard choices and choosing 
between conflicting criteria) for them. At least two repercussions seem to result from this 
action. One is that the organization can easily reject the recommendations that the 
consultants make. Another is that the consultants can become the scapegoats when things 
aren’t going as expected. In both cases, the organization avoids the adaptive work that 
Heifetz suggests is crucial for growing and learning organizations.
In several ways, the consultant culture also affected the role I played during the 
FA. For example, my company supported the view that the client was always right. While 
this attitude was aimed at promoting client satisfaction and maintaining positive 
relationships, it sometimes resulted in constraining the advice and decisions that would 
otherwise be made.
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In summary, I felt that consultant culture influenced the role I played in the 
change process and had a significant impact on the way that I viewed the FA and 
interpreted this research study. Additionally, I also have come to appreciate the delicate 
balancing act that doing backyard research requires. The fact that I put on the researcher 
hat only after I had played an active participant role, in some ways, made it easier to 
negotiate the different roles that one must play when doing backyard research. On the 
other hand, my attempts to be as objective as I could be and keep my contributions to the 
process carefully bracketed and in the distance, certainly skewed the story that was told 
here.
Summary
This dissertation presented findings from a study about leaders’ perceptions of 
organizational culture at a combined government and military organization. Chapter 1 
provided the background to the dissertation topic, the statement of the problem, the 
purpose of the study, and a discussion of the importance of studying leadership, culture 
and change. In addition, the research questions were articulated. Finally, the significance 
and limitations of the dissertation were discussed.
Chapter 2 reviewed the relevant literature in the field of organizational change, 
culture, and leadership. This literature review laid the foundation for the study. Chapter 3 
outlined, in detail, the methodological procedures that guided the research process for this 
study.
Chapter 4 presented the findings of the dissertation through a analysis of narrative 
framework that also, at times, incorporated elements of narrative analysis. Finally, 
Chapter 5 summarized the dissertation and provided succinct direct answers to the 
research questions. This chapter also discussed implications for theorizing about
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organizational culture, implications for practice, as well as recommendations for future 
inquiry. Methodological insights—especially insights related to Polkinghome’s analysis 
o f narratives and narrative analysis distinction—also were discussed in this final chapter.
The overall results in this dissertation study—that were implicit in Chapter 4 and 
made explicit in this Chapter, include: (a) the construct of culture had been part of the 
leaders conscious and unconscious framework for most, but not all, members of the FA 
team; (b) those who used the construct attached somewhat different, although not 
completely inconsistent, meanings to the term; (c) those interviewed identified various 
mechanisms and strategies used in FA change initiative; (d) the change mechanisms used 
by FA leaders appear to be similar, although somewhat incomplete, to those used in the 
literature; and (e) most team members interviewed described being constrained in various 
ways by the existing culture despite the change strategies used. In most situations and 
especially during implementation, interviewees suggested “push back” and resistance to 
change had more to do with the culture of the military and civilian organization than with 
the adequacy of the mechanisms and change strategies themselves.
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Preliminary Study Interview Questions
■ Tell me about your role as a Program Lead/FA Team Lead during the FA Study?
■ Describe your experience of the FA Study?
■ What was the actual process of change like from your perspective?
■ What do you do to minimize change resistance? Maximize change 
acceptance/openness? (Are these the same behaviors/actions?)
■ In what ways did you see the organization support/accept or resist change during 
the FA?
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Interview Guide
Note: The following questions will be used heuristically to guide, rather than direct,
the conversation.





o Years in Organization: 
o Years in Current Position: 
o Prior Work Experience: 
o Gender:
■ Can you please draw for me a timeline from the time that you were bom until now 
and mark key moments in your life?
o Can you please tell me about each of these points.
Organization Context/Background:
■ How would you describe what life is like in this organization to someone that 
wasn’t familiar with your organization?
o Can you tell me how this organization is similar or different than 
others that you have worked in? 
o This organization is unique in that it is a combined military and 
government-staffed organization. How would you describe this kind 
of organization to someone who is has never been associated with a 
military and government-staffed organization?
■ What are things a person needs to know in order to be successful in this 
organization? How would you stay out of trouble?
General Questions About the FA Initiative:
■ What are some things people would say about the FA effort now? Would what 
they say now be different that what they would have said during the change 
process? Did what you told me represent all the different views of the FA effort 
then and now? If not, what might some of these different views be?
■ What are things people would see here in the organization now (as a result of the 
FA) that they wouldn’t have seen before?
■ What are things you would hear people say about the organization as a result of 
the FA change effort that they wouldn’t have said before?
Change Initiative Timeline:
■ Can you please draw for me a timeline from the start of the Functionality 
Assessment change initiative to the end and mark significant events that 
occurred?
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■ Please describe the significant events marked on the timeline and describe why 
you marked them [participants will be asked to point out times they specifically 
intervened in the FA change process and how].
Influential Individuals/Groups:
■ Can you please point to times on the timeline [or additional points on the 
timeline] when you specifically intervened in the FA change effort and tell me 
what you did during these interventions?
■ Are there any other individuals/groups that aren’t represented on the timeline that 
are important in the change process? If so, can you tell me about them and their 
actions?
■ Our company helped with change, did that impact you in anyway [or in any other 
ways]? Please describe.
Opposition from Individuals/Groups (Resistance Factors):
■ I’ve noticed that you haven’t said anything about people “fighting back” (resisting 
change) on your timeline? Did you experience any resistance? Can you talk 
about times when you experienced push back (or observed it with others)? [Or 
can you tell me about any additional times when you experienced push back]?
■ What specifically stands out in your mind about an event where you experienced 
resistance in the FA? Can you please describe what this was and if you did 
anything or observed others doing something about this?
■ Can you think of anytime specifically where you tried to influence 
individuals/groups that tried to oppose the FA change process? What did you do? 
What were you thinking when you took this action? Was this a routine 
[automatic] action for you or did you specifically think about and plan what you 
were going to do? What were the results—what happened?
Factors that Influenced the Change Effort (Culture):
■ You’ve talked in terms of “culture”—where did you pick this up? Can you think 
of how you were introduced to this term? What does it mean to you? In what 
specific [or other] ways did the notion of organizational culture impact your 
thinking and actions during the FA change effort?
(OR)
■ Some literature on organizational change mentions needing to attend to the 
organizational “culture” during change effort? Are you familiar with the term 
organizational culture?
o If yes: What does this term mean to you? Do you remember how you 
became familiar with the term? I was wondering if you thought in 
cultural terms at any point during the FA change effort. If so, can you 
describe your thinking and how your thinking influenced your actions? 
[Or, were the things that you thought about during the FA change 
effort, in retrospect, in any way consistent with the notion of 
organizational culture?]
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o If no: [Supply the definition of organizational culture]. Were the 
things that you thought about during the FA change effort, in 
retrospect, in any way consistent with the notion of organizational 
culture? If so, can you describe your thinking and how your thinking 
influenced your actions?
Final Question
■ Is there anyone else in this organization that I can interview that would have a 
much different view of the FA change effort than what you’ve described?
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Functionality Assessment Timeline (Reference)
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Preliminary (Pilot) Research Study Permission Letter
Captain Avila
Assistant Chief of Staff for Community Support Services 





As a former consultant with your organization during the FA project, I would like to 
request your permission to conduct a pilot study with the Support Services organization. The 
purpose of this pilot study is to conduct empirical research on leadership and the 
organizational change process. The pilot research study would help fulfill partial 
requirements in the course: Advanced Qualitative Research in the Leadership Studies 
doctoral program at the University of San Diego.
I think your organization would make a very good environment for observing the 
study in which I am interested. During the Navy’s FA Study, I was able to interact 
extensively with staff and gain first-hand experience with the Navy’s Support Services 
operations. For this study I am interested in learning how leaders respond and relate to the 
change process during a large-scale, organizational change initiative (e.g., the Functionality 
Assessment).
Methodology:
This study will be conducted using a qualitative method, with myself as the primary 
researcher. Two members from the FA leadership team will be selected for an interview. 
Selection will be based on your staff member’s availability and willingness to participate.
The interviews will be conducted on-site and will take approximately one hour to complete. 
The interviewee will be informed about the nature of the interview and purpose of the study 
prior to the interview. Documents and observation notes collected during the FA Study may 
be used to help supplement interview data and general observations pertaining to the 
research. The study will be conducted during the month of March 2003 and will focus on 
San Diego metro installations: Naval Station, San Diego; Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado; 
and Point Loma. Data collection and findings from the research will be kept strictly 
confidential and will only be used in a class presentation and research report.
If you have any questions pertaining the nature o f  this study or intended use or 
purpose, please contact me.
Sincerely,
Derek Noether
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Research Study Permission Letter
Captain Avila
Assistant Chief of Staff for Community Support Services 




Approximately one year ago, you gave me permission to conduct a preliminary 
research study with the Community Support Services organization. This research 
study allowed me to collect some initial data about organizational culture and 
leadership. These data helped me refine my research interests and focus. I am now 
ready to begin my dissertation work and would very much like to conduct this 
research in your organization.
I have selected your organization as my preferred study site because of the 
understanding I have of it. This understanding is partially the result of the research 
study I conducted last year; my work as a consultant with the FA project in your 
organization also provided additional understanding and background. My experience 
as an FA consultant also helped me develop the sort of rapport with people in your 
organization that is required to effectively execute the study I am planning. 
Consequently, I am requesting your permission to conduct a dissertation study with 
the Support Services organization.
The study will examine how leaders used the notion of culture to manage resistance 
during the earlier change process. Interviewing would be the primary method of 
gathering data. Interviews with the six members of the leadership team that managed 
the change process would be conducted. These interviews would last no longer than 
one hour each and would be conducted in a way and at a time so they did not interfere 
with the work the individuals were currently doing in the organization. In addition, 
up to six additional interviews could be conducted if any of the original six 
interviewees identify additional employees who are likely to have a different view of 
the change process than members of the leadership team have. Once again, 
interviews will be arranged so as not to interfere with interviewees current work 
responsibilities. In all instances, participation in interviews will be voluntary. On 
occasion, there may be a need to contact an interviewee to clarify a point that is less 
than clear, but these follow-up contacts normally will be in the form of brief 
telephone calls or email messages.
Participation in the study will be completely voluntary. Potential interviewees will be 
invited to participate in the study, in other words, but will be told that they have the 
option of declining the invitation. My experience in the past suggests that most
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people welcome the opportunity to talk about—and, in the process of talking, reflect 
upon—their work.
I very much appreciated the opportunity to study your organization in the past. I hope 
you will be able to give me permission to continue this work in the next stage of my 
research. The insights that this research should produce hopefully will be useful to all 
of us who work in organizations and, on occasion, must lead and manage large-scale 
change efforts.
If you have any questions, please contact me either by telephone (619.725.6797) or 
email (noether derek@bah.com). You should also feel free to contact my 
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Research Study Consent Form
Community Support Services 




I am inviting you to be a part of my research study. The purpose of the study is to 
examine how leaders used the notion of culture to manage resistance during the 
Functionality Assessment (FA) change effort.
If you agree to participate in the study, I will contact you to schedule an interview. 
This interview will last no longer than one hour and will be conducted in a way and at 
a time so to not interfere with your work. Participation in this study is completely 
voluntary. You have the option of declining to participate in this study at any time.
I hope you will be able to participate in my research. The insights that this research 
should produce hopefully will be useful to all of us who work in organizations and, 
on occasion, must lead and manage large-scale change efforts. If you have any 
questions, please contact me either at the above address or by telephone 
(619.725.6797) or email (noether derek@bah.com). You should also feel free to 
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Consent to Participate in a Research Study
A doctoral student in the Leadership Studies Program in the School of Education at 
the University of San Diego, is conducting a study of leadership’s perceptions of 
organizational change in the Commander Navy Region Southwest’s (CNRSW) 
Community Support Services (CSS) in San Diego, California. The title of the study 
is, “How Leaders use the Construct of Culture to Influence Change Resistance: A 
Public Organization Perspective”. Below are the conditions under which participants 
in the study will be evaluated:
1. Participants will be asked to share their perceptions of what they experienced 
during the Functionality Assessment (FA) Study.
2. Efforts will be undertaken to keep the identities of participants confidential. 
For example pseudonyms will be used both for the organization being studied 
and organization members who are interviewed as part of the study.
However, those familiar with the Navy’s CSS organization and the FA study 
may still be able to identify participants. Hence, confidentiality cannot be 
guaranteed even though every effort will be made to provide it.
3. Interviews will be recorded and the recordings will be transcribed; tapes, 
transcriptions, and research artifacts will be kept in a locked cabinet and/or on 
a password protected computer. Data will be destroyed five years after the 
dissertation has been completed and approved.
4. Interviews will be arranged in a place and time that is convenient to the 
participants so that they do not distract from participants’ current work 
responsibilities.
5. Participation in the study is completely voluntary. Participants can withdraw 
from the study at any time. Data collected prior to withdrawal will not be 
used unless a participant agrees to let it be used.
6. If participants have questions or concerns at any point, they are encouraged to 
contact Derek Noether (619.696.3460 or noether derek@.com) or his advisor, 
Dr. Robert Donmoyer (619.260.7445 or donmover@sandiego.edu).
7. The information collected will be used in Derek Noether’s dissertation and 
any addition publications emerging from the dissertation.
8. There is no agreement, written or verbal, beyond that which is expressed on 
this consent form.
I, the undersigned, understand the above conditions and give my consent to my 
voluntary participation in the research that has been described.
Signature of the Interviewee:_______________________________ D ate:__________
Printed Name:_______________________ Address:___________________________
Contact Information: Phone:__________ Fax:_________ E-M ail:_______________
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER NAVY REGION SOUTHWEST 
937 NO. HARBOR DR.
SAN DIEGO, C A 92132-0058 „  x n y  r e f e r  TO:
February 13,2004
To Whom it May Concern:
I, Captain Nancy L. Avila, U, S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff for Community Support Services, 
authorize and give permission for Derek Noether to conduct a research study with members of 
the Community Support Services.
I understand that the purpose of this study is to conduct empirical research on leadership and the 
organizational change process. I am aware that the research study will result in a dissertation in 
partial fulfillment of the Leadership Studies doctoral program at the University of San Diego.
I am aware that participation in the study will be completely voluntary and that the researcher will protect 
the confidentiality of participants. Also, a copy of said dissertation must be provided to the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Community Support Services when finalized.
Sincerely, 
L. AVILA 
Captain, U. S. Navy 
Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Community Support Services
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Definitions & Terminology
AS-IS -  The “AS-IS” refers to the baseline or current state of the organization.
Business Process Reengineering (BPR) -  Involves examining and changing the 
organizations fundamental business processes to ensure they are aligned with the 
organization’s mission and primary objectives.
Change Agent -  Selected organizational member with the purpose of assisting and 
guiding a planned change effort.
Change Initiative/Effort -  Generally refers to a specific project that proactively 
seeks to fundamentally change an organization.
Commander Navy Region Southwest (CNRSW) -  CNRSW is a very large 
collection of military installations (11 bases) located throughout California and 
Nevada. The CSS organization is one of the many supporting organizations within 
the CNRSW.
Southern California Support Services (SCSS) -  The CSS organization provides a 
variety of community services to military members and their families in the 
Southwest region of the United States. SCSS consists of five community support 
organizations that include: Bachelor Housing, Food Services, Military Family 
Housing, Morale, Welfare and Recreation, and Social Services. These support 
organizations represent a total annual operating budget of approximately $260 
million. Over 2,200 positions are included in the assessment, representing military 
billets and civilians supported by appropriated and non-appropriated funds.
Functionality Assessment (FA) -  A large-scale, planned organizational change 
initiative that was completed over two and one-half years, from 1999 to 2002. This 
change initiative involved five divisions in the CSS organization and included 
significant reform in operations, staff, organizational structure and facilities. The FA 
process is similar to other large planned change efforts commonly referred to as 
Business Process Reengineering (Hammer, 1993).
Large-scale, planned change -  a planned change effort that involves several people 
and has significant impact on any combination of organizational aspects including 
staff, information systems, processes, infrastructure or other resources.
TO-BE -  The “TO-BE” refers to the designs and plans (i.e., blueprint) for the future 
state of the organization.
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